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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores how the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA) is operationalised 
within an integrated statutory learning disability service and examines how the 
legislation is manifested in everyday lived experience of an ethnic minority. In 
England and Wales, the MCA established a framework for assessing cognitive 
decision-making ability with mental capacity conceptualised as 'objective', 'rational' 
and person-specific. Taking as points of departure rationality and individualism which 
are associated with Western liberal democracy, the MCA evokes interest in how the 
notion of mental capacity is understood within different cultures. In the statutory 
context, with on-going heated debates about the epistemology of mental capacity, 
there is the need to examine how professionals concretise an arguably nebulous 
concept in their roles. These aforementioned issues are addressed in this thesis 
through examination of data collected during two phases of ethnographic fieldwork in 
a London local authority. Proposing a new relational model as a theoretical approach, 
it is argued that ethnicity, learning disability, and mental capacity emanate from 
human interactions; therefore, greater attention should be paid to context and localised 
meanings to better understand how they interact in everyday living. 
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CHAPTER ONE. SETTING THE SCENE 
FOR MY THESIS 
Situated within the sociology literature, this thesis interrogates the social categories 
ethnicity, learning disability, and mental capacity. The thesis is framed within social 
constructionist epistemologies. As such it addresses the situated understandings that 
professionals formed and utilised in their statutory duties towards learning disability 
service users. The thesis also attends to institutional practices that generated and 
sustained the enactment of these three social categories in fieldwork. The Mental 
Capacity Act 2005 (MCA) in particular covers a wide range of issues which until it 
was originally proposed were believed to be governed by common law. Spanning 
private and public spheres of life, some of the matters included: whether family 
members could make decisions on behalf of each other, who could advocate for 
people considered to lack mental capacity to make their own decisions, if doctors 
could treat people in their best interest where they lacked capacity, and when 
researchers could include people unable to consent to their participation. 
The MCA affirms the right of people to make decisions for themselves but it 
also extends the duty to assess mental capacity to non-professionals. The 
empowerment of (non)professionals to assess capacity together with the increased 
role of the State in private affairs highlights the need for increased research on the 
applications of the MCA in practice. In particular, research is needed on areas such as: 
whether the MCA is operationalised holistically or discretely in statutory contexts, 
and the framework by which different professionals make decisions about which 
MCA powers or duties apply. The MCA also suggests that cognitive conditions such 
as learning disability, dementia, and brain injury are more likely to trigger mental 
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capacity assessments; therefore there is the need to address how this latter supposition 
manifests in the life of service users. 
My interest in research into applied aspects of mental capacity, ethnicity, and 
learning disability emanate from my professional and life experiences. As a Black 
British man of Ghanaian ancestry living in the United Kingdom, I confront the 
implications of my ethnicity daily. My lived experiences in London bring the social 
inequality arising from ethnic (or racial) classification to the fore of my consciousness 
and this partly influenced my choice of profession as a social worker. Whilst 
practising as a social worker it was my witnessing directly the propensity of the State 
to incarcerate young black men andlor people classified as learning disabled that 
motivated me to enrol on a Master of Research (MRes) degree to seek some 
intellectual answers. In the course of my Master's I was inspired by my tutor to 
investigate the MeA's attempt to resolve the delicate balance between care/control of 
learning disability service users (Keywood, 2(06). Thus I explored the generic impact 
of the MeA on learning disability social work in my Master's dissertation. My PhD 
research has built on my previous understandings. But I have also been galvanised 
from my discussions with advocacy groups, fellow researchers, and stakeholders to 
think differently from currently accepted conceptualisations of mental capacity as 
cognitive and individualistic. Thus as well as data gathered from months of 
ethnographic fieldwork, my life history, and experiential social work knowledge, I 
have drawn on sociological literature to compile this thesis. In the main I have been 
influenced by social constructionism in my conceptual thinking, a departure on the 
applied literature on mental capacity which draws predominantly on the disciplines of 
medicine, law, and philosophy. 
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Keeping to theme of scene setting, in the remainder of this chapter, I explain the 
MCA in greater depth. Furthermore I explain the epistemological and theoretical 
underpinnings of my thesis. Then in Chapter Two I discuss the literature on the 
concepts of ethnicity, learning disability, and mental capacity. The literature review 
chapter has been compiled from searching the Social Care Institute for Excellence 
(SCIE) database of MCA-related multidisciplinary studies I, specialist databases, and 
within journals in psychiatry, jurisprudence, and social work. I have also benefitted 
from discussions with professionals and widely published researchers in my 
substantive concerns (McManus et aI, 1998). In Chapter Three I explain my rationale 
for affiliating with the qualitative research paradigm as well as justify why 
ethnography is the most appropriate methodology for my thesis. Subsequently in 
Chapter Five, I account for my fieldwork practices. The MCA's statutory duty to 
assess capacity has led to the creation of new Research Governance Framework 
(RGF); however, few empirical studies have been conducted within the MeA's RGF 
so, I address this issue in Chapter Five. In Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight I present 
my analyses of empirical data. Lastly, I reflect on how my subjectivity shaped the 
research in Chapter Nine. As a final note, I also deliberate on the epistemological and 
methodological possibilities of relational sociology to advance future research in my 
area. Now however, as a prelude to these forthcoming sections I continue with scene-
setting by explaining the main provisions of the MCA. 
Substantive provisions of the MeA 
I <http://www.scie.org.uk/publications/mca/index.asp> (accessed on 28 July 2013 and 
regularly throughout my PhD). 
10 
In Chapter Two, I discuss the MCA's history in detail but as part of scene-setting, in 
this section, I briefly explain the reasons why a new law on consent was deemed 
necessary. The MCA was enacted because of recognised ambiguities and loopholes in 
health and social care practice around informed consent, particularly from the late 
1970s onwards. Responding to these debates, in 1989, the head of the judiciary in 
England and Wales (formerly known as the Lord Chancellor) began consultations to 
bridge these legal anomalies. Overlapping the Law Commission's work on mental 
capacity was the increasing topicality of adult protection, which was driven by 
deinstitutionalisation and the 'rights agenda' (Law Commission. 1995). Encouraged 
to move from large hospitals into the community, learning disability and mental 
health service users demonstrated previously unrecognised capacities to adapt to 
everyday living. Simultaneously, community care exposed them to new social 
demands and professional networks from which they had been denied the skills and 
knowledge to cope with, thereby heightening legal uncertainties in their care - for 
example, the question of who had the power to make decisions on their behalf in 
emergencies. Thus the MCA was designed to enshrine the principle that people have 
the right to make decisions for themselves but it also provides more robust legal and 
ethical frameworks for decision-making for those with impaired mental capacity. 
The primary legislation is augmented by a Code of Practice (Department for 
Constitutional Affairs (DCA); 2007) which explains in more practical terms how the 
Act should be operationalised in day-to-day practice: 
Everyone working with and/or caring for an adult who may lack capacity 
to make specific decisions must comply with this Act when making 
decisions or acting for that person, when the person lacks the capacity to 
11 
make a particular decision for themselves. The same rules apply whether 
the decisions are life-changing events or everyday matters. (DCA; 2007; 
pIS; emphasis added). 
The MCA is based on the functional model of assessing capacity which postulates 
that mental capacity should only be assessed where doubts arise about a person's 
mental capacity in respect of a specific issue at a particular time. The MCA is also 
based on the 'unwise' decision principle, therefore notionally, mental capacity 
assessments cannot be proposed just because of concerns about the likely 
consequences of a person's choices. The functional model is a two-stage process of 
capacity assessment. Firstly, assessors have to determine whether a person has 'an 
impairment of the mind or brain' or there is 'some sort of disturbance affecting the 
way their mind or brain works' (DCA, 2007; p41). If there is an impairment of the 
mind or brain, then there is a second stipulation that the condition should be 
impacting on the person's ability to make a decision at a particular time. In the MCA, 
the latter requirement is termed the decision and time-specific principles because it 
stipulates that mental capacity assessments should be about a particular decision; 
mental capacity should also be assessed at a discrete period of time and that one 
assessment should not influence the outcome of another. The MCA Code of Practice 
advises that professionals who assess capacity should keep formal records, however in 
day-to-day care arrangements capacity assessments need not be documented. 
Furthermore where a person has been assessed as lacking mental capacity, the MCA 
stipulates that any action done of their behalf should be in their 'best interest' or what 
'the 'best course of action' is for the person.' (Joyce, 2007; p7). 
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Advocates consider the MeA as empowering because it introduces new rights and 
duties in respect of incapacitated people. The MeA allows for advanced directives 
(AD) by which people can stipulate their wishes for a future in which they may lack 
capacity. Through ADs, people can outline medical treatments that they should not be 
subject to at a later date. In addition, the MeA empowers people to nominate others 
as Lasting Power of Attorney to prospectively make decisions about their property, 
welfare, and medical treatment. Stanley and Manthorpe (2008) also argue that the 
'time-specific' principle should be seen as beneficial to service users because it 
requires practitioners to assess capacity frequently, and at a time that the person is 
most capable. For example, if professionals know that immediately after medication a 
service user's decision-making capacity is inhibited, then they are obliged under the 
MeA to assess their capacity at a different time when they are unaffected by 
prescription drugs. Another right introduced by the MeA for service-users is that in 
such assessments, all necessary communication aids have to be provided. Upon 
'reasonable steps' being taken to establish (in)capacity people can make decisions on 
behalf of others if in their best interest and furthermore, where these decisions are to 
do with 'care and treatment' there is immunity from prosecution (Brown and Barber, 
2008). 
Aside from new formal rights, the MCA links into the broader Safeguarding 
Adults policy framework (ADSS, 2005; DOH, 2000) by seeking that 'adults who lack 
capacity to make decisions for themselves are protected from abuse.' (DCA, 2007; p243). 
Firstly, the MeA posits that people lacking mental capacity are susceptible to abuse 
and, as a result, it introduces a new crime of wilful neglect and abuse towards 
incapacitated people. Equally importantly, the MCA re-establishes the Court of 
Protection (COP) to be the final arbiter on capacity and 'best interest' disputes. 
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Therefore where statutory services and families dispute care plans, COP judges 
adjudicate on the way forward. Additionally COP appoints officers called Deputies to 
represent and look after the affairs of people who lack capacity and do not have 
family or friends. 
COP's role in the resolution of contentious mental capacity assessments has 
thrown into sharp focus the care/control role of the State. Increasingly COP is being 
drawn into ruling on cases previously regarded as outside the remit of the State. For 
instance in 2010 COP judges pronounced on whether a woman of Bangladeshi origin 
classified as learning disabled could be involved in an arranged marriage (Beckford, 
2012), an issue previously regarded as cultural practices outside the remit of statutory 
services (Clawson and Vallance, 2010; Dunn et aI, 2008; Ryan, 2012). 
In general, learning disability service users and people considered to have 
'cognitive problems' (MCA Code of Practice, DCA, 2007; p34) have been central to 
debates about whether the MCA is useful. Historically in the UK people informally 
identified as socially incompetent have also been regarded as lacking mental capacity 
to manage all their affairs and in need of 'care' (Hirst and Michael, 2010). As a result 
opponents of the functional model of mental capacity warned about the possible role 
of social stigma in assessments. As long ago as 1993, Carson argued that because 
certain social categories were associated with incapacity, the first stage of the 
functional model would create a 'diagnostic threshold' thereby increasing the 
propensity for labelling some people as incompetent. Echoing Carson's arguments, 
more recent critiques have highlighted that the functional model lacks redress against 
the ingrained societal prejudice of certain people becoming intrinsic to capacity 
assessments (Keywood, 2006). More broadly, other writers oppose the concept of 
mental capacity. Winnick (1995) for instance has raised the possibility that an 
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assessment of incapacity may become a mark of social disadvantage and impact on a 
person's sense of self-worth. 
In a more expansive sense, Carson and Keywood's work show that social 
categories are contested to some degree. For instance although learning disability is 
the statutory classification for people who are seen to display maladaptive behaviours 
or have less that average intelligence (DOH, 2001; Northfield, 2004), it is contested 
by advocacy groups. Those who oppose the category learning disability do so because 
it suggests that disability is inherent within the individual rather than caused by 
societal barriers, as implied by the social model (Stevens, 2008). As such user groups 
prefer the term 'learning difficulties', a position that I align with. However, I use 
learning disability in this thesis to reflect statutory parlance. Similarly some people 
contest official ethnic classifications because notwithstanding that conceptually 
ethnicity applies to everyone; officially, it has become associated with ethnic 
minorities and black people. This explains why the nomenclature Black and Minority 
Ethnics (BME) is prevalent in statutory social services (Mason, 2000). However the 
association of BME with black people leads others who consider themselves 'white' 
or 'Asian' to resist the category (Cole, 1993). 
Thus there is an arguable dissonance between how social categories are 
operated by statutory services and how individuals experience or articulate these 
concepts in lived experiences. Nevertheless alongside categorisation of people into 
groups of service users, statutory agencies also classify need. As a case in point, 
England's statutory guidance Fair Access to Care Services (DOH, 2003; 2010) 
stipulates four bands of eligibility, which are low, moderate, high, and critical needs. 
Therefore with social services provision, categorisation of need and people are 
interdependent in the sense that some services are only reserved for persons assessed 
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as displaying statutorily determined personal characteristics. Consequently accessing 
statutory services exposes people to official categorisations simultaneously as social 
categories are contested. To these on-going scholarly debates, this thesis adds some 
originality by showing how three social categories intersect in the sphere of service 
delivery. I accomplish this task by applying social constructionism as an 
epistemological framework for understanding how and why social categories are 
created. 
Epistemological frames: applying 
social constructionism to research 
on social categories 
Social constructionist influenced research starts from the premise that individuals 
actively create meanings in their everyday lives through their immersion in social 
networks. From this vantage point social constructionists expose the interactions that 
lead to meaning-making (Gubrium and Holstein, 2008). Applied to my research 
concerns social constructionism draws attention to the situated-meanings of ethnicity, 
learning disability, and mental capacity. This latter point entails moving away from 
any supposition that ethnicity, learning disability, and mental capacity are innate 
human qualities universally displayed independent of culture and local contexts 
(Mallon, 2007). However, my argument is not that in other societies people do not 
consider that their peers cannot make decisions for themselves or that people exhibit 
(dis)similarities. Rather as Hacking explained '[s]ocial constructionists about X tend 
to hold that: 'X need not have existed, or need not have been at all as it is. X, or X as it 
is at present, is not determined by the nature of things; it is not inevitable.' (1999, p6; 
original emphasis). Thus if X is taken to represent the substantive concerns of my 
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research then Hacking's theorisation would hold that they have to be understood as 
historically contingent exemplars of modernity within Western intellectual and socio-
political contexts. Social constructionist research involving the categories ethnicity, 
learning disability, and mental capacity, would therefore explore the developments of 
these concepts in order to explain why and how they have taken on their current 
meanings (Parton, 2(09). 
To explain how people come to embody social categories, social 
constructionists draw attention to the process of classification as a starting point 
(Keogh, 2(05). Here conceptual parameters of phenomena are mapped out through 
micro, meso, and macro interactions. As Hacking (2006) has shown elsewhere, 
classification may include medicalisation or geneticisation, whereby attempts are 
made to prove that categories are an intrinsic part of humans instead of arising from 
their social situations. With respect to ethnicity for instance, some long-standing 
research traditions still aim to show that ethnic groups have genetic lineages even in 
the face of contra evidence that intra-group differences matter as much as inter-group 
disparities (Carter and Dyson, 2011). However, notwithstanding countervailing 
knowledge, classifications can become bureaucratised 'as an objective way to 
determine who needs help, but the relation is reciprocal. The criteria used by the 
system in tum define what it is to fall under various categories' (Hacking, 2006; 
unpaginated) . 
To paraphrase Hacking, once social categories become institutionalised, 
people at the micro level define themselves in relation or opposition to statutory 
classifications. Arguably bureaucratisation also entails identification because social 
classifications become assigned to people on the basis of their apparent 
correspondence to taxonomies. At the group level individual classification attains the 
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feature of categories, whereby 'outsiders' such as professionals are imbued with 
power to group together those who are prima facia similar (Jenkins, 2(00). The model 
elucidated here is, however, not sequential: classification, identification and 
categorisation can occur synchronically through complex social and institutional 
arrangements (Hacking, 1999). 
In a contribution to social constructionists' theorisation of categories, 
Zerubavel (1996) posited that classifications are not 'out there' in the world and 
differences (or similarities) are neither as sharp nor close as we take them to be. In 
Zerubavel's model, humans are brought up to 'lump' things of resemblance together, 
thereby ignoring acute differences. Simultaneously, we 'split' things of the same 
characteristics and exaggerate their apparent anomalies. Taking learning disability as 
an example, in everyday life, professionals come across people who display abilities 
that confound the agreed conceptual parameters of the label, yet services operate as if 
everyone labelled learning disabled is similar notwithstanding their marked 
differences. An alternative example is that people of white and black parentage are 
described as black (for instance Barack Obama); in this way, they are 'lumped' 
together with black people and equally 'split' from white people even though they 
could be described as either. Zerubavel postulated that 'lumping and splitting' is a 
process of socialisation, which enables us develop shared-meanings to make sense of 
a complex world. Zerubavel' s work also implies that in our social relations we are 
continuously (re)creating conceptual boundaries of phenomena. 
The theoretical discussion up to this point suggests that social constructionist 
ideas can be usefully applied in research interested in interrogating the concepts of 
ethnicity, learning disability, and mental capacity. At one level, the concepts of 
classification and categorisation arguably support a view that the substantive concerns 
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of my research are 'constructed' because individuals (re)formulated these concepts. 
Given that at the micro level people continuously (re)create meaning of concepts and 
classifications, social constructionism enjoins researchers to attend to context and 
actions: 'the meaning of these [Le. ethnicity, learning disability, and mental capacity] 
and everything else is contingent on the actions of people, who must supply 
classifications, interpretations, and narratives to make sense of them.' (Harris, 2008; 
p233). While a convincing epistemological explanation of social categorisations, 
social constructionism has been at the forefront of the 'science wars' in which 
scholars debate the nature of reality (Hacking, 1999). As Elder-V ass (2012) shows, 
some theorisations of social constructionism take relativist positions akin to 
postmodemism to deny foundational knowledge. An avowedly relativist position is 
problematic for reasons which I now outline below. 
The meaning of 'reality' in my thesis 
Within the realm of statutory services professionals' duties and powers are set out in 
legislation. For instance Section 7(1) of the Local Authority Social Service Act 1970 
says 'Local authorities [or social workers] shall, in the exercise of their social services 
functions, including the exercise of any discretion conferred by any relevant 
enactment, act under the general guidance of the Secretary of State.,2 This later 
citation supports the view that any professional employed in statutory services 
operates within a context where their responsibilities and duties are set out: they are 
required to assess mental capacity, or meet the needs of learning disabled service 
users, or that professionals have to assign ethnicity and other social categories. Even 
if professionals can exercise some discretion when discharging their responsibilities, 
2 The National Archives <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpgal1970/42> (accessed 
20 March 2011). 
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their duties exist inasmuch as they are stipulated by laws, which professionals and 
citizens alike are mandated to follow. 
A social constructionist who has theorised about reality is Searle (1996). 
Searle proposed that the concepts of ontological objectivity and institutional facts can 
explain different conceptualisations of 'reality'. To Searle there are certain aspects of 
the world that cannot be denied. We cannot argue against the existence of mountains, 
for example, or that people use money in everyday transactions: thus mountains and 
money are 'ontologically objective because their mode of existence is independent of 
any perceiver [e.g. professional] or any mental state' (Searle, 1996; p8). Similarly we 
may conceive of statutory assessments of mental capacity or learning disability or the 
census because they occur independently of an individual's interpretation. Those 
events that occur as a result of governments discharging their functions can be termed 
"'institutional facts", [ ... ] so called because they require human institutions for their 
existence.' (Searle, 1996; p2). For professionals operating within statutory services, 
ethnicity, learning disability, and mental capacity are therefore institutional facts. 
Given the 'reality' of the statutory contexts in which social services operate, my 
research attends to 'epistemic subjectivity' (Searle, 1996) by exploring the agency (or 
discretion) that professionals and service users display within the bounded reality of 
responsibilities, duties, and entitlements provided by law. Going by Searle's 
exposition of ontological objectivity, my thesis arguably avoids the heated debates 
about the (in)compatability of social constructionism with realism (Elder-Vass, 2012). 
Through application of Searle's work my thesis sidesteps debates about the nature of 
'reality' which in any case can lead to infinitely regressing arguments about 
foundational knowledge (Delanty, 1997). 
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Social constructionists argue that institutional facts do not exist in themselves but are 
called into being through the use of language (Weinberg, 2008; p25). Consequently 
social constructionism suggests that rather than existing outside of social contexts, 
ethnicity, learning disability, and mental capacity may rather be 'language games'. 
Deriving from the work of Wittgenstein 'language games' refers to how the repeated 
use of a word or phrase leads us to believe that it has essential characteristics 
independent of ourselves (Rasalingham, 2009; p325 - 326). According to Weinberg 
(2008) 'language games' is a useful analytic tool in constructionist research because it 
highlights that 'truths' are only validated within the contexts of their application. Thus 
in social constructionist theorisations, one way by which 'reality' is created is through 
the development of common understandings and shared meanings. Recalling 
Zerubavel's notion of 'lumping and splitting' already described above, while in their 
routine practices professionals may not agree on the finer details of the concepts of 
ethnicity, learning disability, and mental capacity, they nevertheless develop working 
understandings. Consequently, how these concepts are operationalised will vary from 
service to service, hence another reason why constructionist-inspired research attends 
to context. 
The philosophical exploration of social constructionism in this section shows 
that it offers rich epistemological possibilities for my research. Epistemologically, 
social constructionism draws attention to how social interaction necessitates creation 
of individual classifications. People then become identified with such classifications 
resulting in social categories when similar people are put together as a group. Social 
categories are 'real' because once embodied, they shape how people visualise their 
identities and on the other side, how institutions mobilise and respond to individuals. 
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Using this broad epistemological framework, I have also adopted Foucault's work on 
discourse and govern mentality to theorise how social categories are actually formed. 
Theorising social categories 
In this section, I explain Foucault's theories on discourse and governmentality to 
show how they influenced my understanding of ethnicity, learning disability, and 
mental capacity within statutory contexts. Foucault's work postulated how and why 
social categories become embodied, therefore it has direct relevance for my research. 
Drawing attention to institutional processes, Foucault also explained why people 
sometimes accept instead of reject categories. In the second half of this section I also 
explain an alternative theory on social categories proposed by Van Gennep and Victor 
Turner. 
Foucault: discourse, power/knowledge, and 
governmentality 
In Foucauldian thought '[w]hat is constructed ("made") then, are "subjects", and 
Foucault means here that when human beings are "made subjects," they are also 
subjected, that is, constructed as objects of power' (Miller, 2008; p252; original 
emphasis). To Foucault, power is evidenced in many forms, one of which is 
discourse. Mills (2004, pI5) suggests that in Foucauldian thought discourse 'is 
something which produces something else (an utterance, concept, an effect) rather 
than something which exists in and of itself and which can be analysed in isolation.' 
In this sense, discourse encompasses the institutions, practices, and systems, which 
shape our perception of reality by stipulating to us how we should conceive of the 
world around us. Additionally discourses exist in multiple forms (including speech) 
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but institutions set rules of recognition and acceptance. As such in Foucault's 
conceptualisation, discourses are simultaneously inclusive and exclusive. At the same 
time as determining the kinds of knowledge accepted as truth discourses provide 
grounds for disregarding other evidence. For this latter reason, even though there is a 
multiplicity of discourses through the exercise of power, certain knowledge is 
privileged over others. 
Situating the present deliberations on Foucault's ideas within my research 
concerns, the concept of discourse potentially explains why medical model 
explanations of learning disability or mental capacity dominate the operationalisation 
of statutory services. This exposition of discourse is also helpful because it places the 
categories of ethnic minority (or BME), learning disability, and mental capacity 
within an institutional context - for example the social services bureaucracy - where 
certain understandings are privileged with concomitant procedures specified about 
how professionals should intervene. Placed within statutory contexts, the Foucauldian 
concept of discourse highlights practices such as referrals, assessments, and care 
package reviews, which result in formal classifications of service users and thresholds 
of need. 
Moving from individual reality to knowledge about groups of people - i.e. 
social categories - Foucault introduced the concept of bio-power. In one sense bio-
power is the process through which governments collate, document, and categorise 
the minutiae of subjective characteristics. There is, however, a feedback loop with 
bio-power because on the aggregation of subjective characteristics, individuals adopt 
such knowledge to regulate themselves. Thus once an individual accepts that an IQ of 
70 or less is in fact learning disability, they adopt this knowledge and accordingly act 
along the lines stipulated for those so classified. Bio-power may be summed up as: 
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One or more truth discourses about the 'vital' character of living human 
beings, and an array of authorities considered competent to speak that 
truth [ ... ] Modes of subjectification, through which individuals are 
brought to work on themselves, under certain forms of authority, in 
relation truth discourses, by means of practices of the self, in the name of 
their own life or health, that of their family or some other collectivity, or 
indeed in the name of the life or health of the population as a whole 
(Rabinow and Rose, 2006; p 197). 
As such, bio-power critiques realist ontology that social categories exist outside their 
creating discursive powers (Yates, 2(05). Drawing on Foucault, ethnicity, learning 
disability, and mental capacity may be seen as embodied categories, which are 
ascribed to people through bio-power. Firstly, 'truths' about the inherent 
characteristics of learning disabled people, or ethnic minorities, or mentally incapable 
people are privileged through discursive power. Then at the popUlation level, social 
categories (or groups) of such people are identified through the exercise of bio-power. 
The goal of bio-power however is control of populations (Mills, 2010): even if the 
intention is to help, there is a rationale to control or manage populations in order to 
efficiently organise assistance. Therefore the notions of discourse and bio-power give 
rise to questions about how much agency individuals exercise in their daily life 
because Foucault could be read as theorising that 'realities' about people are created 
by external power without their involvement (Miller, 2(08). 
Some writers have re-interpreted Foucault to argue that his theorisation of 
power allows for agency. Turning away from expositions of power as necessarily 
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oppressive, Foucault saw it as diffused, exchangeable, and requiring a body (material 
entity) to be exercised. Additionally Foucault conceptualised power as inherently 
countervailing of itself (Tremain, 2005; p4). Researchers drawing on these 
Foucauldian ideas about how people challenge dominant discourses about their lives 
focus at the micro level of lived experiences. It is suggested that in their everyday 
lives, people exercise agency by challenging externally imposed categories about 
themselves. Barron (2002) has shown through empirical research that some women 
classified as learning disabled resist the label as oppressive. Similarly, Goodley 
«2003); (Goodley and Rapley, 2002» has suggested that self-advocacy may be one 
means by which people resist being labelled learning disabled. In ethnicity research, 
inspired by Foucault, researchers have explained how in their everyday lives, ethnic 
minorities operate culture as fluid, thereby interrogating any essentialist assumptions 
about cultural identity (Kalra, 2006; Nayak, 2005). In this body of work social 
categories are accepted as 'real' albeit imposed in people's lives, and researchers 
explore at the micro and meso levels how people challenge classifications. 
In other work inspired by Foucault, researchers show that people exercise 
agency by actively co-opting discourses about their social categories. In some of the 
learning disability literature for instance, it has been shown that some groups mobilise 
around a shared and claimed sense of disability for political action (Dowse, 200 1). 
Furthermore in Foucauldian thought, individuals bearing these categories co-opt and 
accept them because there may be associated benefits. Conceptualised this way, the 
economic and social benefits (such as services, closeness to power, citizenship 
recognition) attached to service users accepting categorisations outweigh the 
drawbacks. Consequently, service-users (and their families) on occasion exercise 
power to seek (self)categories . 
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On a macro level Foucault coined the concept of governmentality to link bio-power 
to the actual practice of governing: 'the deliberations, strategies, tactics and devices 
employed by authorities for making up and acting upon a popUlation and its 
constituents to ensure good and avert ill' (Rose, 1996; p328). Similar to Foucault's 
conceptualisation of power, theorists on governmentality propose that Foucault 
conceived of government as diffused through social and professional networks, so that 
in Foucauldian thought, the State is dispersed (Rose et aI, 2(06). Researchers drawn 
to Foucault's social constructionist stance on social categorisation therefore tend to 
analyse statutory and non-governmental organisations through which State power is 
exercised 'at a distance' (Rose, 1996). This draws attention to statutory services as 
potential sites of governmentality as the former is imbued with powers and duties to 
categorise people to meet their needs. 
Foucault's work is usually applied in poststructuralist work but here, I have 
drawn on the work of Miller (2008) to explain how Foucauldian ideas relate to my 
research. While helpful, Foucault may be interpreted as proposing an ontological 
theory in which people by necessity are categorised. Paradoxically therefore, while 
Foucault's work is praised for debunking claims of objectivity, arguably it could be 
criticised for proposing a singular ontological state for humans. An alternative theory 
on social categorisation which holds that people are sometimes in-between categories 
is liminality which I have also drawn upon in my research 
Van Gennep and Victor Turner: Iiminality as 
an alternative state of being 
In their various writings on social ontology, Van Gennep and Victor Turner proposed 
the concept of liminality as useful in explaining the nature of being. Liminality 
describes the state of in-betweeness (Thomassen, 2(09); as such the concept is 
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analytically useful in researching statutory services which exist to serve particular 
social categories and thresholds of need. With regards to integrated learning disability 
services, in order to be eligible for services, a person needs to conform to the category 
of learning disability and additionally, their needs have to be determined as within the 
eligibility criteria. Statutory services operate, therefore, as if people can be identified 
neatly as either learning disabled/not learning disabled or that professionals can 
incontrovertibly determine when needs shift on the eligibility criteria. However, on 
occasions some objects, events, or even concepts do not fit into their pre-determined 
categories, calling into question the efficacy of classification systems. Van Gennep 
(1960) and Turner (1966; 1969) deployed 'liminality' to explain the transition period 
between classifications at which point things are unclassifiable and/or miscategorised. 
Van Gennep was the first to propose the ontological theory of liminality in 
'The Rites of Passage' (1960). In his theorisation of liminality, Van Gennep begins 
thus: '[t]he life of an individual in any society is a series oftransitions from one age to 
another and from one occupation to another [ ... ] progression from one group to the 
next is accompanied by special acts' (1960; p2-3). In Van Gennep's postulations, 
changeovers are always accompanied by 'rites of passage', which are ceremonies held 
to mark the occasion of change. Taking the life of a person classified as lacking 
mental capacity as a case in point, by Van Gennep's conceptualisation, such an 
individual is born into a group - e.g. people are born into families, or an ethnic group, 
or socio-economic class - and then later, the person becomes (re)categorised as an 
adult, and subsequently as incapacitated. At the point of being classified 
incapacitated, the 'rites of passage' would be the assessment (taking into account the 
functional model), during which other professionals and materials (e.g. forms, pens) 
will be assembled to declare that the person lacks capacity. Van Gennep further sub-
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categorised rites of passage into three stages; namely, separation, transition, and rites 
of incorporation, with the second stage (transition) identified as the liminal period. 
According to Van Gennep these sub-categories do not manifest simultaneously in all 
rites of passage and one stage might be more important in some cases. But within 
statutory services, people classified as disabled arguably experience all three sub-
categories: they become separated from children's services and are incorporated into a 
new system (adult services) at 18 years. In statutory services, the point at which 
children move to adult services (the liminal period) is also called 'transition' (DOH, 
2006; p14) as in Van Gennep's work. 
Whereas Van Gennep's theorisation focused on periods of transition, Turner 
explored the characteristics of people undergoing change, thereby making the concept 
of liminality even more relevant to discussions about social categorisations. Turner 
conceptualised periods of separation and incorporation in rites of passage as fixed and 
liminality as fluid: 
The attributes of liminality or of liminal personae ("threshold people") are 
necessarily ambiguous, since this condition and these persons elude or slip 
through the network of classifications that normally locate states and 
positions in cultural space. Liminal entities are neither here nor there; they 
are betwixt and between the positions assigned and arrayed by law, 
custom, convention, and ceremonial. (Turner, 1969; p95) 
Building on Turner's ideas cited above, it may be said that 'threshold people' 
defy convention because they do not fit neatly into established social categories: 
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'[t]heir condition is one of ambiguity and paradox, a confusion of all the 
customary categories' (1966; p97). 
Van Gennep and Turner's work can be criticised for viewing European 
societies as superior, hence the charge of racism can be applied to their work. 
Furthermore, their work could be interpreted as suggesting that events occur 
linearly, as in for instance Van Gennep's sub-categorisation of the rites of 
passage I have described above. Notwithstanding these criticisms, Van Gennep 
and Turner's ideas offer fruitful avenues for theorising about statutory services. 
The concept of liminality suggests there are certain service users who would not 
conform readily to categorisations. As a result of not fitting pre-allocated 
classifications, such people may provoke anxieties in professionals leading to 
their isolation from social networks. For empirical research based within 
statutory services, one line of enquiry that the concept of liminality provokes is 
professionals' action on encountering people transitioning between categories. 
Conclusion 
In this introductory chapter I have explored social constructionist epistemologies and 
used two ontological theories on social categories to set the scene for my thesis. I 
have proposed that social constructionism augmented by Foucault's concepts of 
discourse, powerlknowledge, and govern mentality offers useful ways by which 
researchers come to know or explain social categories. Researchers can gain 
knowledge about social categories by studying what people do in their everyday lives 
including discharging their duties within institutions. As they go about their routine 
activities and encounter complex worlds, according to Zerubavel (1996) and Jenkins 
(2000), people compartmentalise certain phenomena, and in time, people create 
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similarities and differences between objects (or concepts). Because we live within 
societies characterised by institutions which exercise power, people can assign 
individuals to social classifications; the latter translates into social categories if people 
are put together into groups. Foucault's ideas that I have examined above suggest also 
that agency is exercised because categories developed through institutions may 
become the yardsticks by which people self-identify. More succinctly, there is a 
feedback loop between lived experiences at the micro level and macro institutional 
discourses. In one sense however, while social constructionism may be said to be 
outlining how researchers can identify social categories, social constructionists are 
arguably proposing a theory of ontology on social categories. The latter point flows 
from the constructionist supposition that by our very natures, we engage in 'lumping 
and splitting' of concepts (Zerubavel, 1996). It is for this reason that Van Gennep and 
Turner's work also holds promise for my research for they too propose the alternative 
ontological theory that people are not necessarily always categorised because they 
periodically exist in states of in-betweeness. Having discussed the theoretical 
influences of my research, in the forthcoming chapter, I review the literature on 
ethnicity, learning disability, and mental capacity, to show how I have derived my 
research questions. 
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CHAPTER TWO. LITERATURE 
REVIEW 
This chapter reviews the literature on ethnicity, learning disability, and mental 
capacity, which are central concepts to my research. Taking into account the 
viewpoint of the research participants, my thesis explores how these three social 
categories are operationalised within an integrated learning disability service. A key 
dimension of my thesis is the institutional context of statutory services taking as a 
starting point what professionals do within their employment setting. Theoretically, 
my research is influenced by social constructionism and as such, I take as a point of 
departure that learning disability, ethnicity, and mental capacity are ideas or 
'constructions' (Hacking, 1999) which nevertheless impact on lived experiences 
(Carter and Fenton, 2010). The general approach in this chapter is therefore to chart 
how the three social categories are understood and researched, paying attention to 
how social categories become embodied categories in everyday living. 
Ethnicity, learning disability, and mental 
capacity: analysing threads 
One commonality between the categories of ethnicity, learning disability, and mental 
capacity is that they are relatively new concepts. Historically in the UK, people 
judged to have maladaptive behaviours or below-average intelligence have been 
described pejoratively (Wright, 20(0). The Mental Deficiency Act 1913 marked the 
first attempt at classification based on the new pseudo-science of eugenics and the 
development of tools to 'measure' intelligence (Race, 2002). However the term 
'learning disability' was first used by Samuel Kirk at the beginning of the 1960s in 
the United States of America (USA) (Scanlon, 2005) and it is now the accepted 
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statutory term in the United Kingdom (UK) (DOH, 2001; 2(09). Even taking into 
account the classification systems enshrined in the 1913 legislation learning disability 
and mental capacity have been informally seen as indicating peoples' cognitive 
capacities. 
However in liberal democracies (e.g. the UK) the capacity to make decisions 
assumed socio-political, legal, and ethical importance. O'Shea (2011), writing about 
the history of consent, noted that one characteristic of modernity in Europe was that 
governments derived their legitimacy from the consent of the population instead of 
from God. According to O'Shea the English civil war caused a break with the notion 
of divine right of sovereigns to rule without their population's consent, a revolution 
given further impetus by the American Declaration of Independence in 1776 which 
stated that '''Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from 
the consent of the governed." (cited in O'Shea, 2011; p12). Thus liberal democracy 
arose from the idea that people could chose those who ruled them at free and fair 
elections during which individuals considered information, weighed up their options, 
and arrived at rational decisions about who should govern them. Therefore implicit in 
the conduct of democratic elections is the supposition that voters have mental capacity 
thereby leaving aside '[the] question: how and to what extent can a section of the 
citizenry, identified by impairments in their intellectual functioning, participate in a 
defining activity of a democratic society, namely voting in a general election?' 
(Redley, 2008; p375). 
The assumption that citizens in liberal democracy have mental capacity 
additionally underpinned the notion of informed consent which also required that 
doctors sought patients' explicit agreement before medical treatment (Buchanan, 
2004). Specifically, within the UK, from the 1980s onwards it became clear through a 
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serious of judicial decisions that legal ambiguities existed around informed consent. 
In respect of medical treatment, it was noticed that informed consent was underpinned 
by common law instead of codified legislation (Gruhh, 1998). As such doctors could 
be charged with battery in certain situations if they treated patients without their 
consent (Wilson, 1996). During the case of Re F (1990), at the same time as 
authorising the forced sterilisation of a woman presumed to lack capacity to consent, 
the House of Lords also recognised that however beneficial, no one had the legal right 
to make decisions on behalf of another person. 
With growing pressure for clarification of the legal framework in England and 
Wales, the Law Commission began consulting in 1989 on a new law on informed 
consent; however, it was only in 2005 that MCA was enacted. The MeA's long 
gestation highlights how complex the issue was regarded at the time, as well as the 
on-going demographic changes likely within the nearly 20-year period of 
consultation. In the time that it took to enact the MeA, mental capacity came to the 
fore in other Western countries. Demographic changes (ageing population and altered 
family structures), increasing stress on human rights, medical advances, and 
reconfiguration of learning disability services from institutional to community 
delivery led to the groWIng prominence of mental capacity (Carney, 1997: Glass, 
1997; Hale, 1997). Consequently the concepts of mental capacity and learning 
disability may be seen as historically contingent within liheral democracies - for 
example, the UK, USA. Canada, and Australia - which are also regarded as Western 
or populated mostly by white people. This raises questions about how the concepts are 
understood or operationalised by people of different cultures or how heing seen as 
ethnically different influences (self)categorisation (Biswas and Bhaumik, 2003; Mir et 
aI, 2001; O'Hara, 2003). 
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Because the MeA is law, it can be said to have formally constructed the social 
classification 'mental capacity' (Jenkins, 2000). which historically has been 
informally associated with the classification 'learning disability'. My research is 
motivated by the need to understand the role of statutory services - a site of power -
in the lives of those categorised as mentally incapable (or learning disabled) who are 
ethnically different. Through statutory services, UK governments have imbued 
professionals with powers, duties, and technologies to categorise service users with 
the view to meeting their needs. One such category is ethnicity, which I now expand 
upon in Part One. 
Part One. Ethnicity 
People (self)categorised as ethnically different from the dominant white population 
were involved in my fieldwork; consequently, the concept of ethnicity is important to 
my analyses. Framed around the question 'what is ethnicityT, in this section, I 
explore the relevance of the sociology literature on ethnicity for my research. 
The multiple dimensions of ethnicity 
In sociology, it is now accepted that ethnicity is a socio-political construction 
emanating from human interactions (Alexander, 2006). Drawing on social 
constructionism Moore (2003a) identified three ethnicity models, namely: 
primordialism, modernism, and mobilisationism. Primordialist models consider 
ethnicity a consequence of long-standing historical and 'archetypal traits' amongst a 
group of people. Moore argues that this model is outdated because it implies that 
ethnicity is static whereas in his view, most researchers now consider ethnicity 
formation a dynamic and fluid process. As a result, the modernist model is preferred 
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because it captures the 'dialogical and relational" nature of ethnicity (Moore, 2003a; 
p93). Here, because of prevailing social tensions, ethnicity is created as a means of 
including 'us' and excluding 'them'. Extending this line of thinking. in the 
mobilisationist model, ethnicity is another tool in the prevailing group conflict over 
resources. Sometimes this approach is referred to as the instrumental model (Fenton, 
2003; p98). 
Moore's exposition of ethnicity is characteristic of the sociology literature 
which although orientated towards social constructionism nevertheless emphasises the 
'reality' of the situations leading to ethnicity's creation. Thus. it is assumed that there 
are real, tangible, and visible markers such as how people dress, their religious 
practices, skin colour, and customs which coalesce into ethnicity. In the quest for 
power, actors mobilise the symbolic markers to create 'them' and 'us'. As a further 
clarification Jenkins (2008) distinguished between 'groups' and 'categories'. In the 
former individuals believe that they share similarities (be it physical appearance, 
history, ancestry, culture) whereas in the latter, people are characterised as identical 
by 'outsiders'. One way by which the State categorises is through census whereby 
people select from prior classifications. In the UK official ethnic categorisation 
includes Black and Minority Ethnic (BME), or ethnic minority (Aspinall, 2002; Cole. 
1993; Mason 2(00). 
There are conceptual difficulties however with nomenclature. Taking 'ethnic 
minority' as a case in point, Mason (2000) notes that it is generally applied to people 
without white skin tone: in this sense, it is now replacing 'race', which is discredited 
for assuming that skin colour reflects genetic differences between people. Besides. 
where people are offered the opportunity to describe their ethnic identity in their own 
words, they employ divergent terminology from official categories. Aspinall (2012) 
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conducted a survey of 326 young people in which they were asked to describe their 
ethnicity using their own terms instead of selecting from prior classifications. 
According to Aspinall only 14 respondents referred to their skin colour preferring 
instead to highlight their mixed heritages. Interestingly most of the options on census 
forms are based on skin tone so from Aspinall's survey it may be concluded that self-
identities do not always match official categories. 
Mirroring the structure/agency debate, the issue of individual/group identity is 
also important to conceptual explorations of ethnicity. If ethnic identity exists, then by 
corollary, there is the need to address the structural (group) or agency (individual) 
contexts of its formation. Jenkins (2008) argues that groups and categories are always 
implicated in each other's formation: identifying your similarities through social 
interaction necessarily requires labelling the Other. As the interactional, spatial, and 
conceptual differentiation of the Other is on-going, group boundaries are always 
fractious and in-being. An alternative view from Jenkins' is that ethnicity need not 
emanate from groups. According to some writers, ethnic groups do not exist in and of 
themselves; instead, it is what people do and the choices they make that produce 
outcomes identified as ethnic relations: 
[T]he mobilisation of ethnic identities is relational [ ... ]: we do not 
therefore belong to groups, we (occasionally, often, sometimes, never) 
relate to significant others, in specific social contexts, by drawing on 
available identities including ones which could plausibly be called 
"ethnic". Crucially some particular cultural attribute or performance 
takes on special significance in creating and sustaining the social 
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boundaries between people. (Carter and Fenton, 2010; p5; emphasis 
added). 
Echoing the above, Brubaker takes issue with the notion of 'groups.' In his view, 
groups are socially constructed: their boundaries and (di)similarities between 
members are enacted. By 'invoking groups, they [powerful actors] seek to evoke them, 
summon them, call them into being. Their categories are for doing--designed to stir, 
summon, justify, mobilize, kindle and energize.' (Brubaker, 2002~ p166; original 
emphasis). Brubaker, therefore, challenges any assumptions that there are 
collectivities which fonn 'naturally' to be identified as ethnic groups. Brubaker may 
also be taken as arguing against any supposition that, empirically, it is possible to 
detennine such entities called 'groups'. Thus groups are socially or conceptually 
constructed. The discussion to date suggests heated conceptual debates about the 
nature of ethnicity, which are also paralleled by contentions about how ethnicity can 
be operationalised in field research. 
Operationalising ethnicity 
In the UK, contravening Brubaker's postulation of 'ethnicity without groups' the 
category of BME collectivises ethnic minorities and has consequently become 
synonymous with ethnicity (Mason, 2(00). What Brubaker calls group-thinking 
therefore underlines researchers' operationalisation of ethnicity: research in ethnicity 
is arguably underpinned by an assumption that there are social groups who fonn the 
basis of collective ethnicity identities. Ethnicity may be conceived in temporal or 
spatial terms (Malesevic, 2011). In temporal terms people identify their ethnicity by 
recourse to historical lineage whereas in spatial terms, ethnicity is assigned to people 
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on the basis that they inhabit a smaller geographical and statistical space within a 
bigger white political entity. Thus, despite convincing evidence that ethnic minorities 
have lived in the UK for centuries (Dabydeen et aI, 2010), their historical lineage in 
the UK is constructed as emanating from post-war immigration, and in spatial terms, 
they are simultaneously considered a smaller unit of a bigger white population. 
Conceived of as a group, people become reified into the category of BME which is 
conceptually predetermined (as in the census). 
Influenced by group-thinking, empirical studies have operationalised ethnicity 
or BME either through the researcher assigning ethnicity to the participants or 
accepting ethnicity that has been self-defined (Ellison, 2010). These, however, give 
rise to other complications. To start with, where researchers assign the participants' 
ethnicity, they replicate some of the conceptual difficulties I have discussed above 
because ethnicity can refer to skin colour, place (or country) of origin, geographical 
space, religion and culture. Without asking participants, researchers risk erroneously 
assigning ethnicity on the basis of visible markers such as skin tone, name or 
religious/and cultural practices. Studies adopting researcher-assigned ethnicity are 
therefore in danger of conceptual conflation and to mitigate this, participant self-
identification is advised (Bradby, 2003). However not every participant may be able 
(or want) to self-identify - for instance not every person communicates 
"conventionally". If self-identification is the methodological approach then people 
assessed as lacking mental capacity for instance may not be regarded as capable of 
understanding their culture, historical lineage, or the totality of their ethnic identity. 
Furthermore people may change their ethnic self-identification over time 
depending on circumstances and timing. As an illustration of the latter point, a person 
identifying as Black British of Ghanaian origin may decide to self-classify as solely 
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Ghanaian if in Ghana. Arguably, in effect, any attempt to research ethnicity through 
self-identification risks conceptual reification. The charge of reification is particularly 
difficult to escape in ethnicity research where people are at the sharp end of socio-
economic inequality. Motivated by a desire to effect political change researchers may 
need to present marginalised people as a group, and communities may need to form 
political alliances on the basis of static categories (Banton, 2005). Therefore, in 
applied research, participant self-identification could lead to reification and we may 
perceive a disjuncture between current substantive understandings of ethnicity as a 
fluid concept, and praxis requirements for a static ethnic category. 
Arguably, however, the issues of reification and conflation can be addressed if 
ethnicity is seen not as inherent within groups or individuals but as emanating out of 
social relations. A relational approach draws our attention to the conclusion that, 
essentially, ethnic categories are lived in day-to-day interactions (Stanfield, 2011). 
In my research I have conceived of ethnicity as emanating from social 
relations. Adopting Brubaker"s model of ethnicity without groups (Brubaker. 2002). 
in my conceptualisation, a person's ethnicity is not derived from their incorporation 
within a group of people similar to themselves because the group dissolves to be 
replaced by an individual acting out their ethnicity in given contexts: '[0 ]ne might just 
as well speak here of negotiations or conversations; the underlying idea would remain 
the same regarding the primacy of contextuality and process in sociological analysis.' 
(Emirbayer, 1997; p290; original emphasis). Flowing from Emirbayer's idea is the 
implication that we are all ethnic minorities depending on context: a white person 
could be a minority in Britain if they found themselves in a room of ethnically-
different people and vice versa. More importantly, in such a context, the white 
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person's ethnicity does not dominate; rather different ethnic relations beyond the 
whitelblack or majority/minority dyads emerge. 
Contravening the on-going epistemological debates I have outlined above, 
there seems broad agreement in the sociology literature that culture is analytically 
central to discussions about ethnicity (Gunaratnam, 2003; Mac an Ghaill, 1999; 
Nagel, 1994). In my research I employ culture as another analytic thread between 
ethnicity, learning disability, and mental capacity. This is because the concept of 
culture leads to allied questions about how people of different ethnicities 
conceptualise learning disability, how people in different cultures relate towards 
individuals so classified (Jenkins, ]993; ]998), and how culture impacts on decision-
making (Bekker et aI, ] 999; Garro, ] 998). 
Exposing culture 
Culture is considered a difficult concept to define because it is now employed in all 
disciplines. A helpful starting point, however, is Wuthnow et al (1984; p3): '[culture 
is] the symbolic-expressive aspect of human behaviour. This definition is sufficiently 
broad to take account of the verbal utterances, gestures, ceremonial behaviour, 
ideologies, religions, and philosophical systems generally associated with the term 
culture'. Some writers suggest that we are living the 'cultural turn' (Murji and 
Solomos, 2(05) by which it is meant that having previously been the predominant 
concern of anthropology (Faubion, 2(01), culture, with its attention to meaning-
making is now analytically central to all social science research (Alexander, 1996). 
In his analysis of the conceptual relevance of culture to ethnicity, Malesevic' 
(2011) argued that 'ethnicity can never be reduced to culture, neither can it be 
explained without extensive reference to culture [ ... ] Although ethnicity is not culture 
there is no ethnicity without culture' (p77). Malesevic"s exposition is helpful because 
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he located culture within the political, suggesting that individuals call on their cultural 
markers within spaces of socio-economic and structural change. In this sense culture 
is a social construction. Groups can create markers to delineate themselves during 
structural changes or powerful actors can make claims on behalf of a group from the 
State, which in tum can accede or resist these requests (Nagel, 1994). 
In a contribution to the discussion Dewalt et al (1998) proposed that culture 
has explicit and tacit elements. The explicit parts of culture are visible, for instance: 
costume styles, food consumed, social norms, and artefacts. In contrast '[t]acit aspects 
of culture largely remain outside our awareness or consciousness' (p260). Dewalt et 
aI's point is that culture consciously and/or unconsciously drives actions and that 
aspects of culture include what people routinely do in their lives. The concept of tacit 
culture further suggests that in decision-making people may draw on an internalised 
way of doing things within their social networks, which may be based on kinship or 
more formal professional ties. Relatedly the notion of culture also implies shared 
values which guide actions at the micro, meso, and macro level. Thus culture 
encompasses what people do in their everyday lives, including patterns of behaviour 
within organisations which lead to taken-for-granted knowledge and localised re-
interpretation of social customs (Kunda, 2002; Taylor, 2004). As Soy sal noted 
'[c]ulture has become the commonsense in ordering, organising and managing the 
world (2009, p5; original emphasis). 
Summary 
Placing the literature revIew within sociology, I have shown that conceptually, 
ethnicity emanates from social relations. There is a consensus that the concept of 
ethnicity exists inasmuch as it is debated as an idea and people are (self)categorised as 
such. Within the UK 'ethnic minority' or 'BME' applies to people different from the 
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dominant (usually white) population. These aforementioned concepts are also 
contested: firstly, because they treat people of different cultures as a group, and 
secondly, because they are considered a euphemism for "race: I have also shown that 
there are convincing arguments for researchers in ethnicity to focus on the individual 
rather than groups as the unit of analysis in ethnicity research (Caughey, 2006) 
because such an approach recognises individual agency to affect their identity. Having 
discussed ethnicity in Part One, I now explore how the concept of learning disability 
has been operationalised in statutory services and how this impacts on lived 
experience. 
Part Two. Learning disability 
My aim in Part Two is to situate my thesis within the multiple research and policy 
agendas in learning disability. Firstly I explain how learning disability became 
formalised as a statutory imperative. Then, influenced by Graham (2010, p141) who 
argues that 'the everyday lives of people defined as having learning disability have 
been adjusted for the realisation of governmental values', I show how top-down 
classifications influence lived experience. By necessity this means that I have to chart 
some policy (r)evolutions within learning disability statutory services to identify the 
context of my research. From the institutional standpoint, I discuss integrated 
services, the site of power (Rose, 1996) for categorising and managing the lives of 
people classified as learning disabled. Then I discuss supported living and risk which, 
being policy strands in adult social care, also impact on the lived experiences of 
service users. 
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Learning disability: a historical overview 
Since the post-war period in the UK learning disability has been operationalised 
through statutory services, making the point of service delivery important to research. 
The key legislation is the 1970 Local Authority Social Services Act which led to the 
formation of local authorities' Social Services Departments (SSDs), and the 
professional title 'social worker' (Buchanan, 2011). Contemporaneously there was 
increasing stress on deinstitutionalisation and equal rights of learning disability 
service users and SSDs were charged with moving people classified as learning 
disabled from long-stay institutions into the community (Atkinson et aI, 1997). In the 
1990s Conservative governments implemented the 1990 National Health Service and 
Community Care Act (NHSCCA). The thrust of the NHSCCA was an ideological 
need to introduce 'market forces' into adult social care and SSDs were re-organised 
under the policy of care management (Lewis, et aI, 1997). While previously SSDs had 
a duty to assess need and provide services, from the 1990s onwards, they were 
required to split their functions between assessments and commissioning of services. 
Where needs were identified by SSDs they would 'purchase' learning disability 
services within a mixed economy of provision from voluntary, statutory, and private 
organisations (Cambridge et aI, 2005). The publication of Valuing People (DOH, 
200 1; P 14) signalled new policies of promoting service users' independence and 
choice but community care and marketization were maintained (DOH, 200 1; 2009). 
The historical overview of the policy and concepts of learning disability here 
is aimed at showing the continuities of the past with the present and their influences 
on research agendas. Bearing in mind that learning disability is a social category, one 
strand of current research agenda involves interrogating the label 'learning disability' 
either from medical model or social science perspectives. My thesis takes a social 
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science perspective and is anchored in the tradition of exploring society-person 
interactions. 
Agendas in learning disability research 
In this section, I expand further on research agendas in learning disability with the 
following issues in mind: 
• How and why researchers seek to understand the lives of people classified as 
learning disabled. 
• In the post-war period policy has aimed at integration of health and social 
services (Wistow, 2012), therefore I address the rationale and methodologies 
for studying integrated services. 
• Substantive and methodological agendas in researching how current policy 
imperatives around adult learning disability services are achieved. 
Researching the lived category of learning disability 
Substantive aims in researching learning disability from social science perspectives 
have changed alongside consensus on effective methodologies. This is not to say that 
these changes occurred sequentially but rather, at 'moments' in time, researchers 
become occupied with some substantive concerns which they believe can be answered 
with particular methodologies (Denzin and Lincoln, 2003). In the immediate post-war 
period researchers sought to understand how deinstitutionalised people lived in the 
community. Edgerton (1984; 1993) and Atkinson (1985) are recognised as 
methodological innovators in deinstitutionalisation because unusually for research on 
learning disability at the time, they adopted qualitative (ethnographic) methods taking 
a longitudinal approach (Jenkins, 1993). Following these original works, there 
emerged another substantive agenda in learning disability research aimed at 
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interrogating the category 'learning disability.' Arguably this new research direction 
arose through a convergence of theory and politics. Theoretically, postmodernism, 
poststructuralism, and social constructionism which all aimed to challenge 
foundational knowledge and the possibility of unitary identity attained credence. 
Simultaneously, the social model of disability was gaining prominence. Although 
aimed at situating disability as a societal rather than an individual phenomenon and 
thereby politicising the debates (Oliver, 1992; 1996; 1998), the social model 
nevertheless inspired researchers to question the category 'learning disability' . 
For instance Siminski (2003) employed quantitative methodology to show that 
'disability is socially derived' (p711) by analysing data from the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics' 1998 Survey of Disability Ageing and Carers. Goodley (200 1) conducted 
an ethnography of a self-advocacy group which was inspired by the social model and 
poststructuralism. From this study, Goodley argued that 'Impairment [including 
learning disability] is social not the product of isolated individual pathologies.' 
(p22 1). Similarly drawing on 'feminist poststructuralism' and using a life story 
approach, Roets (2009) argued that through self-advocacy, people labelled learning 
disabled were active agents in constantly challenging 'the dominant master narrative 
about them' (P697). 
In one sense my research departs from the traditions discussed up to now 
because I pay relatively more attention to the statutory and institutional contexts 
leading to learning disability classifications. In another sense however, my research 
keeps to the substantive agenda in the social science literature on learning disability 
around: the need to interrogate the category and the need to understand how people so 
classified live. Moreover my research explores how current policies on learning 
disability, which aim to enhance service users' 'rights', 'independent living', 'control 
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[over their lives]' and 'inclusion' (DOH, 2009; p. 29) are actualised in service users' 
lives (Fyson and Kitson, 2007; Graham, 2010). A key policy in this regard is 
independent living which includes supported housing. In the next section I explore the 
literature on supported housing, which was the site for my fieldwork with a service 
user. 
Understanding supported housing 
After gaining credence in the 1990s, supported housing became a central plank of 
policy for service users to attain increased choices, independence, and social inclusion 
(Kinsella, 2(09). 
Supported housing is typically accommodation where an individual has a 
tenancy agreement with the landlord of the property. Care and support is 
provided to an individual in their home either by the landlord or by 
another organisation(s) or through a completely personalised 'bespoke' 
arrangement. (DOH and Housing Options, 2010; p6) 
The key criterion for supported housing is that service users sign a tenancy agreement 
(Fyson et aI, 2(07). Therefore mental capacity is important to the present discussion 
because service users have to understand the implications of their choice of 
accommodation and tenancy. 
Although important to current policy in learning disability, the dearth of 
empirical studies on the daily life of service users in supported housing is also 
recognised (Bond and Hurst, 2010; Simmons and Watson, 1999). The few studies 
have shown that the term 'supported housing' can refer to many types of tenancies 
sometimes indistinguishable from residential living. For instance McConkey and 
Collins (201 0) found in their study that that 30 people lived in the same 
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accommodation; however, because they all had individual tenancies, they were 
classified as supported tenants and not institutional residents. In terms of 
methodology, a review of the international literature on supported housing by Kozma 
et al (2009), which built on earlier work by the same authors (Beadle-Brown et aI, 
2007) is worth further discussion because it includes relatively recent studies and a 
large number of papers were re-analysed. Kozma et al (2009, pJ95) found that most 
papers utilised quantitative methodology: 'In most studies (66 of 68) investigators 
took a quantitative approach, using a variety of instruments. People with intellectual 
disabilities had virtually no input into the design of studies.' While helpful in 
evidencing trends quantitative methods nevertheless do not fully capture the detail 
and minutiae of everyday lives of service users (Shaw and Gould, 200 1). 
The literature reviewed here suggests the need for critical research exploring 
the lived experiences of supported tenants. Researchers need to observe the everyday 
lives of tenants to understand how the policy aims of 'independence', 'choice' and 
'inclusion' are actualised. While researchers have studied how choice is 
operationalised in learning disability, these were within residential homes (Antaki et 
aI, 2009; Dunn et aI, 2008; 2010), hence the need for research sited in supported 
living where the policy framework is explicitly geared towards enabling service users' 
'independence'. The literature reviewed here also highlights the need for qualitative 
approaches: methodologically, as 'choice' and 'independence' are value-laden 
concepts, qualitative rather than quantitative methods may be required (Moriaty, 
2011). Having so far discussed learning disability from the lived-experience 
perspective, I now want to shift focus to another substantive concern - i.e. the point of 
service delivery - since the second site of my fieldwork was an integrated learning 
disability service. 
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Researching the integration of learning disability 
services 
Learning disability is a social category operationalised by statutory services through 
integrated services. Integration of the National Health Service (NHS) and local 
authority social services has been a longstanding policy aim since the post-war period 
(Wistow, 2012). It is assumed that integration increases choice of services by 
changing the spaces within which social care is delivered: 'This co-location of 
services will make easier the joint assessment of patients' needs.' (DOH, 2000; p71). 
Services' integration has occurred along a continuum: in 'full' integration 
statutory services combine their physical and organisational spaces, and budgets. On 
the other hand 'relative autonomy' refers to informal coordination between services 
(NHS Confederation, 201 0). Furthermore, different terminology is applied to 
professional practice within integrated services including: 
• Interdisciplinary working: where there is full integration and distinct 
professionals with their own identities work in a coordinated manner towards 
an apparent single goal. 
• Inter-professional working: distinct professionals work in separate teams but 
with formalised processes for sharing information and working. 
• Multi-professional team: a group of professionals working together but 
maintaining distinct professional identities (Nancarrow et ai, 2012; p12 -16). 
In the integration literature the models of professional practice within integrated 
teams identified by Nancarrow et al are used inter-changeably, making it difficult to 
identify the organisational context of studies. Furthermore, even though integration 
has been a long-standing policy aim, there is little agreement on what constitutes an 
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integrated service. Also, there are on-going debates about the efficacy of joint-
working. I address these issues in more detail below. 
Substantive agendas in integration research 
Perhaps due to frequent organisational changes in adult social care (Duffy et ai, 
2010), most of the literature focused on structural integration and its impact on 
outcomes for service users (Ham and Oldham, 2009; Syson and Bond, 2010; 
Humphries and Curry, 2011). A strand of the literature on structural integration 
addressed economic costs and benefits; sometimes concluding that financial savings 
can accrue (Turning Point, 2010). The literature on outcomes for service users also 
recorded ambiguous findings. From their evaluation of two integrated services, Davey 
et al (2005) noted that integration led to increased communication between 
professionals; however, this did not sufficiently impact on outcomes for the older 
people involved in the study. The lack of consensus on the benefits of structural 
integration led Cameron et al (2012) to conclude after a systematic review that 'the 
evidence base [for the benefits of integration] is patchy and more research is required 
to sharpen and broaden our understanding of these outcomes' (p 18). 
Where ostensibly focused on the impact of integration on front line practice, 
studies rarely mentioned the reality of daily social care practice. Instead they focused 
on possible conflicts between different professions. Maslin-Prothero and Bennion 
(2010) noted confusion between social workers and medical staff about their roles and 
responsibilities, leading to conflict between managers. The British Association of 
Social Workers (BASW) reported concerns among members about dominance of 
health professionals and ethos in management of integrated teams (Godden, 2012). 
Sometimes concerned with the erosion of social work values within integrated teams, 
researchers took a defensive posture to argue for the (potentially) unique contribution 
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of social work (Herod and Lymbery, 2(02). Few studies focused on how professionals 
within integrated services cooperate. Additionally, the rare studies taking joint-
working from the point of view of social workers tended to be based within older 
people's services (Emilsson, 2013) or in adult mental health (Bailey and Liyanage, 
2012; Liyanage, 2012). However, notwithstanding the many policy changes in service 
delivery, learning disability remains the responsibility of social services (DOH, 2001; 
2009; Stevens, 2004), which are increasingly provided through integrated teams 
(Appleton, 2(09). Therefore, there is the need for studies sited within integrated 
learning disability teams. 
There is sparse literature on empirical studies which were situated within 
integrated learning disability services, and/or focused on exploring what professionals 
conceive their duties to be towards service users, with the MCA as context. Arguably 
in order for this knowledge gap to be addressed, there is a need for research 
methodology such as ethnography that will enable researchers to observe the minutiae 
of practice and service users' everyday lives over a period of time (Shaw and Gould, 
2(01). My research addresses these gaps in the integration literature. 
Within the broader context of this chapter, the literature reviewed to date 
shows that in the post-war period, statutory services have been important institutional 
contexts for categorising people as learning disabled and meeting their assessed 
needs. Additionally some social science literature seeks to interrogate the category of 
learning disability by understanding people's lived experiences, or their social 
situation (for example, housing, employment prospects, and leisure activities). In 
policy terms it is now agreed that those categorised as learning disabled have equal 
rights to choice and independence (Lawson et aI, 2(08) and the MCA is conceivably 
part of the same human rights agenda in social services (Joint Committee on Human 
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Rights (JCHR), 2(08). In the upcoming section, I argue that any research on learning 
disability within a statutory setting also has to pay attention to risk because the latter 
is now a pre-occupation of statutory services (Titterton, 2(05). 
Operationalising risk in social services 
It is now recognised that 'risk might be regarded as being everywhere [in statutory 
services], but perhaps nowhere properly understood.' (Warner and Sharland, 2010; 
pI035). By this latter point research in adult social care has to address understandings 
and operationalisation of risk in statutory services. Therefore, my research 
investigates perceptions of risk within my fieldwork sites. In this section, I explore 
three theoretical approaches to risk namely realism, cultural/symbolic, and 
governmentality perspectives (Lupton, undated)3, and how they have influenced my 
research. The cultural/symbolic and govern mentality perspectives are broadly social 
constructionist and have enabled me to understand and explain my fieldwork data, 
critique practice, and form alternative explanations to operationalisation of risk within 
my research sites. This is because in the main, social constructionist theorisations of 
risk attend to how wider socio-cultural practices and localised meanings shape 
individual (or collective) interpretations of risk (Lupton, 1999). On the other hand, the 
realist literature suggests that risks exist in service users' lives (Webb, 2006); as such, 
I have utilised this theoretical approach to foreshadow actors' motivations for action 
within my research sites. 
3 From webpage <http://www.academia.eduI75796111 Sociology and risk> (accessed 
24 April 2013). 
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Realism, risk, and policy responses in social care 
From the viewpoint of statutory services, Kemshall et al (1997) proposed that a realist 
understanding of risk underscores service provision. Diminishing funding for 
statutory services has resulted in more stringent eligibility criteria, which in tum have 
culminated in two developments. Firstly, professionals have to concentrate resources 
on the neediest; the flipside of this is the requirement to assess those who would be at 
most risk without services. Secondly, organisations have responded to less funding by 
developing better systems for resource allocation, and concomitantly better risk 
assessment tools. These two issues led Kemshall to conclude elsewhere that: '[t]he 
identification of risk and the categorisation of risks into thresholds for intervention 
and service delivery have become key mechanisms in the rationing of scarce social 
care resources.' (Kemshall, 2002; p82). Kemshall' s theorisation, therefore, ties risk 
with needs assessments. In policy terms, people classified as learning disabled are 
viewed as 'vulnerable' because they are deemed more likely to face risk (JCHR, 
2(08), or be mentally incapable (Brown, 2011) thereby triggering the need for State 
protection (MCA Code of Practice, 2(07). 
A by-product of the realist supposition that service users face risk in their lives 
is that a strand of the literature attempts to quantify the probability of some service 
users being victims or propagators of risk. Some studies suggest people classified as 
learning disabled are more likely to commit arson or sex offences (Barron and Banes, 
2004; Lambrick and Glaser, 2004). By contrast other writers argue that learning 
disability service users are susceptible to abuse (Calcrafi, 2(07) depending on the 
following: managers' decision-making, the knowledge and aptitude of care staff, the 
behaviour of service users (whether with 'challenging' behaviours or not), and the 
design of the built environment (White et aI, 2007). Of the abuse that learning 
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disability service users are more likely to suffer, sexual abuse has been highlighted 
(Mitchell and Glendinning, 2007), although this stance is challenged for implying that 
learning disability service users are inherently vulnerable (Hollomotz, 2009). 
Based on these realist assumptions, in statutory services actuarial tools have 
been developed to help professionals predict risk to certain service users (Royal 
College of Psychiatrists, 2008). Implicit here is that professionals, being more capable 
of processing risk-associated information, are better risk assessors than lay people 
(Stalker, 2003). As such professionals are imbued with duties and powers to assess 
and manage risk. The distinction between power and duty is important because with 
the former, practitioners can exercise discretion in their situational responses whereas 
with the latter 'local authorities [social workers] have no choice to do something as it 
is imposed by law. No allowance for shortfall of resources is acceptable, although 
professional discretion may inform the manner in which the duty is informed 
[discharged]' (Gaylard, 2011; p20). In the next section, I explain professionals' duties 
where abuse is suspected in adult services. 
Policy responses to risk and vulnerability in adult services 
In policy terms where risk is deemed 'real', the term abuse is used to denote its 
operationalisation: 
[A]buse' covers a wide range of actions. In some cases, abuse is clearly 
deliberate and intentionally unkind. But sometimes abuse can happen 
because somebody does not know how to act correctly - or they haven't 
got appropriate help and support. It is important to prevent abuse, 
wherever possible. If somebody is abused, it is important to investigate 
the abuse and take steps to stop it happening. (DCA, 2007; p244) 
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In the quote above, based on the assumption that abuse exists, professionals are 
enjoined to 'prevent' abuse or investigate where reported. Policy responds further by 
categorising abuse into the following: financial, physical, sexual, psychological, 
neglect and 'acts of omission' (MCA Code of Practice, 2007; p245). Furthermore, 
statutory guidance, No Secrets (DOH, 2(00), mandates agencies to establish joint 
procedures for responding to 'alerts' that an adult is at risk or has been abused. 
However, although concerned with wider strategic and organisational issues, No 
Secrets does not prescribe procedures for investigating reports of abuse (Fitzgerald, 
2(08). 
Faced with the absence of a codified statutory framework in safeguarding 
vulnerable adults (Law Commission, 2(08), statutory agencies draw on a mixture of 
piecemeal legislation and inter-agency procedures (Naylor, 2010). One such inter-
agency procedure is the 'London multi-agency policy and procedures to safeguard 
adults from abuse' (SCIE, 2011; p51-102), which outlines a seven-stage sequential 
model cited below: 
1. 'Alert' - This is the reporting stage of abuse. 'Alert' may be from the 
public, other agencies andlor professionals. 
2. Referral and decision - Formal notification through documentation, and 
at this stage, the notified organisation decides its response. 
3. 'Strategy discussion or meeting' - Inter-agency discussions between 
professionals to plan a response to an 'alert.' If it is decided that further 
investigation is required, a lead investigator will be assigned. 
Alternatively it may be decided that the alert is more a criminal matter, 
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in which case it is referred to the police or that no further action is 
warranted. 
4. Assessment and investigation - Further details sought about the nature 
of risk posed/faced. 
5. Case conference and protection plan -Winding down of investigation at 
a multi-agency meeting; plan formed about how to protect the victim -
the Protection Plan. 
6. Monitor and review - Inter-agency meetings to discuss the progress of 
the Protection Plan. 
7. Closure of the Safeguarding Adult process. 
Spanning through this sequential model is risk assessment: 'Risk assessment is 
integral to the whole process of safeguarding and is specifically concerned with the 
identification of specific risks to a person covered by the Safeguarding Adults policy 
and procedures.' (SCIE, 2011; p50). Furthermore, the SCIE procedures show that 
each stage of the model depicted above has allotted timescales for their completion, 
and although roles are assigned for all statutory agencies, social workers are usually 
the lead professionals in safeguarding work. The discussion up to date suggests, 
therefore, that any research situated in social services would need to take risk 
perceptions as one of the contexts of the study because professionals have a duty to 
assess and manage risks. 
Problematising the realist literature on risk 
Some drawbacks in the realist literature are identified in terms of conceptualisation, 
methodology, and substantive concerns. Some researchers take issue with how the 
realist literature conceptualises risk within statutory services. For instance there is 
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lack of service user involvement (Wallcraft and Sweeney, 2011; Duffy and Gillespie, 
2009) especially learning disabled people; and there is little knowledge of how 
professionals' and users' ethnicity impact on risk assessments (Mitchell and 
Glendinning, 2(07). With regards to quantification of risk susceptibility of learning 
disabled service users to crime, there are heated methodological debates. Some 
writers argue that prevalence rate of crime committed or suffered by learning 
disability service users depends on inter alia whether people accessing services are 
included, whether an IQ measure of intellectual disability is applied, and how 
'offence' is categorised (Simpson and Hogg, 2001; Lindsay, 2(02). Thus there is a 
complicated picture around how to determine whether learning disability service users 
are at risk of perpetrating or being victims of crime. Research on the use of risk 
prediction tools also highlights the need to attend to professional discretion. As a 
further elucidation of this latter point, Kemshall (201 0) reports that professionals 
rarely use the actuarial tools for risk prediction in the ways intended because they 
prefer narrative case analyses instead of formal calculations. Equally, other studies 
show that professionals sometimes circumvent actuarial tools on moral grounds 
(Broadhurst et aI, 2010), or on the basis that risk assessment procedures are 
substantively and systematically ineffective (Fish et aI, 2009; Munro, 2005; Munro 
and Hubbard, 2011). Holland et al (2002) therefore enjoin researchers to focus 
primarily on the social processes that lead to risk (categorisations) instead of debating 
what crimes are suffered or committed by learning disability service users. My 
research responds to the call by Holland et al. I have focused on the organisational 
processes by which service users become identified as 'criminals' or 'vulnerable' 
using social constructionist perspectives on risk which I outline in the following 
section. 
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Social constructionist perspectives on risk 
In my research, I have utilised social constructionist perspectives which include 
cultural/symbolic and governmentality approaches as conceptual tools to explore 
fieldwork data. Following a distinction by Lupton (1999), social constructionist 
perspectives on risk can be placed along a continuum with 'weak' and 'strong' 
versions on either end of the scale. In the 'weak' version it is argued that risk exists 
but is only identified or actualised within wider macro structures. Considered within 
the setting of statutory services, the weak version would hold that what is categorised 
as risk is the outcome of professional and service user interaction mediated by 
institutional contexts. 'Strong' versions of social constructionism postulate that 
everything we take for granted in the world emanate from social relations (language, 
meaning, and institutional contexts) rather than exist independently of our perceptions 
(Kitzinger, 2000). Thus the 'strong' social constructionist theorisation of risk takes a 
more relativist stance on the meaning of risk than 'weak' social constructionism 
(Lupton, 1999; p30). 
'Strong' social constructionism: governmentality and risk 
According to Taylor-Gooby and Zinn (2006, p408) 'govemmentality approaches posit 
risks as entirely constructed, the product of social processes which enforce particular 
power relations'. Brought to theorisations of risk, governmentality perspectives take 
two analytic standpoints. Firstly, there is attention to broader socio-political concerns 
with controlling the population (Rose, 1999; Rose et aI, 2006). Secondly, attention is 
paid to the micro-location of professionals (or experts) within a nexus of domination. 
Advocates of governmentality also posit that in addition to external control, power 
creates conditions and knowledge for people to engage in self-regulation: power is 
'already 'out there' in the patterning of social practices and discourses, acting 
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through, and able to steer, the capacities of individuals to act as if for themselves' 
(Tew, 2006; p35; original emphasis). The governmentality thesis on risk therefore 
seeks to uncover the means (or technologies) by which issues or people become 
categorised as risk(y), and the feedback loops through which such knowledge is 
adopted by individuals to self-control (O'Malley, 2009). 
One strand of the governmentality thesis is thus concerned with interrogating 
how individuals' personal characteristics and history are accumulated through 
technology, and how this enables statutory service to engage in surveillance of those 
deemed 'at risk' (Yar, 2003). Influenced by governmentality, Parton (1998; 2008; 
2009) has written widely about the changing nature of children's social work practice. 
Whereas previously social workers were mandated to intervene where children were 
in danger, currently professionals are charged with 'prevention' of future bad 
outcomes on the basis of government identified 'risk factors' to children's 
development. Parton's criticism lies in how these perceived risks have been actualised 
through technology (Parton, 1998). 
The relevance of the govern mentality perspective on risk for my research is 
that it is an alternative theoretical view to the realist underpinnings of risk 
conceptualisation in statutory services. Whereas the latter holds that risk inheres 
within the personal characteristics of service users - for example, learning disabled 
people as 'vulnerable' - the former posits that vulnerability is an entirely constructed 
concept to manage service users' needs. Influenced by governmentality, in my quest 
to understand lived experiences, I have taken as a starting point that externally created 
categories of abuse may not necessarily resonate in the day-to-day lives of service 
users or professionals. The governmentality literature also highlights the need for my 
research to pay attention to the social, spatial, and organisational contexts which lead 
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to individuals or events being categorised as 'at risk.' However, arguably, given its 
focus on macro-social processes, governmentality perspectives may not fully account 
for how externally-derived categories become embodied and actualised in people's 
everyday lives. For this reason I have also been drawn on theorisations which focus 
on how subjective meanings translate into perceptions of risks. 
'Weak' social constructionism and risk 
One strand of the 'weak' social constructionist literature focuses on socio-cultural 
understandings of risks. This thesis is influenced by the work of Mary Douglas (1985; 
1992) who wrote extensively about how given societies develop a shared 
understanding of risk. A key tenet of Douglas' work was that risk is a means by which 
cultural groups insulate themselves from the Other - '[ w]hat is selected in a 
community to be labelled as 'risks' are phenomena that in some way threaten moral 
principles' (Lupton, undated; p13)4. As such, Douglas drew attention to the shared 
cultural understandings which led to the development and maintenance of perceptions 
of risk within a given society. According to Douglas, one way by which cultures 
police their ethical boundaries is through the adoption of taboos. 
Douglas (1979) defined a taboo as 'a ban or prohibition' within a certain 
culture (p72). However what is forbidden is so taken for granted within a given 
society that members hardly question the reasons why. According to Douglas taboos 
are also a system of classification drawn upon to make sense of a complex world: 
behaviours or events which are collectively regarded as harmful to the moral 
sensibilities of the community are categorised as taboo areas and banned. But in order 
4 From webpage <http://www.academia.eduI7579611l Sociology and risk> (accessed 
24 April 2013). 
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to hold the system of classifying taboos turns 'into automatic psychological reflexives 
[ ... ] Taboos bar the way for the mind to visualize reality differently' (Douglas, 1979; 
p7). Douglas' theorisations of risk offer conceptual tools for my research because she 
may be said to take a middle ground between the governmentality and realist 
positions. Douglas took a realist position on risk but drew attention to cultural 
context: 'Note that the reality of the dangers is not at issue [ ... ]. This argument is not 
about the reality of the dangers, but about how they are politicized.' (Douglas, 1996; 
p29). Douglas' aim was to expose how local meanings formed about a given 
phenomenon and the cultural practices that sustained their interpretation as risks 
(Lupton, 1999). Another area where Douglas' work has been useful is her postulation 
that what becomes identified as risk is necessarily accomplished through social 
processes (Elliot, 1983). In this respect, service users and their families as well as 
professionals actively engage in constructing or resisting risk. 
Douglas' theorisation of taboos arguably highlights the psychodynamic aspect 
of risk conceptualisation. Thus in contrast to the suppositions of the realist literature 
of context-free risk assessments, emotions may lie at the heart of whether people 
assign or take risks (Zinn, 2006; Gillies, 2011). Anxiety about blame for 'failure' 
could mean that social workers operationalise a low risk threshold while, on the other 
side, service users may become unpredictable if fearful of constraining professional 
intervention (Stanford, 2012). Furthermore, with people holding different subjective 
interpretations of risk, there is the need to understand the rationale for action as well 
as professional discretion in the face of statutory procedures (Broadhurst et al, 2010; 
Evans, 2012). 
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Summary 
Here in Part Two, I have reviewed the literature on learning disability to identify 
substantive and methodological issues for my research. I argued that learning 
disability is a social category underpinned by statutory classifications and 
operationlised within the context of integrated learning disability services. While 
service integration has been the hallmark of social policy since the post-war period, 
there has been little research on inter-professional relationships within integrated 
learning disability teams, and how they contribute to the discharge of statutory duties 
under the 2005 Mental Capacity Act. Furthermore whereas the current policy aim is 
'independent living' (DOH, 2009) there is little empirical research in how having 
supported living accommodation as a home enhances service users' choice and 
inclusion. Finally, I also discussed the literature on risk given the acceptance that 
safeguarding is now a key policy drive in adult learning disability services (ADSS, 
2005). In reviewing the literature on risks, I acknowledged that my research is 
influenced by realist and social constructionist perspectives. As a final note to Part 
Two, I want to argue that within the context of social services research on risk, my 
'paradigm proliferation [is] a good thing to think with' (Lather, 2006) for two reasons. 
The realist position arguably defines the context that professionals work within; hence 
in order for me to appreciate the rationale for their actions, I need to understand that 
body of work. Having done so, I applied social constructionist perspectives to analyse 
data and critique practice. In Part Three, I discuss mental capacity, which is also 
relevant to my research. 
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Part Three. Mental capacity 
In Part Three, I discuss the literature on mental capacity arguing that realism 
underpins current understandings of mental capacity both as a concept and an entity 
that can be measured. In so doing, I position my research as a critique of present 
theorisations of mental capacity. 
Conceptualising mental capacity 
An examination of the metal capacity literature should move between the general and 
the particular because UK literature and English law have been influenced by wider 
international debates. Generally there are four qualities associated with mental 
capacity - understanding information, appreciating information, reasoning, and 
evidencing a choice (Saks and Jeste, 2006) - and according to Berghmans et al 
(2004), this conceptualisation can be credited to the work of American scholars Roth 
et al (1977) and various works by Appelbaum « 1998,2007,2010); Appelbaum and 
Grisso (1995), Appelbaum et ai, 1998). 
There are on-going debates about the meaning and credence of each of the 
four qualities identified by Appelbaum - for instance whether 'understanding' should 
be prioritised over 'appreciation' of information (Dunn et aI, 2006). Furthermore each 
legal jurisdiction interprets differently the four qualities Appelbaum and colleagues 
associated with capacity. Taking the MeA as a case in point Appelbaum and Grisso's 
qualities 'appreciate' and 'reason' are substituted by 'use' and 'weigh' (Owen et aI, 
2(09). But despite the divergent jurisdictional interpretations, there is a growing 
consensus amongst international scholars about the epistemological underpinnings of 
mental capacity (Bergh mans et aI, 2004). To start with, being rooted in liberal 
democracy, mental capacity is underpinned by the conception of an atomistic 
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individual who is capable of making decisions 'rationally'. As such it is also assumed 
that mental capacity can be 'objectively" assessed. In addition, there is a legal 
presumption that adults have capacity, which should be task and decision-specific. 
These premises of mental capacity also imply that decisions with riskier consequences 
require more rigorous tests of capacity and vice versa. Two further areas of consensus 
are that capacity involves a normative judgement by an assessor in the sense that they 
have to judge whether the assessee has 'good enough' capacity. 
It is also generally accepted by international scholars that laws on mental 
capacity should be predicated on functional models of assessment (Wong et aI, 1999). 
In other words, mental capacity should only be assessed if doubts arose about a 
person's ability to perform a specific function at a discrete time period. In England 
and Wales, the MCA is based on the functional model: therefore, before a person's 
capacity is assessed, there should be some evidence that they may not be able to make 
a decision. To assess people's mental capacity, the MCA outlines the following tests: 
'a person is unable to make a decision for himself if he is unable-
(a) to understand the information relevant to the decision, 
(b) to retain that information, 
(c) to use or weigh that information as part of the process of making the 
decision, or 
(d) to communicate his decision (whether by talking, using sign language 
or any other means).' (MCA Section 3 (1), The TSO, 2007; p2)5. 
In addition to the tests of capacity outlined above, the MCA is underpinned by 
five principles: 
5 < http://www.1egislation.gov.ukJukpga/2005/9/pdfs/ukpga 20050009 en.pdf> 
(accessed on 12 June, 2013). 
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1. A person must be assumed to have capacity unless it is established that 
they lack capacity. 
2. A person is not to be treated as unable to make a decision unless all 
practicable steps to help him to do so have been taken without success. 
3. A person is not to be treated as unable to make a decision merely 
because he makes an unwise decision. 
4. An act done, or decision made, under this Act for or on behalf of a 
person who lacks capacity must be done, or made, in his best interests. 
5. Before the act is done, or the decision is made, regard must be had to 
whether the purpose for which it is needed can be as effectively achieved 
in a way that is less restrictive of the person's rights and freedom of 
action. (TSO, 2007; pI9) 
Arguably the most important of the above are the 'best interest' and 'unwise decision' 
principles. The former is seen as being a 'more objective' way of assessing a person's 
preferences and requires the decision-maker to use a check list to detennine 'best 
interest' (Brown and Barber, 2008). According to Dunn et a1 (2007) 'best interest' is 
based on the assumption of individualisation because assessors have to take only the 
person's preferences rather than that of their family or community into account. The 
'unwise decision' principle on the other hand is supposed to reaffinn the primacy of 
autonomy because it focuses on the process of assessing capacity instead of the 
outcome of a person's choices (Wong et aI, 2000). Thus if after an 'objective' 
assessment a person's mental capacity is established, then their right to make any 
decision however unconventional or 'unwise' is enshrined in law. 
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The discussion above on mental capacity shows several strands of research with 
accompanying gaps in the literature. Broadly, there are on-going philosophical 
discussions about the nature of mental capacity and why individual autonomy should 
be the primary concern (Buchanan, 2004; Code, 2011). However, arguably, a 
drawback of the philosophy literature in general is the lack of empirical research on 
how people understand the yardsticks of mental capacity enshrined in the MCA. 
While influenced by the philosophical debates, empirical researchers have sought to 
develop tools to ascertain (or judge) capacity in different populations but such 
research can also be criticised for ignoring the role of values and emotions (Charland, 
2011) in decision-making and taking it for granted that mental capacity exists .. 
Agendas in mental capacity research 
One strand of the empirical literature seeks to develop and test instruments capacity 
assessment tools in different population categories. Within learning disability research 
where classification is dependent on IQ scores (DOH, 2001), the substantive agenda is 
an exploration of the links between IQ scores and (in)capacity (Arscott et aI, 1999; 
Gudjonsson, 1992; Gudjonsson et ai, 2000; Wong, 2000). Since the advent of the 
MCA Dye et al (2007) have ascertained the capacity of 'mild to moderate' learning 
disability service users to consent to participate in research. The research was based 
on the hypothesis that people would demonstrate capacity if visual aids were provided 
and fewer demands made on their memory. One of the findings of the study which 
the researchers described as 'counter-intuitive' was that providing visual aids and 
making fewer demands on the participant's memory did not enhance their capacity to 
consent. The disproving of their initial hypothesis led the researchers to question the 
efficacy of instruments used in appraising capacity to consent and more broadly 
'suitability of current concepts of the capacity to consent being applied to all 
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situations in which people with intellectual disabilities need to make decisions' (2007; 
pI73). 
Nevertheless there are many instruments for evaluating mental capacity: for 
instance in two systematic reviews Owen et al (2006) and Okai et al (2007) 
respectively identified 16 and 29 different tools for assessing capacity in psychiatric 
contexts. Similarly Appelbaum (2007) and Lee (2010) have proposed tools for 
assessing capacity in medical treatment, dementia, and older people. The MacArthur 
Competence Assessment Tool-Treatment (MacCATT-T) is however described as 'a 
gold standard' (Breden and Vollman, 2004) for capacity assessments because it 
ascertains all four benchmarks of capacity and its reliability has been widely tested. 
Stemming from the proliferation of capacity-assessment tools, it is noteworthy that 
there are many synthesising literature reviews on capacity assessment research. 
Sturman (2005) reviewed the literature on studies reporting evaluations of 12 
instruments for assessing capacity and Dunn et al (2006) reviewed 23 instruments for 
ascertaining consent for clinical treatment and research. Although these tools are 
considered improvements on 'subjective' assessment, it is also recognised that they 
emanate from the narrow contexts of capacity to consent to research and treatment 
(Kapp, 2007; Moye and Marson, 2007), whereas everyday events are innumerable. As 
such there is a gap in the literature on how people understand and conceptualise 
mental capacity in their everyday lives as opposed to theorisations derived from 
testing people within the limited confines of hospitals or research settings. 
Specifically in England and Wales, this limited context is a major drawback because 
the MCA has expanded the areas in which capacity should be assessed thereby 
highlighting further the need for research on every day (non)professional 
understandings and operationalisation of mental capacity. 
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Furthermore the review of the literature on mental capacity assessment tools above 
shows that their use involves some normative judgement on the part of the assessor, a 
point recognised in English law (District Judge Ashton, 2012). Here the MeA's test 
of capacity can be used as a further explanation of why mental capacity assessments 
are not wholly objective: an assessor has to determine 'on the balance of probabilities' 
what constitutes 'understand' or 'use' or 'retained' (MCA Code of Practice, 2007). If 
capacity assessments involve subjective assessments, then by extension, the social 
contexts of mental capacity tests as well as power issues have to be taken into account 
in the discussions (Glass, 1997); however, this is rarely attended to in the empirical 
literature. One study which explicitly set out to address 'context' is Olumoroti et al 
(2007) who used one woman as a case study. The researchers described the life story 
of the patient as well as their medical condition in a vignette, and asked various 
medical practitioners to assess the woman's mental capacity. But in this research 
context was operationalised akin to a patient's life (or medical) history. Thus in their 
operationalisation of 'context' Olumoroti et al (2007) wrote about the social 
background of the person being used as the case study and they also described the 
mental illness that led to their hospitalisation. While the definitional difficulty of 
'context' is recognised, usually institutional features, social processes, and the views 
and meanings multiple actors bring or take from a given situation are regarded as 
important to delineating 'context' in empirical social science (Holstein and Gubrium, 
2004; Shaw, 2007). Thus, those who oppose current conceptualisations of mental 
capacity argue that present theories do not take adequate account of the social 
contexts that lead to capacity assessments. 
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Critiques of mental capacity 
One critique of the liberal democratic legal framework of mental capacity - and 
therefore by extension the MCA - is Kerzner (2011). Kerzner's position is that 
because liberal democracy places moral value on autonomy and choice those assessed 
as incompetent have their freedoms constrained because they are deemed incapable of 
choosing. In Kerzner's view, instead of assessing mental capacity to choose, it would 
be more desirable for people with disabilities to have their legal capacity enshrined in 
legislation: 'legal capacity as [ ... J a social and legal status accorded independent of a 
person's particular capabilities [such as mental capacity]' (2011; p14). In place of 
mental capacity, a model of 'supported decision-making' is proposed whereby it is 
assumed that all people can make decisions, and that what is required is assistance to 
do so. Inspired by Kerzner's work, in my fieldwork, I sought to understand the care 
arrangements that arose within a context in which a service user's capacity was not 
assessed, but their carers operated on the basis that they had capacity to make 
decisions. 
Unlike Kerzner, some writers agree with the principle of mental capacity but 
oppose current theorisations. Charland (2011) for instance takes issue with the 
exclusion of emotions from the benchmarks of capacity, noting that people draw on 
emotions in their decision-making. Tan et al (2006) also question the cognitive 
suppositions of current theories arguing that they are unable to capture the unique role 
of values in decision-making. Based on a mixed methodology study of patients 
diagnosed with Anorexia Nervosa, Tan et al found that patients passed the 
competency tests using MacCA IT yet they did not want to eat. The researchers 
explain this contradiction between the participants' competence (on MaCA TT) and 
their opposition to food through the medium of values: although competent, the 
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patients did not value survival and therefore did not want to eat. Tan et ai's research is 
therefore an argument for the benchmarks of capacity to be widened beyond cognition 
to include human values. While Tan et aI's research is an interesting contribution to 
the literature their arguments could be used to circumvent the unwise decision 
principle of the MCA. For instance professionals might force-feed people reluctant to 
eat on the basis that they did not have the "right" values about food. Nevertheless Tan 
et al are arguably the first researchers to consider the interaction between mental 
capacity and values. As such, their work provokes curiosity about how the MCA is 
operationlised within social work, a profession which explicitly espouses a value-base 
(Adams et aI, 2002; Payne, 2(05). 
Finally, some critiques have started from the premise that mental capacity is a 
concept developed within Western (and by implication Euro-centric) legal traditions; 
therefore, their empirical research has sought to ascertain how the benchmarks of 
capacity apply in other cultures. In a review of instruments for assessing mental 
capacity in North American hospitals, Cattarinich et al (2001; p1476) noted 'most 
instruments possess two flaws: their content is not culturally informed and may not be 
relevant, and/or their form (i.e., structure) does not lend itself well to the assessment 
of Aboriginal seniors [ ... ]'. Issues such as differences in the interpretation of body 
cues, and a cultural disposition among Canadian Aborigines to downplay their 
knowledge could not be captured by the instruments reviewed by Cattarinich et al. In 
the Australian literature attention is also drawn to the inefficacy of capacity- assessing 
instruments with Aborigines (Clements et aI, 2010). LoGiudice et al (2006) reviewed 
some tools for assessing capacity in Australia and noted their cultural 
inappropriateness: whereas not all Aborigines were conversant in English, the 
instruments assumed that assessees were literate in English; and the conceptual 
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meanings of time, space, and number they took for granted were understood 
differentl y in Aboriginal culture. 
Within the context of the MeA, some writers recognise that mental capacity 
may be understood differently by some ethnic minorities (Shah and Heginbotham, 
2008; Shah et aI, 2(09). While for instance 'best interest' is underpinned by 
individualism, 'in cultures and communities where the hierarchy of the family is 
important, where decisions about individuals can be made by those higher up the 
family hierarchy the individualistic nature of the Act can clash with some cultural 
traditions.' (Myron and Kalathil, 2008; p26). The possibility of cultural issues 
impacting on capacity assessments also suggest that service users' articulation of their 
mental capacity may be as valid as professional opinion (Higgs, 2004). These issues 
have led to calls for alternative theoretical and methodological (qualitative) 
perspectives in mental capacity research (Bergh mans et aI, 2004). Furthermore, there 
are calls for the under-representation of ethnic minorities in capacity research to be 
redressed (Moye and Marson, 2(07). My research responds to these recognised gaps 
in the literature through an in-depth study of everyday activities within an integrated 
service and supported living accommodation taking into account culture. It may be 
said that my research is unusual in mental capacity because it adopts ethnographic 
methodology, and it is contextualised within statutory social services. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have reviewed the literature on ethnicity, learning disability, and 
mental capacity, which are three central concepts to my research. Under the 
epistemological framework of social constructionism, I have argued that these three 
concepts are historically-contingent, and developed within Western socio-political 
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and intellectual traditions. 'Learning disability' replaced pejorative tenns 'idiot' and 
'imbecile' while ethnicity is currently preferred to 'race' because it is now accepted 
that phenotypes (including skin colour) do not necessarily reflect genetic differences 
(Carter and Dyson, 2011). Ethnicity is therefore now regarded as a social category 
(Banton, 2011). Similarly I have argued that even though there have been 
longstanding interdisciplinary discussions about mental capacity in the UK, the MCA 
established it as a social category by stipulating its existence and offering guidance on 
how capacity can be assessed. Overall the literature reviewed suggests the need for 
research into how these social categories impact on lived experience but for different 
reasons. There is a vast body of sociological literature which mostly addresses 
ethnicity qua ethnicity, hence the recent call for (re)focusing on the impact on lived 
experiences (Carter and Fenton, 2008). One way forward is empirical research based 
within statutory settings where 'street-level bureaucrats' allocate State resources 
(Lipsky, 1980). Similarly with learning disability, there is an increasing call for 
researchers to understand how current policy aims of independent living and choice 
are actualised in the everyday lives of those so classified (Graham, 2010). In terms of 
the MCA, it is a relatively new piece of legislation with few empirical studies 
conducted on its operationalisation. In paying attention to mental capacity, ethnicity, 
and learning disability in my research, I am also inspired by Hacking (1999) who 
argues that in lived experience, constructed social categories intersect. 
Final note: (re)situating culture within mental capacity, 
and learning disability research 
In the MCA Code of Practice it is theorised that culture impacts on decision-making: 
'[b]e aware of cultural, ethnic or religious factors that shape a person's way of 
thinking, behaviour, or communication. For example, in some cultures it is important 
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to involve the community in decision-making.' (DCA, 2007; p33). As the MCA Code 
of Practice is statutory guidance it stands to reason that professionals are mandated to 
apply its theorisation of culture in their assessment of mental capacity. However 
within the MCA literature, arguably no research has explored the interaction between 
culture and mental capacity within statutory settings (Myron and Kalathil, 2(08). To 
address the aforementioned gap in the MCA literature, the anthropology literature 
may provide conceptual tools and methodological inspiration - i.e. ethnography. 
Anthropologists have explored how cultural practices impact on decision-making (for 
instance Hunt and Mattingly's collection of papers in 1998). Culture matters to 
discussions about mental capacity because it provides a 'lens' through which actors 
interpret the world (McCracken, 1986), classify themselves and others, and choose 
between available options. 
In respect of the learning disability literature, there is a strong case for 
(re)inserting culture into on-going substantive discussions. That 'learning disability' is 
interpreted differently within distinct cultures is agreed upon (Jenkins, 1993; 1998); 
however, other anthropologists argue that in certain cultures, people so classified are 
not necessarily regarded as lacking mental capacity (Whyte, 1998). Within the UK, it 
is noted that culture is rarely discussed in the learning disability literature (Hubert, 
2(06). Furthermore in debates about disability culture, sociologically-inclined 
researchers conceive of disabled people as a group who face a 'disablist dominant [i.e. 
white] culture' which the former opposes (Riddell and Watson, 2003). Thus 
paradoxically, while in UK statutory services culture is seen as the preserve of ethnic 
minorities (Jeyasingham, 2012), the disability culture literature rarely features the 
position of ethnic minority disabled people. 
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CHAPTER THREE. RESEARCHING 
LIVED EXPERIENCE THROUGH THE 
QUALITATIVE PARADIGM AND 
ETHNOGRAPHY 
In this chapter, I situate my research within the qualitative paradigm and introduce 
ethnography as the overarching methodological framework. To achieve my research 
aims I carried out ethnographic fieldwork in two phases: the first phase was based 
within an integrated learning disability service, and phase two was a case study of a 
service user living in supported accommodation. The case study is embedded within 
the methodological framework of ethnography. This chapter is divided into two parts: 
in Part One, I discuss the qualitative research paradigm and identify ethnography and 
case study research within the tradition. In Part Two, I discuss ethnographic data 
analysis and representation with the aim of showing that researchers are enjoined to 
identify their subjectivity in the text. To contextualise the main discussions of this 
chapter on qualitative research and ethnography, I want to firstly explain my research 
questions. 
Deriving my research questions 
In this section, I revisit some of the discussions in the previous chapter to anchor my 
research questions in recognised gaps in the literature. Starting with ethnicity, it is 
generally recognised that whether self-imposed or attained through categorisation by 
powerful actors, ethnic classifications impact on resource allocation; however, there 
appears to be a disjuncture in the sociology literature. One strand of the literature 
addresses ethnicity qua ethnicity but at the expense of material and social 
consequences of ethnic categorisations (Carter and Fenton, 2010). On the other hand, 
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the applied literature struggles to avoid reification (Ellison, 2011) and as such does 
not reflect current substantive understandings of ethnicity as fluid. These two gaps in 
the literature have influenced my research interests. I want to address how ethnic 
categorisations impact on the decision of 'street level bureaucrats' (Lipsky, 1980). 
Within this broad area of interest, I have also empirically addressed the following two 
sub-questions: 
• How do professionals articulate the concept of ethnicity and how does this 
shape their practice decisions? 
• From service users' viewpoints, what are the impacts of professional 
decisions-making arising from their conception of ethnicity? 
In respect of learning disability, statutory services are increasingly delivered through 
integrated services whether these are informal arrangements between different 
agencies or more formal organisations which pool together budgets and locate staff in 
the same space. But as evidenced from my literature review there are gaps in the 
literature about how integrated services operate. With the MeA as a backdrop, I am 
interested in: 
• The internal composition of an integrated learning disability service and how 
its structure impacts on the discharge of duties under the MeA. Who makes 
decisions about which duties to discharge; is the MeA implemented wholly or 
discretely and how are such judgements made? 
• The literature review showed that risk is a prime concern of statutory services: 
how does this relate to the MeA? What understandings of risk are propagated 
by professionals and service users? 
• Lastly, how are all these substantive concerns manifested in the lives of 
service users? 
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To answer these questions above I situated my research within the qualitative 
paradigm and adopted ethnographic methodology. 
Part One. The qualitative research 
paradigm 
Paradigmatically, both quantitative and qualitative approaches have been applied in 
researching social categories. However quantitative approaches are criticised because 
being primarily interested in the statistical correlations, they take social categories as 
starting points, thereby frequently leaving them (un)interrogated (McCall, 2005). As 
such the qualitative paradigm is preferred in researching how social categories 
emanate within relations and how they are operationalised in statutory contexts. 
Arguably qualitative research is suitable for understanding social categories because, 
among other aims, it seeks 'an in-depth and interpreted understanding of the social 
world of research participants by learning about their social and material 
circumstances, their experiences, perspectives, and histories' (Moriaty, 2011; p2). 
In qualitative research 'researchers study things [or people] in their natural 
settings, attempting to make sense of, or to interpret, phenomena in terms of the 
meanings people bring to them.' (Denzin and Lincoln, 2003; p5). In doing so, 
advocates of the qualitative paradigm seek to understand phenomena from the 
viewpoint of the main actors, which in tum leads to at least two implications. Firstly, 
the need to understand subjective viewpoints makes qualitative research particularly 
suitable for studies which seek to explore concepts and substantive issues at the level 
of lived experiences. Such concepts may include the yardsticks of mental capacity 
75 
which developed principally within medico-legal deliberations and not from the 
viewpoint of service users (Moye and Marson, 2007; Appelbaum, 2010). 
Furthermore as Becker (2009) observes, qualitative research allows for an 
iterative process, therefore the researcher can further refine their methodology in the 
course of fieldwork: '[s]uccessful researchers recognize that they begin their work 
knowing very little about their object of study, and use what they learn from day to 
day to guide their subsequent decisions about what to observe, who to interview, what 
to look for, what to ask about.' (Becker, 2009; unpaginated). From Becker's 
observation flows a second implication for qualitative researchers seeking to 
understand phenomena from actors' perspectives. Principles of iteration mean that 
qualitative research has been found useful where researchers seek to uncover the 
viewpoints of those who are seldom heard but nevertheless become subject to taken-
for-granted understandings of their lives. Thus qualitative research is a way of 
challenging dominant epistemologies because researchers can orientate their study 
towards the concerns of participants as they garner knowledge about their social 
condition. 
Qualitative research is now applied in nearly all substantive areas including 
research on 'race' issues, ethnicity (Gunaratman, 2(03), disability (Barnes, 2(03), 
social work (Shaw and Gould, 2(01) and recently, in mental capacity (Dunn et ai, 
2010). Most writers agree that at the core of the qualitative paradigm is a quest for 
meaning, either from the researcher's viewpoint or that of research participants. It is 
also acceptable in qualitative research to collect different sources of data - for 
example from interviews, documents, from observations, or even videos and 
photographs (Bryman, 2008). However, although qualitative research is accepted in 
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· the 'mainstream', there are on-going epistemological debates, which I now discuss to 
further situate my research. 
Epistemological debates in qualitative 
research 
The epistemological debates in qualitative research are varied but central to these is 
whether the output of research provides a window on some external truth. Initially the 
epistemological consensus underpinning qualitative research was positivism and 
realism: researchers assumed that the product of research was a window onto an 
independent world, hence a need for canons for verifying the quality of acquired 
'truths'. In recent times, the epistemological debates have widened with strict realists 
on one end of the continuum and postmodernism on another. Realism assumes that it 
is possible to obtain 'objective' knowledge which reflects an external world or that if 
the right methods are followed, then stable knowledge can be acquired. However in 
practice realists take a more circumspect approach to 'objectivity'. 
Hammersley, for instance, may be seen as a 'subtle' realist in that he 
acknowledges that social science can produce facts or 'real' knowledge; however, 
such evidence cannot form the basis of value judgements. He noted in an elucidation 
of his epistemological position that: 
social scientists, whether realists or non-realists, have no distinctive 
expertise to determine what is good or bad about the situations they seek 
to describe and explain; or what, if anything, should be done about them. 
This is because even where value judgements rely on research evidence 
they also necessarily depend upon other factual assumptions and upon 
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value principles that are plural and often in conflict. (Hammersley, 2009; 
p7; original emphasis). 
On the opposite side of the epistemological continuum is postmodemism, which 
disputes the possibility of any foundational knowledge and rules for verifying the 
quality of research. But as Delanty (1997; p96) has argued, postmodemism creates a 
problem of indeterminacy through the process of deconstruction given that its aim is 
'not to reconstruct emancipatory potentials but to deconstruct the illusion of 
universality itself.' Taken to its logical conclusion, postmodemism leads to an infinite 
regress of deconstruction, and for this reason, Delanty suggests that it is on the wane 
as an epistemological approach. Thus, it is now recognised that in qualitative 
research, unchecked realism is epistemologically questionable (and perhaps 
unsustainable); and so is postmodemism. 
It seems, therefore, that a more tenable epistemological position to underpin a 
qualitative research project is social constructionism. In the main social 
constructionism aims to combine realists' quest for foundational knowledge with 
postmodemists' reminder of the need for attention to power and culture that often 
underpin claims of fundamentality. As I have shown in the Introduction (Chapter 
One) my research is situated within the qualitative paradigm and is underpinned by 
constructionism. Constructionists take the position that knowledge creation is a social 
process because '[research] participants actively construct the world of everyday life 
and its constituent elements.' (Holstein and Gubrium, 2008; p3). Epistemologically 
constructionism implies that 'reality' is unstable, hence the need for researchers to 
gamer mUltiple perspectives on a phenomenon. In a contribution to the discussion, 
Seale (1999) suggests that one methodological requirement in research which aims at 
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garnering multiple perspectives on a phenomenon is triangulation. The point of 
Seale's conceptualisation of triangulation is that the researcher gathers divergent 
sources of data from multiple participants: data is compared and contrasted in order to 
understand as full a scope of the phenomenon as possible, and not to aim for a 
singular view of 'reality.' Furthermore researchers understand that there can be no 
foreclosure to analysis as re-engagement with the data leads to new interpretations 
(Lather, 2010). 
Qualitative research is sometimes criticised for not being generalisable, 
adequately rigorous, or representative of the phenomenon it purports to study. These 
criticisms are longstanding and originate from writers who position qualitative 
research as a paradigmatic opposite of quantitative research. Being repeated 
criticisms, questions of generalisability, validity, and sampling have been attended to 
by proponents of qualitative research (Morse et ai, 2002; Payne and Williams, 2005; 
Denzin and Lincoln, 2008; Bryman, 2008). Barbour (2001, p1117) for instance has 
argued that the supposition that qualitative research should satisfy similar evaluative 
criteria as quantitative methodology 'is overly prescriptive and results in '''the tail 
wagging the dog." Barbour's latter cited point is that quantitative and qualitative 
paradigms ascribe to different epistemologies. 
One further reason for Barbour's assertion is that qualitative research is 
premised on creativity and attention to context. It is acknowledged that qualitative 
researchers do not seek to generalise the outcomes of research; although if the 
researcher provides 'thick description' it may be possible for other people facing 
similar circumstances to apply their research output. It is also now recognised that the 
evaluative criteria for qualitative research is transparency, and researchers are 
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enjoined to provide as much detail about their methods as possible in order for other 
scholars to ascertain the credibility of their approach (Golafshani, 2003). 
For my research purposes, one qualitative methodology which has been 
widely applied successfully in my substantive concerns of ethnicity, learning 
disability, mental capacity, and social care organisations is ethnography. Ethnography 
aims at gaining actors' perspectives through either their first-hand accounts or the 
researcher observing their daily lives. For instance Alexander (2006) edited a 
collection of ethnographic studies on 'race' and ethnicity; similarly Casper and Talley 
(2005) edited a special issue of the Journal of Contemporary Ethnography advocating 
the use of ethnographic methods in disability studies; while Jenkins (1998) also drew 
attention to the methodological utility of ethnography in researching mental capacity 
and culture. Similarly Pithouse (1998) and Broadhurst et al (2010) applied 
ethnography in the study of social work agencies. These previously cited works 
provided methodological inspiration and justification that I could achieve my research 
aims through ethnography. 
Methodological utility of ethnography 
Ethnographers seek to understand human actions and experiences from the point of 
view of the actors in their 'natural' settings: '[ w ]hatever the range of data collection 
techniques, we believe that ethnographic research remains firmly rooted in the first-
hand exploration of research settings.' (Atkinson et aI, 2001; p5). The distinguishing 
feature of ethnography from other qualitative methodologies is the simultaneous 
combination of key qualitative research methods. The researcher observes and 
participates in the activities of research participants over time, formally or informally 
interviews them, keeps detailed field notes, engages in reflexivity and through the 
ethnographic text accurately represents the group they are studying (Hammersley and 
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Atkinson, 2007). Furthennore, there is 'malleability' in ethnography (Amit-Talia, 
2000; p 11) because fieldwork starts with broad research questions which are 
refocused onto emerging pertinent issues. The methodological flexibility of 
ethnography makes it suitable for my thesis interests: the literature on the applied 
aspects of the MeA is still emerging, and there is as yet no research addressing how 
the three social categories of ethnicity, learning disability, and mental capacity, are 
manifested in practice. 
Exploring epistemological agendas in ethnography 
An underpinning epistemology in the quest to understand people's lives is that 
everyday living is inherently complex and that this sometimes leads to a disjuncture 
between what people say and what they do (Scott-Jones and Watt, 2010). At one 
level, to reconcile the differences between actions and deeds, ethnographers are 
enjoined to seek a range of data sources - for example observations of people at 
different times, interviews of many sources, and documentary evidence - as a way of 
triangulating the data sources: 'testing one source of infonnation against another to 
strip away alternative explanations and prove a hypothesis.' (Fetterman, 1998; p93). 
Primarily however, writers on ethnographic methodology enjoin researchers to try to 
understand by 'discovering' what people do first before attempting to interpret their 
actions (Schensul et aI, 1999). Taken to its full implications, arguably, a 
predominantly inductive approach is advised in ethnographic research. 
Another epistemological underpinning of ethnography which arises from the 
assumption of everyday living as complex and multidimensional is the need for 
research to be based in the setting where the activity being studied occurs. It is 
believed that it is only by basing the research in the context or setting in which the 
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phenomenon occurs that one would understand what the group actually does. As such, 
if a researcher is interested in how statutory agencies discharge their duties, they are 
enjoined to site their research where services are administered. By corollary, an 
attention to context (or setting) requires the need for 'thick description' by which the 
ethnographer describes the minutiae of the environment in which research participants 
were observed. In the quest to seek understanding, the thrust of the ethnography is to 
allow people to articulate their lived experience through their actions or their own 
words. The researcher, on the other hand, attempts to understand such lived 
experiences by participating and observing the lives and interactions of those they are 
studying. Within this latterly discussed epistemological framework, Casper and Talley 
(2005) have argued that as disability is lived experience ethnography is a particularly 
useful methodology. 
In an often cited study, Edgerton and colleagues applied participant 
observation in a longitudinal study to understand people classified as learning 
disabled living in the community following deinstitutionalisation (Edgerton, 1993). 
Edgerton et al found that the service users had successful coping strategies by 
drawing on sympathetic social networks. In further methodological writings on their 
study Edgerton et aI argued that participant observation was useful: '[p]articipant 
observation allows us to learn what [learning disabled] people actually do, as well as 
what they say they do, and it permits us to glimpse what meaning these activities have 
for them and those who know them.' (Edgerton et ai, 1984; p503). As such when 
people are studied in their 'natural' social environments, as is the aim of ethnography, 
researchers understand better their strengths and coping mechanisms (Shaw and 
Gould, 2001; p139). 
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In summary, ethnography is a methodology that aims to attain subjective experiences 
through the researcher's immersion in the world of participants over time. The key 
method in ethnography is, therefore, participant observation, through which 
researchers combine other methods, and grasp the detail of lived experiences. 
Combining qualitative methods through participant 
observation 
Participant observation is recognised as the most important ethnographic method 
(Sanger, 1996) because it leads to a more holistic understanding of the phenomenon 
being researched: 'a long-term period of social immersion in a particular setting, from 
which is generated the total ising and holistic descriptive account - the 'ethnography 
of the group being researched' (Mitchell, 2010; p2). Participant observation has 
therefore been found useful in research with people classified as learning disabled 
who may not communicate conventionally and whose views have to be inferred from 
their actions. For instance, in their five-year study of the parenting strategies of 
mothers classified as learning disabled, Traustadottir and Sigurjonsdottir employed 
participant observation. They noted that participant observation allowed them to 
develop rapport with the women in the study who were suspicious of professionals 
because of their concerns that their children would be taken into statutory care. 
Another reason was that 'some of the women were inarticulate and found it difficult 
to explain things in interviews. In such cases, observations and visits to their homes 
over an extended period were the best ways to learn about their lives' (Traustadottir 
and Sigurjonsdottir, 2008; p333). 
The epistemological underpinnings of participant observation are changing. 
Previously, it was supposed that the researcher could be a 'fly on the wall' witnessing 
without impacting on people's lives (Angrosino and Perez, 2000). Expanding further 
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on the theme of epistemology Angrosino and de Perez (2000) enjoin researchers to 
conceptualise observation as a 'context of interaction' whereby 'ethnographic 
observers interact with or enter into a dialogic relationship with members of the group 
being studied' (p678). In a contribution to the discussion Hume and Mulcock (2004) 
encourage ethnographic researchers to be 'insiders out and outsiders in'. On this basis 
researchers should position themselves close enough to attain familiarity and build 
rapport whilst simultaneously keeping sufficient distance to preserve their 
professional role. 
There are important methodological implications of this turn to interaction in 
the participant observation literature. Along with the general turn to subjectivity in the 
social sciences, ethnographers are required to account for their role in the 
ethnographic text and draw out how their presence contributed to the documented 
events. The corollary of this is the need for reflexivity - through reflexivity the 
researcher acknowledges that the ethnographic text is their point of view and not the 
sole 'truth' (Denzin, 1997). Another important implication of Angrosino and de 
Perez's notion of observation as 'context for interaction' is that researchers can 
regularly interview eyewitnesses. In this sense there is little requirement for formal 
interviews because interviews are intrinsic to (verbal) communication (Warren, 2001). 
So, for instance, to understand the stigma of disability within a family, Taylor 
(2000) studied the Duke family using participant observation over a ten-year period. 
The Dukes are a big family; most of the immediate family and their social network 
have been assigned social categories including learning disability. Even though he 
studied the family for ten years, Taylor noted that 'I have never formally interviewed 
the Dukes but, rather, ask questions that seem appropriate at the time.' (p68). It is 
possible therefore in ethnographic studies to operate observations and interviews 
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simultaneously. Similarly a researcher may collect artefacts, documents, and other 
textual material pertinent to answering their study aims as they become involved in 
the activities of study participants. 
The combination of methods during participant observation has been shown to 
be effective in studying social work organisations. Studies set in social work agencies 
have found that practice culture, frequent organisational changes, increasing 
computerisation, staff shortages, and high caseloads sometimes cause a disjuncture 
between professionals' espoused values and their actions (Broadhurst et aI, 2010; 
Ellis, 2004; Herod and Lymbery, 2002; Rafferty and Steyaert, 2009; Shaw et ai, 
2(09). During participant observation a researcher can sensitively ask professionals to 
explain the discrepancy between their explicated values and actions. Besides, social 
work agencies are complex and fast-paced, so being there and witnessing events 
enables researchers to grasp complexity. Furthermore the MCA is new so through 
participant observation a researcher can observe at first-hand its practice implications 
and how practitioners delineate the remit of the MCA amidst other policy imperatives. 
Another reason why ethnography is suitable for an exploratory study (such as 
the practice implications of the MeA within complex organisations) or understanding 
lived experience is that ethnographic research can involve (re)focusing from the 
general to the particular. This 'funnel model' of ethnography (Fetterman, 1998) draws 
attention to case study methodology as another useful ethnographic strategy. Indeed 
Fox (2004, p312) argues that ethnography and case study methodology are 
synonymous: 'an ethnographic research project is a highly specific case study, made 
up of numerous, even smaller case studies and of the fastidiously detailed qualitative 
materials from which they evolve.' Picking up the discussion about case study 
research in the next section, I show how the methodology has been applied within 
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broader ethnographic research to provide focus and detail on a phenomenon. My 
discussion in the next section is from the reference point of Abrax, who was the unit 
of analysis in my case study fieldwork. 
Embedding case study methodology into 
ethnography 
My second phase of fieldwork was a case study of Abrax, a 19-year old British man 
of Greek ancestry. There are multiple definitions in the literature about what 
constitutes a case; however Tavory and Timmerman's definition is a useful summary: 
there is some consensus that a case refers to the way in which the 
empirical observations in a study are not only 'ideographically' analysed 
as a unique occurrence but as an instance situated within a series - a 
sociological topic of interest, a unit in an empirical or theoretical whole. 
(2009; p248) 
Although applicable in both quantitative and qualitative research, case study research 
is advocated when a researcher is interested in 'how' and 'why' questions (Yin, 
2(09). Here the researcher focuses on one or few instances of the phenomenon with 
the purpose of understanding it holistically through gathering multiple sources of data 
such as documents, interviews and observations (Gillham, 2(00). From the point of 
view that a case study is useful in gaining additional focus on a phenomenon, the 
research strategy can be embedded within an overall ethnographic project or, it could 
be a standalone project wrapped around ethnographic methods (Gomm, 2011). 
One of the leading thinkers of case study research, Robert Stake, argued that a 
case study could be methodologically useful for intrinsic or instrumental purposes. In 
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the intrinsic use of a case study, the phenomenon is researched because in itself, the 
subject-matter is interesting. The instrumental deployment of a case study on the other 
hand allows the researcher to pursue their interest further 'to provide insight into the 
question.' (Stake, 1995; p3). Abrax's life accorded with Stake's exposition of the 
rationale for case studies. Abrax was an interesting case in so far as understanding his 
life would illuminate how the MCA's legislative framework impacted on a service 
user living in supported accommodation. Beyond this, understanding Abrax's unique 
situation would also conform to Stake's exposition of case study strategy as 
instrumental. On meeting Abrax he demonstrated understanding of abstract concepts 
despite his classification as a service user with complex cognitive needs. On top of 
this, Abrax displayed one of the other yardsticks of capacity - choice - but he needed 
his carers to guess a list of his possible choices, read them back to him and ask him to 
confirm via 'yes' or 'no' sounds. At other times Abrax's carers also had to interpret 
his gestures and sounds and they were his link to the external world. Moreover 
Abrax's carers described themselves as 'Africans' and considered themselves to have 
different cultures to Abrax; this provoked curiosity about how their ethnic identity 
impacted on Abrax's decision-making6. Therefore, a case study involving Abrax 
would throw into sharp focus how the MeA's definition of capacity played out within 
different ethnic traditions. In this latter justification for using a case study approach, 
Yin (2009) who is also regarded a key thinker in case study research suggests that the 
method could be 'revelatory' (P48). Put together, the issues discussed in this section 
reinforced the need to consider breadth, focus, and detail. Consequently I embedded a 
case study of Abrax within the broader methodological framework of ethnography in 
my fieldwork (Gomm et aI, 2(00). 
6 In the next chapter I discuss this topic in more detail 
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The discussion of methodology in this chapter also shows that, in ethnographic 
research, data analysis and collection are arguably synchronic. For example the 
argument by Becker (2009) that qualitative research is iterative is, at another level, a 
postulation about data analysis. The researcher has to sift through the data to 
understand where gaps are, and they have to manage the large amounts of data which 
is usually generated through ethnographic research. The researcher also has to pay 
attention to how they would represent themselves and the people that they have been 
studying. In the literature, it is argued that ethnography presents distinct challenges 
around data analysis and representation; these two issues are discussed in the second 
part of this chapter. 
Part Two. Interpreting and 
representing ethnographic data 
While data analysis and representation are pertinent issues in both qualitative and 
quantitative paradigms, in my study, they were amplified because my substantive 
concerns touch on my subjectivity. I am a black man living in a dominant white 
society exploring the theme of ethnicity (and culture). Besides I am a qualified social 
worker engaged in ethnographic research within the context of social care. As such I 
could be considered an 'insider' (Aguilar, 1981), a status which then raises questions 
about whether I maintained adequate 'distance' from the data in my analyses. 
However, in ethnography induction and subjectivity are methodological agendas; 
furthermore there is an ethical requirement for researchers to position themselves in 
the text. Some methodologists advise that ethnography researchers enter the field 
without any a priori conception of the likely outcome of data collection. It is advised 
that, taking an inductive approach, data analysis should proceed from the 'ground' 
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instead of from predefined coding frames (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007). Here in 
Part Two, I start by discussing data analysis in ethnography as a context for exploring 
the theme of representing subjectivity in ethnographic research output. 
Analysing ethnographic data 
Qualitative research generally involves analysing texts - as Silverman (2000) argues, 
even if researchers use interview methods in their research, the voice recordings have 
to be transcribed into text which then becomes the focus of analysis. Various 
traditions in qualitative research have different approaches to analysis depending on 
research aims. For instance, researchers interested in the stories people tell about their 
lives would utilise narrative analysis to explore the content of individual accounts, or 
the construction of life histories within research contexts such as in interviews or 
observations (Cortazzi, 2001; Plummer, 2001; Reissman, 2001). As well as there 
being 'tools for the job' in data analysis, there are also various epistemological 
underpinnings. Some researchers, influenced by realism, would treat data as a window 
onto an independent world, whereas those inclined towards social constructionism or 
poststructuralism would consider data as evidencing the contestability of knowledge 
claims. In ethnographic research, debates about analytic strategies and epistemologies 
crystallise around grounded theory, which is regarded by leading methodologists as 
the primary technique for analysing ethnographic data (Charmaz, 2000; Charmaz and 
Mitchell, 200 1; Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007). I expand on the theme of grounded 
theory further in the next section. 
Grounded theory in ethnography 
Terming it an 'iterative-inductive approach', O'Reilly (2005, p 177) suggested that 
grounded theory data analysis is intrinsic to all aspects of ethnographic research. First 
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proposed by Glaser and Strauss (1967), and reformulated by its initial proponents and 
other writers, grounded theory retains the central tenet that data is collected and 
analysed inductively (Clarke, 2003). Strauss' succeeding work devised 'canons' for 
the application of grounded theory, which appeared to align grounded theory to 
principles of quantitative research (Corbin and Strauss, 1990), because researchers 
had to adhere to detailed formulae. Commenting on grounded theory, McCallin 
(2009) posited that Glaser's future work in contrast was less formulaic but it retained 
aspects of post-positivism and realism in that Glaser considered there to be an 
external world independent of the researcher. 
In response to postmodernist challenges to the possibility of foundational 
knowledge, grounded theory has been reformulated. In 'Grounded Theory: Objectivist 
and Constructivist Methods " Charmaz developed a 'constructivist' approach to 
grounded theory underpinned by the theoretical position that '[ d]ata do not provide a 
window on reality. Rather the "discovered" reality arises from the interactive process 
and its temporal, cultural, and structural contexts.' (Charrnaz, 2000; p524). Charrnaz 
also argued that her approach was akin to ethnographic research because she enjoined 
researchers to take an inductive approach. This allowed researchers to derive their 
findings from observations and interviews rather than deductively from pre-
determined theoretical assumptions or coding frames. 
Similarly Clarke (2003) proposed situational analysis. She advised researchers 
to follow three stages in analysis, which were intended to provide mUltiple 
perspectives on the phenomenon being researched. Situational analysis ostensibly 
responded to the postmodernist challenge to positivism by highlighting the divergent 
perspectives that create knowledge. Nevertheless by proposing a formula for data 
analysis, Clarke may be accused of circularity: she argued that there was only one 
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way of conducting situational analysis, which itself is a methodology geared towards 
attaining diversity in empirical data analysis. 
Charrnaz, on the other hand, can avoid the charge of circularity because she 
eschews a formula for her constructivist approach, and instead provides advice 
through her numerous writings on using grounded theory. For instance she advises 
line-by-line coding as a way of data familiarisation. Charmaz also argues 
convincingly that it is better to code using gerunds: 'Gerunds prompt thinking about 
actions - large and small. If you focus your coding on actions, you have ready grist for 
seeing sequences and making connections.' (Charmaz, 2006; p 136; original 
emphasis). By gerunds, Charrnaz is referring to words ending in 'ing' as in for 
instance: participating, assessing, reformulating. Whether coding according to 
gerunds or not, the key advice however is that researchers generate analytic codes 
inductively (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007). In grounded theory it is also suggested 
that instead of being descriptive, coding should aim at generating new concepts 
(Holton, 2009). Additionally, creativity in data analysis, close attention to data, 
comparing and contrasting salient data, and (re)drafting emerging analytic ideas are 
emphasised (Charrnaz, 2006). 
Another interesting idea in ethnographic data analysis proposed by Brown 
(2011) is the use of the researcher's subjectivity. Brown, who described herself as 'a 
Black female researcher", studied racial discrimination in education with 
predominantly black students. She felt she had experienced discrimination and was 
therefore familiar with the subject matter. However, it was only away from the 
research site, playing close attention to data during analysis that the relevance of her 
life experience to the research became clearer. She noted that '[my] race took on a 
new impetus once I was out of the site. Pouring over mounds of observational and 
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interview data, I realised that race operated in hypervisible and invisible ways 
simultaneously for both the participants and me.' (Brown, 2011; pl06). Brown's 
insight suggests, therefore, that the most useful point of the researcher's subjectivity 
in the research may be during analysis of ethnographic data. More broadly, some 
writers have highlighted the methodological and ethical need for reflection in the 
ethnographic text (Tedlock, 2000). 
Representing people and 'I' in ethnography 
In my research it was important to reflect on how I had affected the outcome of 
fieldwork because I am a black man studying fellow ethnic minorities. I am also a 
social worker who conducted fieldwork within a statutory social work setting. Given 
my closeness to the subject matter of my research, there was the need for careful 
reflection on how I represented the data. Sometimes used interchangeably there is, 
however, a distinction between ethnographic writing and representation. Writing 
refers to the textual product of empirical research whereas representation 
encompasses other forms of exhibiting research output such as through films, 
performance, and poetry (Denzin, 1997; Sparkes, 2009). Some writers advocate 
canons for ethnographic textual representation. Atkinson (1990) suggests that 
ethnography texts require plausibility and authenticity: writers have to convince 
others of the topicality of the research, and their witnessing of the events described 
(indeed Atkinson's advice is now recognised as applicable to qualitative research in 
general (Long and Godfrey, 2004». Referring to the need for ethnography to 
persuade, Sanger (1996) enjoins researchers 'to raise the consciousness of both those 
within and without the same circle, with regards to the issues, events and contexts of 
the study' (pllS). 
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Atkinson (1990) and Sanger (1996) were writing at a time of increasing attention to 
the nature of ethnographic textual representation. Van Maanen (1990) noted the 
consensus on the methodological ascendancy of participant observation but 
highlighted the epistemological and methodological unsustainability of the notion of 
the 'impartial' fieldworker producing unadulterated research. By 1995 VanMaanen 
had noted a 'shift toward text [which] is, of course, part of a much wider scholarly 
turn toward meaning and language wherein the relationship ordinarily held to obtain 
between a description and the object of such description is reversed' (p14). Now there 
is a consensus that, as well as describing the individuals in the study, the researcher 
needs to reveal themselves within the ethnographic text (Angrosino, 2008; Mitchell, 
2010). 
The debates about authors' subjectivity and its influence on research outcomes 
emanate from postmodernist challenges to the longstanding place of ethnography as a 
primary research methodology of anthropology, and the latter's association with 
colonialism. Faubion (2001) has charted the close association between anthropology 
and imperialism in which by studying the culture of 'the Other', researchers provided 
"impartial" justification for colonialism on the basis that "savages" needed 
"civilisation". Initially anthropology was predominantly practised by white, western 
Europeans studying other cultures. From the mid-1970's, through the challenge of 
postmodernism, ethnography underwent a 'crisis of representation' by which 
questions arose as to the ethical and methodological appropriateness of researching 
cultures which researchers (mostly white, western men) were unfamiliar with and 
sometimes sought to misrepresent (Denzin, 2(02). Stemming from these debates, now 
there is a consensus that as well as describing the individuals in the study the 
researcher needs to reveal themselves within the ethnographic text as a means of 
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accountability. Partly, this agreement is also an acknowledgement of the impossibility 
of 'fly on the wall' research activity in which researchers do not impact on 
participants' lives. 
Another aspect of the debates about researcher subjectivity is the increasing 
attention to native anthropology. Here some researchers argue that people from the 
same group are more qualified to understand that culture and they are more likely to 
portray it sympathetically. In the sociology literature, these debates have crystallised 
around the utility of insider research with several traditions in the qualitative 
paradigm arguing for the use of experiential knowledge. These qualitative research 
traditions include standpoint epistemologies in feminist research (Fawcett and Hearn, 
2004), user/survivor-led research in mental health (Townend and Braithwaite, 2002; 
Turner and Beresford 2005), and the participatory or inclusive traditions in learning 
disability research (Atkinson, 2004; Atkinson, 2005; Walmsley and Johnson, 2(03). 
Addressing political agendas, the body of work identified here argues that only those 
who share similar social experiences as research participants can tune into their life 
stories to accurately represent their marginalisation. Additionally, through sharing 
similar embodied experiences as study participants, researchers acquire more fruitful 
research data because they know what questions to address. Consequently advocates 
of insider research draw attention to the possibility of easier fieldwork rapport and 
trust because participants know that their substantive concerns are being addressed. 
Perhaps imbued with a less political agenda than the body of work described 
above, Ochieng (2010), who also described herself 'Black African', interviewed 
families of similar origin. In the process she found to her surprise that mutual ethnic 
identities meant that she became a methodological tool: 'the interesting aspect of this 
analysis is how, as a researcher of African descent researching with families of 
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African descent, I became part of the research process.' (p 1727). Furthermore mutual 
social experiences meant that 'the understandings and knowledge 1 gained from 
families during the course of data collection was influenced throughout the process by 
who 1 am.' (pI728). Following Ochieng's reflective tone, Serrant-Green (2002) 
argued that methodological advantages arise because being an 'insider', a black 
researcher quickly builds rapport and trust, leading to richer data. The emphasis on 
biography as methodologically useful, discussed here, crystallises predominantly 
around data gathering and analysis. 
However, it has to be acknowledged that the use of the subjective '1', who is a 
member of the group being studied risks reification of their culture as well as the 'I' 
engaged in reflective representation. For instance in the case of Ochieng above, she 
could be criticised for reifying the category 'black' by assuming that all Africans have 
the same experiences or that all Africans born in Africa share similar life experiences 
as Africans brought up in the UK. Not only this, Ochieng could be criticised for 
assuming that the 'I' is unchanging because she postulated that the 'I' which carried 
out the research was the same 'I' engaged in data analysis or representation. 
Furthermore, as has been argued by Caughey (2006), '[s]tudies of culture are usually 
orientated towards groups, institutions, and societies. They typically lose much of 
their power to explain individual lives through their reliance on generalisations about 
the allegedly shared cultural orientations of sets of people in a specific group or 
community: (page xi). Thus, apart from reifying the researcher's subjectivity, 
Caughey's point above suggests that insider research could also result in reification of 
culture. This is because, in an attempt to describe the culture of the group to which 
they belong or are researching, researchers may portray culture as fixed in time and 
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shared by every member of the group, when culture is perhaps more dynamic with 
different strands practised individually (Nayak, 2005). 
Other scholars take issue with possible methodological drawbacks which may 
result from an insider or subjective approach. Atkinson (2006) has warned that one 
consequence of the author's subjectivity taking centre-stage of the research is that 
their biography is elevated above the methodological and theoretical rigour usually 
demanded of academic researchers. Moreover there is the risk of 'going native' in 
ethnography generally, and more specifically from (self)identifying with the group 
being researched. 'Going native' could include lack of attention to detail because the 
researcher assumes familiarity with the subject-matter of the research. Some 
researchers who have studied groups they identify with have reported conflicts of 
interest, issues of confidentiality, and distrust from some members of their community 
who doubt the benefits of research (Zubair, 2012). It may be concluded that while 
there are undoubted epistemological and methodological advantages from sharing 
similar experience as research participants, there are also potential drawbacks. 
Altogether, the present discussion in Part Two shows that the epistemological 
debates around representation and data analysis are analogous to the debates about the 
epistemology of qualitative methodology. They therefore call for paradigmatic, 
methodological and theoretical consistency on the part of the researcher. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have discussed the qualitative paradigm and ethnography in order to 
situate my research methodologically. Notwithstanding the on-going epistemological 
debates about qualitative research, there is a consensus around key tenets of the 
paradigm. It is agreed that qualitative research is particularly suitable for 
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understanding lived experience, exploring under-researched substantive areas, and 
garnering detailed data. Ethnography is generally regarded as a methodology which 
fulfils these requirements of qualitative research. Furthermore ethnography is also 
seen as a useful methodology because it is a creative approach, which enables 
researchers to start with a broad area and with time, focus on units or people who 
epitomise the phenomenon being explored. This 'malleability' of ethnography (Amit-
Talia, 2001) makes it suitable to study professional practice in the use of the MCA, 
which as the literature review has shown, is currently under-researched. Moreover, 
little research has sought to understand the lived experience of a service user 
simultaneously classified as ethnically different and learning disabled, within the 
context of the MCA. Having taken the methodological issues outlined here into 
consideration in my research, in the following chapter, I discuss the ethnographic 
methods I employed to achieve my research aims. 
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CHAPTER FOUR. METHODS AND 
RELATIONS IN CONDUCTING 
FIELDWORK 
Here in Chapter Four I provide a reflective account of my data collection methods. 
The chapter is divided into Parts One and Two, which respectively deal with both 
phases of my fieldwork in the integrated service and the case study with Abrax. For 
anonymity purposes I call the statutory service Kotoka and Abrax's supported living 
residence Y arlow. 
Part One. Doing ethnography in 
Kotoka 
I start Part One by explaining how I gained ethical approval and access to Kotoka, 
paying attention to how both impacted on my subsequent methodological practices. 
Then I discuss how I conducted observations, interviews, and data recording. Overall, 
I highlight in Part One the unexpected complexity of Kotoka whilst showing the 
exciting possibilities that existed for further recruitment of participants once I gained 
the trust of professionals. 
Gaining access 
In addition to gaps in the empirical literature I sited my research in statutory services 
for two reasons. Firstly, I envisaged that an institutional context would impact on the 
operationalisation of the MCA. Secondly, I formed the assumption that, with 
tightening eligibility criteria, learning disability service users were likely to have 
complex needs, thereby bringing them within the remit of the MCA. To adhere to the 
principle of inclusivity, I planned my thesis to involve persons who are not presented 
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with the opportunities to take part in research because of the complexities of eliciting 
their mental capacity to consent. Given this latter reason, I required clearance from an 
'appropriate body", which is mandated under the MCA to ethically approve research 
involving incapacitated adults (DOH, undated) 7. One such 'appropriate body" for 
research in social care settings is the Social Care Research Ethics Committee 
(SCREC). However according to my University regulations, I also required ethical 
approval from the Open University Human Research Ethics Committee (OUHREC) 
before applying to SCREe. Therefore by the time I approached local authorities for 
access, my research had undergone ethical clearance from two bodies (the OUHREC 
and SCREC). 
On being granted ethical approval by SCREC In March 20 I I, I contacted 
London local authorities to involve social workers and service users. SCREC 
maintains a record of MCA research governance managers so I did not find it an 
onerous task identifying the relevant people to contact in each local authority. Most 
gatekeepers did not want to facilitate my study and several reasons were provided. An 
example was one gatekeeper who said that due to on-going organisational changes I 
would not be allowed access. Another gatekeeper considered my research 
'in~eresting' though access could not be granted because '[access] would require a lot 
of input and support from our social work staff. They're currently very over-stretched 
and are unfortunately not able to work with you on this at this time.,8 Those managers 
who expressed an interest in facilitating my research did not respond in time to my 
emails and phone calls. Interestingly, although social work departments have a 
longstanding tradition of training students, the research governance managers 
7 < http://www.screc.org.ukJfiles/mcafactsheet.pdf> (accessed 12 June, 2013). 
8 Personal email communication 
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approached appeared unfamiliar with academic research and PhDs in particular. This 
lack of awareness is another potential explanation for the difficulty in accessing local 
authority sites for research as noted by Munro et al (2005). 
Once it became clear that I would struggle to gain access to local authority 
sites, I contacted a previous colleague (senior manager in disabled children's service) 
to make use of her professional contacts. She put me in touch with her colleague Chris 
- a senior manager in Adult Services - who did not initially respond to emails and 
telephone messages until I reached him early one morning. Even then Chris advised 
me to call the Assistant Manager of his team, Danielle, to arrange a meeting but this 
became another gatekeeping mechanism as I now had to negotiate access with Chris' 
intermediary. Nevertheless, in early April 2011, Danielle invited me to a team 
meeting to explain my research and in her words 'persuade' her colleagues to 
participate. As preparation for the meeting, I contacted a University researcher (one of 
the few researchers to have conducted empirical research with social workers since 
enactment of the MeA) and sought her advice on my presentation to the social work 
team. 
I took the Information Sheets and Consent Forms that I prepared for the 
SCREC review to the meeting with social workers. Instead of the 18 professionals 
Danielle said would attend the meeting, there were only six. Also I learnt that I had 
been allocated 10 minutes at the beginning of the meeting for my presentation. 
Mindful of the entrenched audit culture in social work practices (Saario and Stepney, 
2(09) I sought to convince professionals that my research was not primarily an 
evaluation of practice. Instead I highlighted that my fieldwork aimed to understand 
practice under the MCA by 'shadowing' social workers in their routine activities. I 
also told the professionals that I hoped to recruit some of the service users on their 
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case loads for the second phase of my research. At the end of my presentation the 
lower than expected attendance for the meeting and what looked to me to be 
disinterested professionals convinced me that there would be no volunteers for the 
study. As such, I was surprised to hear from Danielle that eight social care 
professionals had volunteered for the research, meaning that more staff had 
volunteered for the study than attended my presentation. In further email 
correspondence with Danielle, we agreed that I would start fieldwork on 06 June 
2011. 
I envisaged that the core participants of my research would include the 
aforementioned eight social care staff. However on the first day of fieldwork one 
person withdrew on account that she was leaving the team after a period of 
secondment. Thus there were seven core participants of my fieldwork, and others that 
I recruited when data collection began. Of the core participants, there were 
respectively five women who described themselves to me as ethnic minorities (Ofira, 
Audrey, Mavis, Annika, and Adwoa) and one white woman (Rose). There was only 
one male core participant (Shane) and he described himself as British of Grenadian 
origin. Shane did not have a social work qualification and he had specified duties of 
liaising and assessing carers. My reflective account here about gaining access to 
Kotoka and ethical approval from SCREC sets the scene to discuss in the next section, 
how the two events impacted on my research. 
Reflections on the methodological impact of negotiating 
access 
A key part of my application to SCREC was completion of the Integrated Research 
Application System (IRAS) form on which I had to identify risks to participants and 
how I would address them in fieldwork. At the time of applying to SCREC, I did not 
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know the setting of my research therefore I had to imagine the potential research site. 
In the event I envisaged a discrete social work team. I also made a 'non-interference' 
commitment on my IRAS form, indicating that as far as possible my research would 
not 'interfere' with the work of the social work team. I also said on the IRAS form 
that I would shadow each social worker for one hour at a time on alternative weeks. 
Besides the 'non-interference' commitment I made two key methodological 
decisions before fieldwork commenced. Firstly, I emphasised to core research 
participants that instead of distinct events I wanted to observe 'routine' activities. 
Having been a social worker and thus aware of the unpredictable nature of practice, I 
reasoned that any attempt on my part to witness specific practice issues would be 
superseded by events. Nevertheless, by telling social workers that I wanted to observe 
their 'routine' activities, the substantive focus of my research changed inadvertently. 
Instead of solely focusing on mental capacity assessments my research aims 
broadened into how professionals drew upon the MeA and accompanying statutory 
requirements in practice. Secondly, before fieldwork commenced, I sent professionals 
a schedule of my shadowing days. My intention was to alternate the days and times of 
shadowing: so for instance if I observed social worker A on Monday afternoon, in the 
following week, I would shadow them on a Tuesday morning. The schedule was a 
strategy I devised to allow me study practices at separate times, thereby facilitating 
my understanding of the rhythm of the team (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007). 
Interestingly, the question as to whether an ethnographer should have a fixed 
research schedule prior to fieldwork is a matter of heated contention in the 
methodology literature. Some writers imply that the researcher should approach the 
fieldwork site with no prior conception, and upon familiarisation, orientate the 
research towards relevant questions. Amit-Talia (2000) for instance, argues that the 
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boundary of the 'field' is difficult to draw - the inference here is that the researcher 
may not have a schedule until starting the research. On the other hand, Hammersley 
and Atkinson (2007) advice researchers to 'case' the site and pilot their study before 
fieldwork, so on this measure, one could have an itinerary. In my case, I found that 
the prior schedule worked well because the social workers noted the dates in their 
diaries and set time aside for me to shadow them. 
Overall, the process of seeking ethical approval and negotiating access had 
unintended consequences. Iversen (2009) noted that 'getting out' of fieldwork could 
be fraught with ethical complications, however these were minimised in my case. The 
social workers knew from the outset what I would be doing and the approximate date 
for completion of my fieldwork. By corollary, I also told them that there was a 
planned second phase of fieldwork for which I would involve some of the service 
users on their case load. A less positive by-product of gaining ethical approval was 
that my commitments to SCREC sometimes circumscribed my fieldwork creativity. 
On some occasions I declined invitations to conduct unscheduled observations as I 
believed that these unplanned appointments were against my commitments to 
SCREe. Equally importantly, because by the time of applying for ethical approval I 
did not know where my research would be sited, I constructed a fieldwork context in 
my mind. Thus one consequence of seeking ethical approval was that I inadvertently 
designed research for a bounded research site with sequential work processes, entirely 
different from what I encountered. I now expand further on my data gathering 
methods in Kotoka. 
Gathering data in Kotoka 
On my first day in Kotoka, it became clear that the research site was far more 
unbounded and complex than I envisaged. Whereas in my application to SCREC I 
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imagined an independent social work team, Kotoka was an 'integrated service' 
comprised of discrete teams of professionals including: social workers, occupational 
therapist, speech and language therapists, nurses, psychiatrists, and psychologists. 
Each team was supported by administrative staff. In conversations with staff on my 
first day of fieldwork, I realised I could recruit other professionals for the study. 
Returning home after my first observation, I noted in my Reflective Diary9 the 
unexpected complexity of the research site and the concomitant need for me to 
quickly decide on the direction of fieldwork: 
I observed far more people and events than I ever imagined would be the 
case and there is so much more that goes on in [the] office than I ever 
imagined would be the case [ ... ] There are so many possible sources of 
enquiry so I have to pretty much make my mind up quickly about which 
one I am going to follow. This is especially the case because the team is 
'integrated' and now that I have access it seems that I can pretty much 
include any professional other than social workers. (Reflective Diary 08 
June 2011). 
One noticeable consequence of service integration was that, in contrast to my prior 
conception, Kotoka received referrals and made referrals in tum. Moreover 
professionals from Kotoka worked closely with several teams within the local 
authority, with important consequences for my substantive interests. These issues 
9 During fieldwork I kept a Reflective Diary in which I recorded daily my reflections. 
I wrote in a more contemplative voice in the Reflective Diary. 
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outlined here showed the need to include more professionals and teams beyond the 
core participants. 
Observing events and practices 
Primarily I designed my research as non-participant observation because of the 'non-
interference" commitment I gave to SCREe. I refrained from engaging in any activity 
liable to be interpreted as 'doing social work". In part my non-participant approach 
was aided by the fieldwork schedule I sent to social workers prior to commencing the 
study. Ostensibly, whilst I was engaged in shadowing one professional the rhythm of 
the team did not concern us although, in practice, each period of observing one 
professional was punctuated by their receiving phone calls, taking messages for 
colleagues, talking across the room to a colleague, engaging in informal case 
management, and navigating the complex information technology system. Also I did 
not have a rigid framework for observations: I observed people and events after 
appraising previously collected data, or I observed chance events which seemed of 
direct relevance to my research. 
Consequently, my observations moved between the general and the particular. 
In the first few weeks I concentrated on understanding the remit of the integrated 
service, work process, inter and intra team relations, and the personalities involved in 
my research. Opportunities also arose for me to focus on particular events such as 
assessments, service user/professional relations, and duty tasks. Sometimes I practised 
focused and general observations in the same shadowing session. Realising that the 
research site was more complex that I had envisaged, at the beginning of each 
shadowing session I made a rapid analysis of whether to engage in focused or broad 
observations. These analyses were helped by the fact that professionals explained 
what they were doing on each shadowing session, and because I observed each person 
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a few times, they compared and contrasted the present observation with previous 
ones. Where it was clear that I would be encountering a new event I engaged in broad 
observation and I employed focused observations where there was a repeated event. 
At other times, I did not observe anyone or anything in particular. I arrived 
early for some shadowing sessions to hang-out in the reception area to gain a sense of 
which service users made unscheduled visits to the office. I obtained valuable data 
sitting in the reception area making notes of the ethnic identity and gender of visitors 
to the office. In order to become familiar with the professionals I also sometimes sat 
in the staff kitchen during lunch time to ask questions and answer some in turn or just 
to get a sense of relations between staff. The observation method I have described 
here contrasts with Fetterman's funnel model (Fetterman, 1998; p35) which starts 
with 'uncontrolled and haphazard' observation and culminates in a more focused 
observation of issues pertinent to the research question. 
I found that I engaged in data analysis as fieldwork ebbed and flowed. In the 
ethnography literature it is often implied that research is a linear process starting with 
research design, fieldwork, and then data analysis. A notable departure is Candea 
(2009) who, in describing his fieldwork in Corsica, argued that fieldwork and data 
analysis are synchronic if only as a way of substantively delineating the research. In 
my case, due to the unexpected complexity of the research site, it became part of my 
fieldwork routine to read over previous notes, making methodological decisions about 
which areas of the organisation and what people to include in subsequent 
observations. One other notable feature of fieldwork in Kotoka was that most 
professionals refused me consent to tape interviews so my routine conversations 
acquired the status of interview data. 
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Interviewing in Kotoka 
Methodologically, I had to make sense of the organisational remit and work processes 
of Kotoka -to achieve this aim, I was inspired by institutional ethnography: 
'Institution, in this usage, does not refer to a particular type of organisation; rather it is 
meant to inform a project of empirical enquiry, directing the researcher's attention to 
coordinated and intersecting work processes taking place in multiple sites' (DeVault 
and McCoy, 2002; p753; original emphasis). DeVault and McCoy expanded further 
that the researcher employing institutional ethnography need not have formal 
interview schedules or a prior idea of whom to interview. Building on incremental 
knowledge, the 'informants are chosen as the research progresses [ ... ] each interview 
provides an opportunity for the researcher to learn about a particular piece of the 
extended chain, to check the developing picture of the coordinative process, and to 
become aware of additional questions that need attention' (P757). I determined who to 
interview from my discussions with the core participants. For instance I learnt that 
there was a Person-Centred Planning (PCP) Coordinator whose role was to help 
service users make decisions during key transition points in their lives. Because this 
task involved eliciting decisions from service users, I felt that substantively, it had 
relevance to my research. I therefore interviewed the PCP Coordinator. 
As fieldwork evolved I gained a greater understanding of the complexity of 
the research site and salient issues. It was clear that the concept 'safeguarding' 
occupied a special place in the psyche of the professionals and impacted on their 
interpretation of the MCA. Realising that there was a separate team in charge of 
Safeguarding Adults policy and procedures, I sought and gained three taped-
interviews. One interview was with Emma, the deputy manager of the team. I also 
conducted two interviews with the team manager Abby (Abby's duties included 
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recruitment and training of Best Interest Assessors JO ). Both Abby and Emma were 
female and I would describe their ethnicity as white. Abby was from South Africa and 
considered herself an ethnic minority in the UK. Reflecting on her experiences in the 
UK she felt that she had been discriminated against because of her accent. Abby, 
therefore, identified with the substantive concerns of my research and was keen to 
facilitate access to other professionals. 
Abby put me in touch with two female occupational therapists who were also 
trained Best Interest Assessors. One was 10, a team manager, and she agreed to be 
tape recorded. The other professional, Patience, was an occupational therapist and did 
not agree to be tape recorded. In the interview Patience appeared reticent, prompting 
me to make the following notes in my Reflective Diary: 
When Patience arrived and we went into the office and we sat down she 
told me that she did not want to be tape recorded. Sitting here now I recall 
that as soon as she said that I had a premonition that the interview would 
be difficult. (Reflective Diary, 2 August, 2011). 
The exchange with Patience recorded in my Reflective Diary neatly captured 
professionals' reluctance to being tape recorded. By an unfortunate co-incidence, I 
commenced fieldwork in the same week that covertly obtained film footage of 
residential care workers abusing learning disabled service users was shown on 
10 In the MCA, Best Interest Assessors determine whether any action by professionals 
on behalf of service users lacking mental capacity is in their 'best interest' (DCA, 
2007). 
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Panorama, a prime-time current affairs programme)). Perhaps as a result of the 
Panorama programme none of the core participants consented to being taped 
recorded; this also encapsulated the general mood of mistrust that my presence 
sometimes generated. On some occasions people indicated that they were 
uncomfortable that I was taking notes. At another multidisciplinary meeting, a senior 
manager asked the Head of Service whether my bag had been searched to confirm that 
I was not secretly taping the discussions. 
On the rare occasions that professionals agreed to be taped, there was a 
palpable sense of tensions being released once I stopped the tape recorder. Of 
methodological importance, professionals appeared to interpret the tape being turned 
off as a signal that the formal interview was over; prompting them to reveal more than 
when the recorder was on. In the case of Patience, whose interview was not tape 
recorded, one way that I overcame her reticence was to make the interview less 
formal. I informed her of my ethical commitment to confidentiality as way of assuring 
her that all the information she gave would not be divulged to other parties I 2, and that 
she could terminate the interview at any time. I also stopped taking notes. It was only 
after Patience felt reassured that she disclosed that in one case that she was involved 
in, managers had proposed a mental capacity assessment of a service user in order to 
prevent her parents from accessing her case files. According to Patience, MCA 
assessments were, therefore, used to 'silence' service users. 
II The TV programme Panorama is broadcast by the BBC (British Broadcasting 
Corporation). As a result of Panorama's investigations, the Government published 
'Transforming Care' (DOH, 2012) addressing concerns raised by the television 
programme. That the government responded with an enquiry evidences the political 
impact of the Panorama report. 
12 With the caveat that unless she told me that she had harmed a service user or 
someone was in danger. 
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Because of the limited consent given for me to tape record, I conducted informal 
interviews during shadowing sessions. The ethnography literature is in any case 
divided on the status of formal interviews. As explained above, in his ten year 
ethnography of a family, Taylor (2000) for instance took his routine interactions with 
the family as 'interviewing'. Forsey (2008, p59), on the other hand, argued that 'those 
being researched may even expect the researcher to employ such a tool [interviewing] 
as part of the investigation, an interview becomes part of the act of participant 
observation. ' 
Most of my interviews were also unstructured in that I did not have any prior 
questions or categories (Fontana and Frey, 2(05). The nature of the questions I asked, 
however, changed in the course of fieldwork as I gained more information, developed 
rapport, and became familiar with the setting. Initially the questions were general, 
such as 'tell me about cases where capacity assessments have been conducted.' With 
time they became more specific: 'last time you told me about service user X and you 
said you did Y, could you explain more?' Moreover I considered all my routine 
conversations with professionals as interview data largely because I took the 
opportunity of each encounter to discuss substantive concerns of my research. 
To sum up this section, once fieldwork commenced, it became clear that I 
could involve professionals besides social workers in my research. I decided whom to 
recruit for the research on the basis of what other professionals told me about the 
work of Kotoka as well as my previous observations. In the main, I found it easy 
obtaining interviews, however because my fieldwork coincided with the Panorama 
documentary programme on the abuse of learning disability service users, my 
presence elicited mistrust. As people were reticent about me tape recording 
interviews. note-taking and field notes became central to my data collection. 
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Note-taking and field notes 
I conceptualised field notes as the texts of unfolding events that I handwrote in a book 
whilst in the field. I make this clarification because notwithstanding their 
longstanding association with ethnographic research, there are debates about the 
nature of field notes, when they should be written, and how they should be organised. 
In their review of the literature on field notes, Emerson et al (2001) explained that 
some researchers distinguish between their recordings of what was observed in the 
field and their reflections, whilst others consider the two together as field notes. In my 
fieldwork I opted to consider field notes as my records of events in the field so from 
the outset, I envisaged that the field notes would be the primary focus of my data 
analysis. So during observations I made detailed notes which I later transcribed using 
my computer (Walford, 2009). I also kept a Reflective Diary in which I recorded my 
thoughts, uncertainties, and new lines of enquiry. Finally I kept electronic memos in 
which I wrote my emerging thoughts on concepts, theories, or analytic threads 
(Charmaz, 2006). Thus while I kept the Reflective Diary and memos to enable me 
keep track of my evolving substantive ideas and changing emotions, my field notes 
were written with their role as the centre-piece of my data analysis in mind. 
I made field note entries immediately after each period of observation. The 
nature of my note-taking changed with time. In his discussion of field notes in 
ethnography, Wolfinger (2002) proposed two methods for writing field notes: 'the 
salience hierarchy' in which researchers document their observations in order of 
importance, or the 'comprehensive', in which they 'systematically and 
comprehensively describe everything that happened during a particular period of time, 
such as a single trip to the field.' (P90). Early in fieldwork I took 'comprehensive' 
field notes: I recorded events chronologically, sequentially and in minute detail. 
III 
Whereas before fieldwork I felt that my prior experience as a social worker would 
help in observations, I was taken aback by the pace of activity in Kotoka. Therefore at 
the beginning of fieldwork I felt that I needed to capture every event. At other points 
my note-taking was underscored by some key assumptions. For instance when I 
observed a multidisciplinary meeting, I noted my observations of unfolding events 
sequentially because I felt that the interactional patterns revealed power hierarchies. 
On some occasions I could tell that taking notes interrupted the flow of 
conversation or I could feel a palpable sense of unease in the room because of my 
note-taking. In all these instances where I did not take notes at the time of 
observation, I used substantive issues from the meeting (or observations) to jog my 
memory or, sometimes, I tried to recall the conversations or observations in 
chronological order. On my way home I would make additional notes on the train 
with the view to immediate transcription. 
Given the reliance on recall described above, I agree with the assertion by 
Emerson (1995) that field notes are constructions. On the one hand, my agreement 
with Emerson is partly due to my paradigmatic affiliation to social constructionism, 
which entails the researcher taking a reflexive stance towards epistemological and 
ontological claims about 'reality'. On the other hand, my agreement stems from the 
experience of writing field notes. Often, even after transcribing immediately after 
observations, I found that I could not be certain of my recollections. On other 
occasions, my recollection of events contradicted the notes I made at the time of the 
observations. Occasionally, my on-going transcriptions clarified previous notes and I 
would return to those documents to annotate. I found periodically that writing notes 
gave me ideas about questions to ask and events to observe in the next fieldwork 
encounter. In this later sense, it may be said that the present influenced future data 
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capture which then played back to my past understandings. Apart from transcriptions, 
another way that the present interplayed with the future was that I was able to recruit 
for the second phase of fieldwork whilst in Kotoka. This was an undertaking given on 
my SCREC form, so as my ethnographic fieldwork in Kotoka evolved, I was 
simultaneously planning for fieldwork with service users. 
In the current discussion of my fieldwork I have focused on my data collection 
methods in Kotoka, a local authority research site. I explained that I required ethical 
approval from SCREC even before I could approach local authorities. Once SCREC 
approved my research I contacted local authorities for access; however, in the end I 
had to make use of personal contacts to gain access to Kotoka. The process of 
negotiating access (seeking ethical approval and using personal contacts) impacted on 
my fieldwork practices because I made commitments which later restricted some 
fieldwork creativity. However an advantage of the ethical approval process, on the 
other hand, was that I committed to recruit service users through Kotoka; therefore, I 
could simultaneously plan for the fieldwork with service users alongside my 
observation of social care professionals. 
Part Two. Case study research 
with Abrax in Yarlow 
Part of the planning for the second phase of fieldwork involved asking social workers 
to identify service users who I could involve in my research. Towards the end of my 
time in Kotoka, I asked them to introduce me to ethnic minority service users on their 
case loads. The first person I was introduced to was Abrax who his social worker 
described as an ethnic minority. Abrax's social worker also told me that she had 
permission from Abrax's parents for me to approach him for recruitment purposes. In 
order to meet Abrax, I sought prior authorisation from a gatekeeper, a senior manager 
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of the private agency which owned Yarlow. Expanding on the theme of a case study 
approach, in Part Two, I discuss the rationale behind my methodological move, how I 
designed the case study, and the methods I used to collect case study data. One 
advantage of the two phased nature of my fieldwork was that, by the time I became 
acquainted with Abrax, I was a more confident researcher, having in one sense 
practised the methodology in Kotoka. 
Constructing Abrax as a unit of analysis 
Abrax was the unit of observation and analysis of the case study. I focused on the 
following social contexts: his family relations, his interactions with his care workers 
in Y arlow, and his everyday life. Because Abrax was provided with 24-hour care by 
five African men, they also featured prominently in the case study. A case study 
methodology applied in Abrax's circumstances for a number of reasons. Returning 
briefly to my discussions on methodology (Chapter Three) a case study is advised if 
the following factors hold: the case is a substantive research concern and the 
researcher seeks 'breadth' and 'depth' of a phenomenon (Stake, 1995). Abrax was a 
central concern of my research which aimed to explore how an ethnic minority 
learning disability service user made decisions in their everyday life. Furthermore, the 
MCA identifies learning disability as a condition which could impede mental 
capacity. Additionally, as Abrax lived in supported accommodation, the MCA 
required a consideration of his mental capacity to consent to changes in his place of 
living (Harker, 2012). 
Beyond substantive interests, Abrax was unique in my view. Although Abrax 
was classified as learning disabled he was believed to have capacity to make decisions 
for himself. On this latter point, Abrax was a deviation from folk understandings of 
learning disability. Abrax's ability to understand and yet not vocalise his thoughts 
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also stood out as a deviation from the MCA's stipulation that one yardstick of mental 
capacity was an ability to 'communicate'. Furthermore, Abrax was a British national 
of Greek-Cypriot origin, nevertheless he was considered ethnically different by a 
social worker. Abrax was unique: therefore, I felt that a case study would provide 
deeper understanding about the interaction between ethnicity, mental capacity, and 
learning disability in everyday life. 
The discussion to date suggests that it was possible to delineate the case. In 
the methodology literature much is made about the need for a case to be 'bounded', 
by which it is meant that the phenomenon under study should have defined 
boundaries (Brown, 2008). However I am unconvinced by the latter advice. 
Epistemologically, one cannot define the boundaries of the case primarily because 
they are temporally and spatially unstable (Verschuren, 2003). In Abrax's situation 
for instance, it was not epistemologically sustainable for me to conceive of him 
outside the network of his paid carers or his family. This is because Abrax's social 
network formed his link to the outside world by (re)interpreting his sounds and 
gestures to other people. Nevertheless I followed the advice of Stake (2005) that it 
was necessary to define Abrax as the case for conceptual and analytic purposes, if 
only as a way of delineating the boundaries of my research. As it happened, with 
Abrax, the focus on him and his immediate social network of his family and the 
private agency constituted his 'everyday life': 'The term 'everyday' or 'everyday life' 
refers to the immediate environment in which a person carries out the specific tasks 
associated with home life, employment, leisure etc.' (Lewis, 1997; p43). 
Although I embedded the case study of Abrax within a broader ethnographic 
methodology, there were differences between fieldwork in Yarlow and Kotoka. The 
activities and individuals in Yarlow were clearly defined. Unlike Kotoka which 
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proved more complex than envisaged, from the outset, I identified Abrax as the unit 
of analysis; therefore I had a focus for the case study. Besides, I knew who to speak to 
in Yarlow about Abrax's needs. On the other hand, in Yarlow I had to focus more on 
minutiae than in Kotoka because Abrax did not communicate in sentences but through 
gestures and monosyllabic sounds. 
Collecting case study data 
As part of the case study I spent time with Abrax at home, in the community, and the 
day centre at different times. Furthermore I interviewed Abrax' s parents in their home 
and I had several telephone conversations with them. This ethnographic data was 
augmented by interviews I conducted with five of Abrax's support workers, 
professionals in the day care centre and an occupational therapist who previously 
assessed Abrax's mental capacity for employment. Finally, I collected documents 
including records made by each support worker after the end of their shift with Abrax. 
In this section, I expand on case study methods, starting with observations. 
Observing Abrax and his social network 
My first three visits to Yarlow were to fulfil the ethical requirement to assess Abrax's 
mental capacity to consent to participate in my study13. In my application to SCREC, I 
gave an undertaking to assess service users' capacity to consent after visiting them at 
least three times. The MCA stipulates that an assessor should 'objectively' measure 
mental capacity. However, I felt that a more ethically robust approach would be for 
me to understand Abrax's communication needs and his personality first before 
assessing his capacity to consent. Consequently, reflecting the overarching 
13 In Chapter Eight I explain further how I assessed Abrax's mental capacity. 
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ethnographic methodology of my study, in order to understand Abrax's life in a broad 
sense, I gathered as much information as possible on the first three visits. Early in 
fieldwork with Abrax, to become accustomed to his unique communication methods I 
sought advice from his parents and support workers about interpretations of his 
gestures and sounds. Due to the procedures explained here, by the time I assessed 
Abrax's capacity, I broadly understood him, and I had also gathered detailed 
information about his life. 
In the case study of Abrax, emphases changed over time or even per 
observation, oscillating between the particular and the general (Merriam, 1988). 
These aforementioned decisions were influenced by what was happening around me 
at the time or whether the observation had been pre-arranged with Abrax and his 
carers. For instance, if an observation was pre-scheduled I would decide beforehand 
whether it was the first time that I was witnessing Abrax engage in that activity. By 
chance sometimes I observed rare events with important consequences for Abrax. An 
example was when I accompanied him to attend a physiotherapist clinic in his old 
school, Marigold, for his yearly fittings of new splints. Visiting Marigold offered the 
opportunity to interview school staff who knew Abrax since childhood and could, 
therefore, explain some epiphanic moments in his life. Additionally, I observed 
Abrax's interactions with his former peers, the reception accorded him by non-
academic staff and his facial expressions within a familiar but infrequently accessed 
space. 
Mainly, however, I set out on my visits to Abrax to observe minutiae. For 
instance when I saw Abrax for the second time, the look on his face, his stretching out 
his hand to touch my arm, together with the noise that he made indicated that he 
remembered me from my first visit. Even on the first visit Abrax could indicate that 
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he knew that I was the person whose photo was on the Participant Information Sheet. 
It seemed to me that Abrax displayed high cognitive capacity in the recognition of 
faces, thus my quest was to capture data on those moments when he displayed his 
understanding. Each day of observations, therefore, focused on how, for instance, 
Abrax displayed recognition, how his carers elicited responses from him, what kinds 
of questions his carers asked him in order to evoke responses, and how Abrax 
indicated that his carers had (not) understood him. 
In addition to minutiae, I also observed the broad strands of Abrax's life in 
order to understand his daily routines. To this end I asked about rituals at key points 
of the day such as meal times, his personal care, how he dressed, and how he 
mobilised using his wheel chair. Recognising that people also live their culture 
through the artefacts in their homes (Caughey, 2(06), I observed the surrounding 
environment, Abrax's rooms, and even the clothes he wore. On several occasions I 
accompanied Abrax and his support workers to a day centre where I observed how he 
associated with his peers and professionals. Abrax had physiotherapy sessions every 
Friday in the day centre so, with his permission, I observed his exercise routine. Like 
the fieldwork with social workers my conversations with professionals constituted 
interview data; however, I also conducted some tape recorded interviews. In the next 
section I expand on my interview methods during the case study, starting with 
interviewing Abrax. 
Interviewing in Yarlow 
Drawn to the principle of inclusivity, although I knew Abrax communicated mainly 
through monosyllabic sounds and gestures I sought to interview him whenever 
possible. Like Booth and Booth I believed that Abrax's means of communicating 
placed the onus on me to 'work harder (by having to ask more questions and probe 
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more fully to elicit information), but also pay more regard to the form of the 
questions, the sort of language used and the conduct of the interview' (Booth and 
Booth, 1996; p60). As Abrax responded predominantly to closed questions, I asked 
his permission about times to visit, whether I could accompany him on trips, and if he 
understood me. Sometimes Abrax and I attempted to communicate using his 
Communication Book; however, this frustrated Abrax because, with challenging fine 
motor skills, it was difficult for him to press the corresponding pictures on the Book. 
All these issues outlined above meant that, to understand epiphanic moments in 
Abrax's life, I had to interview his support workers and parents, an approach used by 
Hewitt (2000) during her work with people she described as 'hav[ing] the most 
profound physical and intellectual disabilities' (p95). Also because Abrax did not 
communicate in sentences, I played a greater part in constructing the data than 
envisaged. For instance, rather than their being explicitly stated, I inferred Abrax's 
views from his movements and sounds. Additionally I took the views of those who 
knew Abrax better than I did such as his parents. 
Interviewing Abrax's parents 
Abrax's parents played dual roles of consultees and informants in my research. 
According to the MeA requirements, in social research, consultees should be 
appointed if prospective participants do not have capacity to consent to their 
involvement (Davies et aI, 2010; Dixon-Woods and Angell, 2009; DOH, 2008). 
Consultees are required by statute to advice researchers as to whether people with 
mental capacity-impeding conditions should be involved in empirical studies. 
Therefore, after deciding that Abrax could not consent to his participation, I appointed 
his parents as consultees to seek their advice, and this metamorphosed into subsequent 
life story interviews about him. In my encounters with Abrax's parents, I was guided 
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by the principle that they should both be present at every meeting and interview. 
Firstly, this was due to my ethical draw to transparency; that they should both hear the 
details about the research simultaneously. Similarly, I wanted to hear their first-hand 
accounts at the same time. Reflecting on my social work experience, I knew that 
parents' stories of their encounters with professionals sometimes contained painful 
stories. These narratives revolved around the fraught process of their children being 
categorised as 'disabled' for the first time or experiences of resource rationing. Thus, 
aside from transparency, I felt that both of Abrax's parents needed to be present at 
interviews to provide mutual support as they recounted his life experiences. 
At the first meeting with Abrax's parents, as well as appointing them as 
consultees, I also piloted some life story interview questions. Abrax's parents agreed 
to a subsequent formal tape recorded interview at which I asked them about key 
moments in Abrax's life (Gibson, 2011). The second interview with his parents was 
more akin to a formal research interview. I had a tape-recorder and a note book. I 
asked new questions about Abrax' s life history or asked his parents to clarify 
information given in the first interview. However, deliberately, I did not have an 
interview schedule. I thought that with Abrax having been known to statutory services 
for most of his life, his family would have been subject to numerous formal 
assessments. To avoid replicating the scenario of statutory assessments, I thought that 
I needed to adopt a conversational tone for the life story interview, and this would be 
achieved without an interview schedule. Subsequently, I transcribed the tape recorded 
interview. I also recorded telephone conversations with Abrax' s parents as data, and 
these were transcribed and analysed. 
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Interviewing support workers 
Abrax's support workers consented to being tape-recorded. However, usually, they 
were busy attending to Abrax's needs so I had to interview them informally as per my 
fieldwork in Kotoka. I formally interviewed one support worker on two separate 
occasions for about an hour each time and another support worker once. Similarly 
adopting a life story approach, all the interviews of support workers involved them 
explaining to me their culture and its impact on their work with Abrax. From the 
outset, my identities as a PhD researcher and a black African male of Ghanaian origin 
who held a British passport influenced fieldwork more than I envisaged. The support 
workers being black African identified with me. In interviews and observations the 
support workers used me as a reference point for their answers. In tum, I deliberately 
drew on my life history to mould conversations, explain my point, or build rapport. At 
other times, my life experiences gave me the intuition to pursue certain angles of 
questioning. 
Contrastingly, at other periods in fieldwork, I felt that I instinctively 
understood certain events or stories and as a result did not pursue or query them 
further. The issues I identify here are hotly debated in the sociology literature as 
(de)merits of insider/outsider research or native anthropology (Ganga and Scott, 2006; 
Messerschmidt, 1981; Mizock et ai, 2011). In accordance with my methodological 
position to reveal my role and (re)present 'I' (as discussed in the literature review, 
Chapter Two), I explore further the role of my identity in Chapter Eight. 
Note-taking and document collection 
During fieldwork in Yarlow I took notes and kept the same electronic templates as 
Kotoka. However, in Yarlow, unlike in Kotoka, I had the opportunity to collect 
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documents. I needed to know what had been written about Abrax. I asked for two 
types of document and was allowed to photo copy about two months' recordings of 
each. One document was a record of Abrax's daily activities, whilst another was the 
carers' notes of events through the night: for instance what time Abrax was helped to 
the toilet, whether he woke up at night unprompted, and his morning routines. 
Analysing fieldwork data 
My research has been guided by a grounded theory analysis for epistemological and 
theoretical reasons. Epistemologically, I have been drawn to an inductive approach to 
the data gathering. Firstly, my research area is relatively new, therefore, there was 
little material to refer to. Secondly I wanted to gain a broad perspective and 
understand complexity; I felt that any prior determination of issues to focus on during 
fieldwork would work against gaining some new directions in my substantive area. 
Due to these epistemological and theoretical positions I opted for a grounded theory 
approach to collecting and analysing data. As such, when I started fieldwork in 
Kotoka and Yarlow I did not have any pre-conceptions about phenomena requiring 
my focus, and I observed and made notes about everything happening around me. 
With time however, as a matter of practicality, I realised that I needed a framework to 
organise the data, if only for data management purposes. 
Fieldwork data handling and coding 
In order to compartmentalise my data, during the first phase of fieldwork in Kotoka I 
bore in mind three possible analytic strands - team tasks, professional decision-
making, and service user needs - that interacted in complex ways for mental capacity 
issues to arise. However, at the same time, I reflexively held on to my theoretical 
position that team tasks, professional decision-making, and service user needs did not 
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have static conceptual boundaries: they were predominantly analytic frameworks for 
thinking about and keeping a bird's-eye view of my data. Then, using the computer 
programme Nvivo, I created electronic folders in which data pertaining to these three 
analytic threads would be stored. I continued with this data management strategy in 
Yarlow: thus the three electronic documents that I used for field notes (discussed 
earlier in this chapter) were later stored into Nvivo so that I could sort through 
documents, rename them, and break them down for coding with relative ease 
(Hutchison et aI, 2010). 
My approach to coding was predominantly influenced by Charmaz (2006) and 
Hammersley and Atkinson (2007). In the main my codes were derived from my data 
with an initial emphasis on understanding the content of the field notes. Following 
Charmaz especially, I have coded using gerunds: my codes are mostly words that 
invoke images of action and end in 'ing' - for example 'participating', 'setting the 
tenns of engagement'; and 'reconceptualising practice issues'. While most of the 
codes emanate from my data others have been attained from my epistemological 
positions. So, for instance, I created the code 'drawing on culture' which is my 
theoretical position that rather than being static or identifiable, people draw on culture 
to make claims against the State. 
In my earlier discussion of field notes, I explained that I wrote memos 
regularly to keep track of my ideas during fieldwork - I maintained this strategy with 
respect to data analysis. Thus in addition to coding data, I also engaged in frequent 
memoing of conceptual categories. As I grouped similar codes into categories 
(Holton, 2010), at key points, these sparked conceptual ideas which I memoed. One 
example of my analytic memos is presented below: 
123 
The concept (node) telling information to service user may be inversely 
related to assessing capacity. In other words where professionals find that 
the service user has the mental capacity to challenge their views or not 
follow what they are being told it becomes more pertinent to 'tell' them 
information: to present it as a fait accompli (Memo, 04 October 2011). 
As well as illustrating my memoing, the data extract above also shows that I engaged 
in comparing codes - in the literature this is referred to as the constant comparative 
method (Holton, 2009). I examined the conceptual differences and similarities 
between my codes, which I memoed, then I examined the data and compared the 
actual incidents from which I had derived the codes. I found that, with time, I was not 
generating additional codes. 
My strategy for data analysis was not a sequential process. I started analysing 
data whilst at Kotoka because even when I transcribed field notes, I made detailed 
annotations expanding on my observations and placing reminders about future issues 
to look out for. By the time that I started at Yarlow I was confident in my data 
analysis strategy but I found that I returned to the data I gathered in Kotoka to clarify 
the codes or change them. As a matter of epistemology I have also taken advice from 
Lather (2011) that data analysis is always in the process of completion so that 
researchers gain new understandings from re-analysing data. In the main the data that 
I have selected for my empirical sections in the thesis (Chapters Five, Six, and Seven) 
are those that best illustrate the phenomena I witnessed in fieldwork. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have shown how I implemented my broad methodological 
framework of ethnography in fieldwork. Taking a reflexive tone, I have shown that 
the processes of seeking ethical approval from SCREC as well as attempting to gain 
access to a local authority site shaped my fieldwork practices. As a result of the 
ethical approval process I imagined that I would be conducting research in a discrete 
social work team; however, on contact with Kotoka, I realised that my research site 
would be an integrated team. Because Kotoka was a multi-disciplinary team, I could 
involve different professionals besides social workers in my research. As such I 
interviewed and observed more professionals than initially envisaged. I also collected 
multiple documents from different sources. Similarly, while prior to starting fieldwork 
I anticipated involving six service users in my research, in the event access was 
difficult. However, Abrax, the one service user I gained access to opened up new 
avenues in respect of the substantive concerns of my research. Thus I modified my 
broad ethnographic approach to include a case study of Abrax. As a final note to this 
chapter, I wish to highlight that my fieldwork experiences provide a powerful case for 
the methodological utility of ethnography in a relatively new field such as studying 
the MCA. Because there are comparatively few studies about the MCA there was the 
need for flexibility during fieldwork in order for me to develop lines of enquiry. By 
conducting ethnographic research, I was able me to modify my fieldwork practices 
while adhering to my methodological and epistemological stances. Since I started 
fieldwork without pre-defined research questions and aims (as encouraged by some 
ethnographic writers (Fetterman, 1998; Amit-Talia 2000; Fox, 2004)), I could 
orientate the substantive concerns of my research. In the next chapter, I therefore 
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discuss my observations in Kotoka, namely; how the MeA is operationalised within 
an integrated service. 
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CHAPTER FIVE. INTEGRATED 
ADULT LEARNING DISABILITY 
SERVICES AND THE MCA 
Focusing on ethnicity and learning disability, this chapter addresses my research 
question on how integrated adult learning disability services are discharging their 
statutory duties under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA). Firstly, I present 
findings on the internal workings of Kotoka, an integrated learning disability service 
where I conducted fieldwork. Given that the core participants of my fieldwork were 
social workers, I highlight the social work team, contextualising it within the broader 
integrated service. 
The literature review also highlighted the paucity of empirical studies on the 
operationalisation of the MCA. More specifically, the literature review showed a 
knowledge gap in how integrated learning disability teams approached their statutory 
duty to assess mental capacity; and relatedly, how social work contributed to this 
quest. In seeking to provide some evidence from fieldwork, the second aim of this 
chapter contributes to research and knowledge of the MCA as an emerging 
substantive field of enquiry. 
This chapter is in three parts. In Part One, I present data on the internal 
workings of Kotoka. In Part Two, I build on the ideas from Part One to illustrate how 
informal practices permeated the assessment of mental capacity. Finally, in Part 
Three, I illustrate how professionals drew on the MCA when they investigated 
allegations of abuse or drew up protective measures. In Chapter One, where I 
discussed my epistemological positions, I argued that social constructionists draw 
attention to context as a significant determinant of meaning generation: in making 
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sense of the world people draw on material, human, and temporal resources. Through 
this chapter, I demonstrate that notwithstanding the increasing bureaucratisation of 
services, institutional contexts influence how the MCA is implemented; context can 
circumscribe or engender professional discretion in relation to statutory obligations. 
Part One below, picks up the discussion about context, and I show how teams are 
configured within my fieldwork site. 
Part One. Scene-setting: services' 
integration and eligibility in 
Kotoka 
The integrated service, Kotoka, is an amalgamation of social care and health services. 
While there were no eligibility criteria for health services, statutory social care was 
allocated according to the Fair Access to Care Services (FACS) guidance (DOH, 
2003; 2010) under which one had to be assessed as either of 'critical' or 'substantial' 
need to receive services. To become a 'service user' or 'case', one had to be referred 
through a completed Referral Form and be classified as learning disabled. Notionally 
a transparent policy in Kotoka existed for processing new referrals. There was a 
multi-disciplinary Referral and Intake Committee (RIC), involving managers of the 
sub-teams, which met on Tuesdays to discuss new referrals. At RIC, decisions were 
made as to which sub-team would conduct the needs assessment. Once assessed as 
eligible for a service, for administrative purposes, the referral acquired the status of 'a 
case' and would be allocated to one team or professional after the RIC meeting, and 
this in tum influenced categorisation. For instance, if the new case was assigned to the 
social work team, then the category would be social care. In the social work team, one 
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was initially classified as an 'unallocated case' until assigned to a social worker's 
caseload, at which point a service user acquired the status of 'a case' . 
Due to tightening eligibility criteria most allocated cases were 'complex' and 
stayed 'open' for a long time. Professionals become acquainted with the case even if 
not the details; thus walking around the social work team, I heard service users 
referred to by their names instead of as a 'case.' In practice, different professionals 
were simultaneously assigned tasks on the case and the category of individual cases 
changed with time. For example, an individual might be discharged from section in 
hospital (the 1983 Mental Health Act's powers of detention) and become subjected to 
a Supervised Community Treatment Order (CTO)14. Although this would primarily be 
a mental health issue, in Kotoka, a social worker would also be involved to address 
the person's social care needs such as welfare benefits, accommodation, food, or 
clothing. Along the line, the service user might need accommodation, and this would 
lead to the involvement of an Occupational Therapist (OT), if adaptations were 
required to the new residence. In Kotoka, professionals believed that being part of the 
same 'integrated' service led to better service provision because the three 
professionals in this described scenario - psychiatrist, social worker, OT - would 
easily agree on how the case should be managed. This sharing of roles was called 
'joint working' and some professionals believed that collaboration with colleagues 
from different disciplines was one of the merits of integration. 
Having set the scene for this chapter by describing how one acquired the status 
of a case, and having also introduced the concept of joint working, I now explore how 
these were manifested on the ground in fieldwork. 
14 Under new legislation in 2008 a CTO is an alternative to hospital detention and the 
service user is treated in the community by a psychiatrist. 
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The impact of service integration 
I start this section by presenting data on two opinions on the benefits of integration 
from the viewpoint of two professionals: one a social worker and the other a Person-
centred Planning (PCP) Coordinator. Extract 1 contains the views of social worker 
Adwoa, which I recorded in field notes after shadowing her. In this extract, she 
suggests that being part of the same service, in the same location enables joint-
working. Extract 2 was obtained from a taped interview with the PCP Coordinator 
who described his role to me as akin to an advocate for service users: 'about the 
inclusion to ensure that the people we support are being consulted and involved in the 
process and that includes the process of driving policy'. 
Extract 1. Integration makes work easier; makes joint assessments easier; 
working relationships better; but feels that they could interact better (Field 
note, Adwoa, 7 June 2011). 
Extract 2. I'm a huge fan of it and it is the way to go, it's clearly the way 
to working because in a sense it is a Person-Centred way to look at it 
because if you're within [ ... ] I mean if you're accessing a service, and you 
can say this when I do training for family groups, it doesn't matter who 
you call if it's in this office, if you need to get hold of a nurse, and they're 
not around, if you happen to have my number, phone up, call me and the 
chances are I can see who you want and I can signpost you very, very 
quickly. It often happens that way. I'll be sat here and somebody can just 
ring, dialled the number they happen to have and actually find the solution 
within minutes whilst they're still on the phone. You know from a 
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customer experience people really appreciate that. (Taped interview, PCP 
Coordinator, 28 July 2011). 
The PCP Coordinator and Adwoa's views were contrasting pictures about integration, 
primarily because of their divergent roles in the organisation. Adowa (a social 
worker) focused solely on the internal workings of Kotoka, drawing attention to how 
being part of the same team enabled professionals to conduct joint assessments, and 
how integration also fostered better working relationships between professionals. By 
contrast, the PCP Coordinator emphasised the service user experience. The two pieces 
of data I have presented above show how even in the face of integration, professionals 
held divergent views on the merits of uniting different professionals within one 
organisational structure. These individual accounts may also be due to distinct 
professional identities. 
Being a social worker, Adwoa was central to the work of the service because 
she had to coordinate the work of other professionals, hence her wish that 
professionals' interacted more closely. On the other hand, the PCP Coordinator saw 
himself as an advocate for service users; consequently, he was happy that any 
professional within the integrated team could serve as a point of contact for service 
users, as per the picture presented to the outside world that Kotoka was a unitary 
service. Thus although Kotoka's publicity material presented images of a unitary 
organisation, with familiarisation, I uncovered specialist teams with relative 
autonomy to set their own internal policies and preference to maintain their identities. 
It is perhaps for this reason that Adwoa expressed her wish that the teams 'could 
interact better'. 
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During fieldwork most professionals identified spatial proximity between 
professionals as the key advantage of integrated services with little mentioned about 
procedural commonalities. A consequence of being in close proximity is that informal 
work practices were encouraged which helped to manage the complexity of the cases 
referred to the team. One way by which professionals learnt to manage complicated 
cases was by negotiating the trajectory of cases outside any formal organisational 
procedures. Professionals from various teams walked to each other's desks, discussed 
the case and agreed on what to do, without necessarily referring to their team 
managers. Because these discussions were informal, one rarely noticed professionals 
document the agreements reached. Managers, on the other hand, relied on these 
informal negotiations of case trajectories to bypass professionals of lower rank in 
other teams who refused to accede to requests. This was explained by Jo, a female 
senior OT manager, below in a taped interview: 
Well I suppose those meetings [RIC] are really just where the paperwork 
comes or discussions happen to make sure that the work between 
professionals is recorded. I suppose it is rubber stamping but I would say a 
lot of that happens because we're able to discuss, you know, people 
[service users or cases] you know. If I have got a difficult case I would 
probably go to the duty at the social work team - 'not sure about this can I 
bend your ear? You know, is there any possibility of something 
happening?' Perhaps this is a social work sort of issue that they can help 
us out in OT and I think we do a lot of that. Because we know each other 
and I think the rubber stamping of that will then happen in RIC (Taped 
interview, Jo, 4 August 2011). 
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The quote above was in response to my question about how cases were allocated 
within Kotoka. Jo explained that usually if she (or more accurately her workers) 
needed help with social work tasks, she requested help directly from the social work 
team. In the process, Jo subverted formal procedures stipulating the completion of 
referral forms. To directly seek help from the social work team, Jo constructed or 
drew the conceptual boundaries of 'a social work sort of issue'. Moreover her 
subordinates in the OT Team may not have been present at the discussion with the 
social work team and although they may be informed of the outcome, they were 
deprived of the detail of the negotiation. This situation would be mirrored on the 
social work team which informally accepted the request for help. Informal 
negotiations in Kotoka sped work up but perhaps to the detriment of workers keeping 
track of details of cases. 
An equally important point to note from the OT manager's quote above is that 
when presented to RIC where it is formally recorded, professionals at the meeting are 
in effect agreeing to decisions made in their absence. Resulting from the 'rubber 
stamping' role of RIC, in Kotoka, professionals could not assume full responsibility 
for their allocated cases since other key decisions were sometimes made by 
professionals in other teams. Furthermore, the extensive use of informal discussions 
in Kotoka, coupled with assigning mUltiple professionals to a case meant that 
professionals were not always up to date with developments on the case. 
I now present some data from my field observations to demonstrate how, even 
within the same team, information about a service user could be fragmented, with 
implications for assessments. The three central characters in the data were all social 
workers: Mavis, Annika, and Claire. I recorded the data extract whilst shadowing 
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Mavis, when she recounted a mental capacity assessment she conducted. Annika who 
was sitting next to me interjected and told me that 'this is an interesting case to 
follow'. Then Claire, occupying the opposite desk, joined the discussion because she 
had just been allocated the case. As such, all three social workers had been involved 
in the case at different key points of the service user's life. Mavis was asked to work 
with the service user when he was evicted from his placement because he injured a 
professional. Annika's role was to conduct an annual review. Subsequently Claire 
became involved as the newly allocated social worker. 
Annika said that at the annual review the main issue was that the service 
user wanted to move to Japan to meet a woman that he had formed a 
friendship with on a social networking site. In Annika's view the service 
user's father was not helping the situation because he promised to go to 
Japan with him even though he displayed very little commitment to his 
son's care. Annika said that at the annual review her analysis was that the 
service user has a character for 'fixations' and as much as she tried to 
move the conversation on to a consideration of the consequences of going 
to Japan, the service user would not deviate from his insistence on 
wanting to go to Japan. Mavis said that she had not heard about the 
service user's desire to go to Japan - 'this is the first time I have heard of 
it'. (Field note, 30 June 2011). 
The MeA Code of Practice suggests that assessments should be conducted by people 
who know the person well; but in the data extract above, the social workers had 
access to discrete pieces of information about the person. Crucially, in the case of 
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Mavis, when she conducted the mental capacity assessment, she did not know that the 
service user had once said that he wanted to move to Japan. Thus, whereas the policy 
drive towards statutory service integration is underpinned by the assumption that 
communication between professionals would improve care (petch, 2011), in Kotoka, 
there was fragmentation of information. While nearly all professionals in the study 
agreed that spatial proximity made it easier to discuss cases, on the other side, 
information was dispersed over a wide network of professionals, with no one 
accorded ultimate responsibility for building a holistic picture of the service user. 
That social workers amass discrete pieces of information without forming an analytic 
thread has long been recognised (Wilkins and Boahen, 2013); however, in the 
integrated services literature, it is taken for granted that unitary organisational 
structures would improve professionals' share of information. The data presented here 
involving Mavis, Annika, and Claire challenges the supposition of better information 
sharing. 
Another important finding from Kotoka challenged the assumption in the 
integrated services literature that amalgamating separate professions into one service 
led to unhealthy competition (Maslin-Prothero and Bennion, 2010). There were 
blurred professional boundaries because professionals (or teams) shared tasks. 
However I did not record any instances of professionals in competition for roles or to 
take the lead in case management. Whereas it has been long recognised that the 
boundaries of 'social care' or 'social work' are difficult to define (Shaw, 2012), 
arguably health workers have a stronger sense of professional identity because of their 
relative special isms. Thus teams identifying as 'health' could name their specialities 
and as such in Kotoka, they could clearly establish the tasks that they were competent 
to carry out and vice versa. On the other hand, in Kotoka, social workers were 
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involved in nearly all 'complex' cases; in all the multi-disciplinary meetings that I 
observed, I noticed the presence of social workers, and the social work team seemed 
the starting point for case allocations. In the next section I present data to explain that 
one reason for the apparent lack of professional competition is because social work 
was accorded centrality in Kotoka. 
The centrality of social work in Kotoka 
In an environment of fragmented information, blurred professional boundaries, and 
informal working practices, the social work team was accorded an omnipresent status 
and a unifying role within Kotoka. Although relatively small in number, social 
workers played a central role in the organisation of work in Kotoka. In the next 
section, I briefly describe the structure of the team before discussing the role of the 
team from the viewpoint of the social workers and other professionals within Kotoka 
and the local authority. 
Gender and spatial constitution of the social work team 
The social work team changed significantly in the course of fieldwork. The core 
participants of my research, who I have described in the methods section (Chapter 
Four) remained in post; however, one social worker, Ofira, who I had shadowed for a 
few weeks left and was replaced by two female social workers and a Care 
Coordinator. Furthermore the team was augmented by two Reviewing Officers. In the 
lower ranks of the team, females were numerically dominant but, arguably, no one 
ethnic group had a higher share of the workforce; additionally, there were more 
qualified than unqualified workers. The management structure of the social work team 
consisted of three female assistant managers and one male white service manager 
(Chris). The names of the managers and ethnic identities (assigned by me) were as 
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follows: Monica (Polish), Sandra (Turkish), Danielle (who I thought of as mixed 
heritage). Thus the one qualified male social worker in the team was the overall 
manager; therefore, a white male in the group held power disproportionate to the 
numerical representation of men. 
Ironically the social work team was not spatially integrated because social 
workers occupied two separate offices split over the ground and first floors. Chris and 
Danielle shared a big desk in one comer of a large open-plan office on the first floor 
with other members of the integrated team. Sitting next to Chris and Danielle was the 
administrator of personalisation. Each sub-team in the service occupied the same 
space but, because the two social care managers sat in a designated comer of the 
office, when I was first introduced to the first floor, I felt that they were separated 
from the rest of the social work team. The feeling of separateness was repeated on the 
ground floor where four members of the social work team sat together around a desk, 
including the Duty Social Worker, called 'Duty' by professionals. The spatial division 
of the social work team affected the types of cases emanating from the ground floor 
office. 
One of the key roles of the Duty desk was to act as a point of contact for 
'emergency' cases. Therefore, there was a social worker permanently available 'on 
duty' to answer telephone calls and unscheduled visits by service users and/or their 
carers as well as professionals from Kotoka and the wider local authority. In addition 
to their other duties, social workers were diarised as Duty for a week at a time. In case 
there was an emergency requiring their absence from the office, each Duty usually 
had a deputy to take over their role. Sitting next to the Duty desk was Assistant 
Manager, Monica, who also acted as Duty Manager. Among social workers Monica 
had a reputation for being knowledgeable in safeguarding issues. Through a 
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combination of professionals on Duty and Monica's standing as an expert in 
safeguarding, many 'alerts' originated from the Duty desk. These factors outlined 
here arguably explain why the OT manager, quoted previously in this chapter, said 
that she would walk to the Duty desk and ask for help if required. 
Social work as omnipresent and moral 
In Kotoka only the social workers had a fully computerised workflow processes I call 
Eboni5• While using Ebony frustrated social workers because they saw it as too 
cumbersome, the speedy ability to retrieve information on service users granted social 
workers power and status through efficiency and made them knowledgeable about 
service users' life histories. Although access to Ebony increased social workers' 
power vis-a-vis other professionals, it also increased their workload. During one 
shadowing session with Audrey, I observed and took notes on her work on the Duty 
desk. To illustrate the cumbersome nature of Ebony, Audrey told me about a letter she 
had received that day from a psychiatrist sitting a few yards away from her in the 
same office. The psychiatrist had written to the social work team to request that a 
service user's care package be increased. Although Audrey and the psychiatrist were 
co-located, the letter was first typed by the psychiatrist's secretary, and emailed to 
Audrey for her to upload on Ebony. Once uploaded, Audrey then had to make another 
record of the email exchange with the psychiatrist in Ebony. Seemingly a convoluted 
process, the uploading of information nevertheless placed Audrey at the apex of 
coordinating the service user's needs. 
15 I have used 'Ebony' as a term of anonymity. 
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During fieldwork in Kotoka I heard more stories about social workers being involved 
in a wider range of cases than other professionals. In one sense the apparent 
omnipresence of social work in Kotoka can be explained in policy terms. The main 
gateway for disabled adults to access services is through care management 
assessment, and this has resided within social care teams (Lewis, 1997; Cambridge et 
al, 2005; Cambridge, 2008; Trevillion, 2007). Furthermore, current policy identifies 
social work as the 'lead professional' in safeguarding investigations (SCIE, 2011). 
Thus with Kotoka being a learning disability service, arguably it was no surprise that I 
observed social work given prominence by other professionals. Nevertheless I also 
observed that social workers were under tremendous pressure due to their high 
caseloads. 
One way In which the social workers managed the stress caused by high 
caseloads was to ascribe a moral dimension to their work, such as the need to protect 
or enhance service users' autonomy, or their right to make decisions for themselves. 
Thus during shadowing of Mavis, she told me that her practice was influenced by her 
belief that people had a right to make decisions for themselves: 
She said that she believed that people had the right to make decisions for 
themselves even within the context of parent-child relationship. Mavis 
spoke passionately and eloquently [about her values] (Field notes, 22 
August 2011). 
Another form of morality that social workers ascribed to their profession was that 
they saw it as their role to improve lives. Audrey, who I regularly observed taking 
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work home over the weekend, maintained that she did not 'get emotionally involved' 
and wished to improve service users' lives: 
Audrey said that she tries not to become emotionally involved. Her view 
is always that whatever the service user's life up to the point that she has 
been allocated the case her job as a social worker is to make their lives 
better. Once she leaves the office she forgets about her cases - 'leave work 
behind' - but in the office she is fully committed and 'gets stressed 
sometimes'. (Field note, shadowing Audrey, 22 July 2011). 
Similar to Audrey's views recorded above, Adwoa also told me on 22 June 2011 
when I shadowed her that, even where families had complained about her, she still 
worked with them to improve their lives. That social workers feel that their role is to 
make service users' lives better is widely recognised in the literature (Shier and 
Graham, 2011). Within Kotoka, however, the moral dimensions of social work 
identified in this section, arguably, were means by which professionals constructed a 
unique identity from their other (non-social work) colleagues, or coped with the 
physical and emotional demands of their roles. Nevertheless the organisational 
structure of Kotoka sometimes caused tensions between social workers' claims to 
ethical practice and the expedient need to deal with high case loads. 
Tensions: rights-based practice, team culture and 
identifying mental capacity issues 
To manage high case loads, there was a set of accepted practices that amounted to a 
culture within the social work team (Kunda, 2002) of assessing new service users in 
the Meeting Rooms in the office after referral had been processed through RIC. 
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Another practice was that close family members and carers were encouraged to be 
present at home visits. Both practices described here saved money and time~ unless 
necessary social workers did not have to travel too often nor did they have to 
routinely provide accessible information formats for service users. In any event the 
cases that social workers dealt with were complex or 'juicy' (as explained by 
Annikka): 'cases that get allocated something need[s] to be happening like someone 
has to be moving [ accommodation], they are more urgent' (Field note, 13 June 2011). 
Allocated cases involved multiple professionals and several dimensions: for instance 
there might be housing, medical, or benefit issues which need to be resolved 
simultaneously. Consequently it was deemed that not all service users could follow 
the discussions~ therefore, it was expedient to make carers and family members the 
focal points of discussions about service users. Because Kotoka was located in the 
busy town centre with heavy traffic, service users would require close supervision~ 
therefore, most carers attended alone. Also, as explained to me by the PCP 
Coordinator during a taped interview, service users eschewed coming to the office 
because they associated the building spaces with 'crises': 
You see a lot of the people we support don't like this building, I mean we 
think it's a friendly, nice comfortable office, building, but a lot of people 
have an association with this building of stressful meetings: 'this is where 
I went, when my placement broke down that's where I went, I went to that 
reception room, I lost my flat I went to that reception room, mum died'. 
You know so often people's first access to a team like this will be because 
there's been a crisis. So the next time there's a crisis, what you do - you 
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bring them back to the same building. (Taped interview, PCP Coordinator, 
28 July 2011). 
Apart from association with 'crises' as explained by the data extract above, another 
downside to conducting assessments within the confines of Kotoka was that 
professionals missed opportunities to observe service users in different environments 
in order to understand how they made everyday decisions. In another sense it may be 
hypothesised that, besides expediency, the culture (or practice) of conducting 
assessments on the premises of Kotoka and/or making carers the focal point of home 
visits, served to resolve some moral quandaries for social workers around mental 
capacity. For, unless in exceptional circumstances, professionals did not have to 
confront the moral and legal minefield of ascertaining whether service users had 
mental capacity to understand prevailing 'crises'. Moreover by making carers the 
focal point of discussions, professionals deferred any ethical dilemmas about whether 
they shared similar meanings with service users about mental capacity. The practice 
of bypassing service users also negated any moral requirement to seek consent from 
them to intervene in their lives. In effect, the culture of assessments allowed the social 
work team to bypass some of the stipulations of the MeA and some of the moral 
quandaries about how to obtain consent for interventions. 
The hypothesis that I have described above could explain how social workers 
in Kotoka reconciled the contradictions between the team culture of conducting 
assessments in the office space, and their belief in the moral quest of their profession 
to seek service users' consent for interventions. Where professionals processed a new 
referral they resolved the tension between their moral imperatives and the team's 
culture by 'casting' another person (usually the carer) into the role of making 
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decisions on behalf of the service user. Thus it was striking that when social workers 
discussed care packages with carers they used the word 'you' as if they were 
arranging services for the carer instead of the service user. For instance on 21 June 
2011, I observed a meeting between Of ira and Mrs Pike during which her daughter's 
care package was reviewed. There were complex discussions around the suitability of 
the current care package but I noticed that Ofira made Mrs Pike rather than her 
daughter the focus of the discussion and this led me to make the following 
observation in my field notes: 
6 weeks respite has been agreed - 'so you can use it how you like': This 
statement struck me because it chimed with my earlier observations about 
how social workers address carers as 'you' as if the services were for the 
benefit of carers rather than the service user. (Field notes, 21 June 2011). 
The present discussions about the informal culture around how social workers 
conducted assessments in Kotoka are within the context of my aim in Part One to 
explore the nature of integrated services in Kotoka. I have shown in Part One that, 
organisationally, Kotoka was a unified learning disability integrated service and was 
presented as such to service users. However the internal dynamics of the service was 
that of several sub-teams using informal practices to meet service users' needs. The 
model of integration was universally appreciated in Kotoka; nevertheless, each 
profession provided different reasons for the efficacy of joint-working. Amidst the 
informality and blurred professional boundaries arising from spatial proximity and 
professional collaboration, the social work team may be seen as a unifying thread of 
the organisation. Social workers were involved in most cases because of the fluid 
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nature of their professional boundaries as well as their role as the gateway to most 
statutory learning disability services. Part One of this chapter has, therefore, been 
about the institutional context of my research. Building on the explanations of Part 
One, in what follows in Part Two, I highlight another surprising finding from my 
fieldwork in Kotoka; namely, the infrequency of mental capacity assessments. Taking 
as the point of departure my previous explanation of informality, I start Part Two by 
discussing how mental capacity was conceptualised. 
Part Two. Conceptualising mental 
capacity in Kotoka 
During one shadowing session (on 13 June 2011), I asked Mavis (social worker) 
about the infrequency of capacity assessments. Her response was 'We're not doing 
capacity assessments everyday but once in a while'. Throughout many weeks of 
fieldwork in Kotoka, I did not witness or observe a formal mental capacity 
assessment. In the MCA, learning disability is identified as one of the triggering 
conditions for capacity assessments so it was reasonable to expect that within Kotoka 
- a learning disability service - capacity assessments would be routine. Moreover the 
thrust of current learning disability policy is increasing choice, independence, and 
empowerment (Hollomotz, 2012), which arguably are underpinned by mental 
capacity. Consequently, I hypothesised before fieldwork that I would observe several 
capacity assessments, but this was not to be the case in Kotoka. Here in Part Two, I 
present data to show that a probable reason for the infrequency of capacity 
assessments is that professionals, service users, and/or their carers in Kotoka 
operationalised mental capacity more broadly than defmed by the MeA's legal 
framework. As such, Part Two builds on my explanation in Part One that the 
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institutional context of my research was one of blurred professional boundaries, joint 
working, informal work processes, and fragmented information sharing. 
Distinguishing between formal and informal 
capacity assessment 
The definition of mental capacity in the MCA is what I conceptualise as formal 
capacity assessment. The main distinction between a formal and informal capacity 
assessment is that the former is documented whereas the latter includes the 
judgements made about a person's capacity to make decisions outside the MCA 
framework. In Kotoka, formal capacity assessments are written on a designated form 
called Capacity Proforma, at which point the assessment is official. The culture within 
the service was that the professional who knew the service user best assessed their 
mental capacity: 
Mavis suggested that the culture with the Integrated Team is that the 
professional who knows the service user best conducts the assessment. 
(Field notes, 30 June 2011). 
In the MCA Code of Practice (2007) it is advised that assessment of capacity should 
involve people who know the service user best, therefore the culture within Kotoka 
captured in the above data extract mirrors statutory guidance. However, in their daily 
interactions, professionals in Kotoka also judged service users' mental capacity 
without due course to the Capacity Proforma or the MCA. 
Jenkins (2000) has argued that (self)categorisation is an indispensable and 
unavoidable means of making sense of a complex world. By Jenkins' postulation, the 
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informal assessment of capacity by professionals may be one way that they navigated 
their myriad duties. Contrasting Jenkins' thesis, in some of the 'caring' services 
literature, it is argued that documentation 'creates' or 'constructs' the service user 
according to institutional indicators. Barrett (1996) in an anthropological study of a 
psychiatric institution - the study involved psychiatrists, social workers, and 
psychiatric nurses - found that the case notes of patients sometimes differed from the 
conditions that they presented with. Barrett's explanation of the discrepancy was that 
the process of documenting needs led to the construction of a patient different from 
their self-descriptions. Similar arguments to Barrett's have been made in respect of 
the completion of electronic assessment forms in social work, where it is argued that 
the layout of forms influenced the assessed needs of service users (Pithouse et aI, 
2009; White et aI, 2008). 
However my observations in Kotoka identified practices that may be said to 
conform more to Jenkins' postulations in that construction of service users' mental 
capacity temporally preceded documentation. By the time social workers documented 
their capacity assessments, they had judged the service user's capacity. Informal 
assessments were conducted on the basis of the social worker's intuition, the service 
user's presentation, and prior categorisation by other professionals. Moreover, service 
users in their daily lives articulated and demonstrated capabilities which challenged 
the MCA's legal framework. Some social workers also believed that all the MCA had 
done was formalise social workers' value-base to seek people's consent before 
interventions; and in this sense, the legislation was a bureaucratic nicety. 
Informal perceptions of mental capacity 
In this section, I discuss how professionals, service users, and/or their families (or 
carers) conceptualised mental capacity. To do so, I draw on a mixture of first-hand 
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accounts and my interpretation of data. The section is presented sequentially and 
thematically thus: mental capacity as communicating, mental capacity as social 
relations, and PCP and the MCA in Kotoka. 
Mental capacity as communicating 
In Kotoka, one of the key yardsticks of informal capacity assessment was whether the 
service user's means of communicating was regarded as 'non-verbal'. By 'non-
verbal' professionals usually meant that the service user did not communicate 10 
coherent sentences intelligible to them. Because being 'non-verbal' linked to 
incapacity, 'verbal' servlce users were generally considered to have capacity. 
Professionals taking this view believed that how a service user communicated was a 
window onto their capacity; if you communicated verbally, then by corollary you 
were more capable than those who couldn't or didn't. One instance that explains 
'mental capacity as communicating' was the case of Mandy, who Audrey, a social 
worker, was convinced needed to move from a big nursing home to a smaller unit. In 
preparation for the move, Audrey and I visited Mandy to conduct an audit of her 
clothes. On our return I asked Audrey whether a mental capacity assessment had been 
conducted prior to Mandy's move. Audrey's response is revealingly captured in my 
field notes below: 
Audrey told me that in the case of Mandy she had not done an MCA 
assessment because it was clear that she was 'non-verbal' and did not 
have any mental capacity to make decisions for herself. Audrey said that 
she felt that because Mandy did not have mental capacity to decide for 
herself (about choice of accommodation) she had felt that it was in her 
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best interest to move to a smaller accommodation with a higher staff-to-
service user ratio. (Field note, 20 June 2011). 
Typical of informal capacity assessments, Audrey then assumed responsibility to 
make decisions for Mandy without recourse to a Best Interest Assessment. In so doing 
Audrey fused stages one and two of the MCA; once she decided informally that 
Mandy did not have capacity, the next logical step was to 'protect' or 'enhance' 
Mandy's best interest. In this way, there was the paradoxical situation whereby 
professionals felt that they were 'protecting' service users' rights although they had 
denied them the right to a formal capacity assessment under the MCA. Thus, one 
inference I can make from the data extract above is that, despite not conducting a 
formal capacity assessment, Audrey felt that her actions were moral because she was 
protecting Mandy's best interest, which was the need for a smaller nursing home. 
Mental capacity as social relations 
Another informal conceptualisation of mental capacity was that it could be inferred 
from a service user's lifestyle juxtaposed with what professionals regarded as the 
societal norm. Here professionals operated a more expansive conception of mental 
capacity beyond cognition. Rather than capacity flowing outwards from the person, 
professionals ascribed mental capacity on the basis of service users' fit into social 
norms or 'social capacity'. The concept of 'social capacity' was coined by social 
worker Annika, in a meeting which I observed as part of my shadowing her. During 
the meeting, the Chair asked Annika whether she had conducted a mental capacity 
assessment. Annika's response was noted as follows: 
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Social worker feels that she has capacity [but current capacity] issue is to 
do with her 'social capacity': Annika was saying here that service user has 
cognitive capacity to make decisions but lacks the skills to change her 
social situation. (Field note, 14 June 2011). 
In her response to the question about whether she had conducted a capacity 
assessment, Annika argued that cognitive capacity was not the main concern with the 
service user. Rather, it was whether the service user was willing to enact changes to 
her current social situation. Hammersley and Atkinson (2007) suggest that sometimes 
the concepts ethnographers develop from data analyses emanate from the words that 
research participants used, so taking their advice, I sought other instances of 'social 
capacity' as coined by Annika. 
'Social capacity': vie\ving sexual relations as mental (in)capacity 
One strand of mental capacity as 'social capacity' linked to sexual behaviour and 
here, professionals' assessment of service users' mental capacity centred on their 
moral evaluations about the latter's sexual lives. Because moral pronouncements 
nested within informal capacity assessments, in many instances, service users' 
demonstration of capacity was not sufficient grounds for professionals, and service 
users needed more than mental capacity to be permitted to engage in certain actions. 
In what follows I introduce two data extracts to illustrate how professionals 
sometimes evaluated a person's mental capacity through moral prisms. 
The first data extract is from a transcript of a taped interview with Emma, a 
deputy manager of the Safeguarding Team. Emma, who may be said to be operating 
with a notion of mental capacity as 'social capacity', suggests that questions of money 
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and sexual relations elicit more concerns from professionals who probe further, even 
where the service user has informally demonstrated capacity: 
And obviously anything that involves service users having sex or giving 
away money or anything like that, you need to establish 'does this person 
have capacity to do that?' In which case it's entirely their business and we 
don't need to have a safeguarding meeting. But if they don't then 
obviously that's much more serious. (Taped interview, Emma, 1 July 
2011). 
In the quote above from an interview with Emma she explained that questions about 
sex and finances provoked even more scrutiny about a person's decision-making 
capacity. As such in Kotoka I heard references to folklore cases around the 'taboo' 
subject of sexual relations. Some cases involved the local authority initiating legal 
proceedings in the Court of Protection to prevent service users being 'forced' into 
'arranged marriages' by their families. In other cases where service users said that 
they consented to sexual intercourse, professionals still felt that they needed to 'take 
action' to 'protect' them. 
The data below highlights Kotoka's approach to the taboo subject of sex. The 
central character in the data extract is Amber, a woman of Irish-Italian origin in her 
mid-20s. Amber became known to Kotoka following reports by her family that she 
had been 'sold into sex'. In narrating Amber's case to me, her social worker, Rose, 
questioned whether she should be classified as learning disabled, given her high 
cognitive capacity: for instance Amber had paid employment as a children's nursery 
nurse, and she was not known to Kotoka until aged 21. Nevertheless once Amber's 
150 
parents reported her apparent sexual profligacy, a six-month Protection Plan was 
devised for her whereby professionals from a private care agency escorted her on 
public transport ostensibly to 'keep her safe'. After six months, Amber was adjudged 
knowledgeable enough to take the buses on her own. Subsequently, alone on the bus, 
she was telephoned by sister's boyfriend inviting her to his flat. The data extract 
below picks up the story: 
When Amber went to the flat she had sex with her sister's boyfriend. All 
this came to light because Amber told one of the workers in the supported 
accommodation. Despite telling the workers that it was consensual, she 
was 'examined' by a doctor who apparently found some marks on her 
thigh and from that it was concluded that 'something had happened' and 
according to Rose [social worker] the marks on Amber's thigh suggests 
that 'it was rough sex'. I gathered from Rose that the learning disability 
team's main concern is that Amber is at risk from sexual exploitation 
stemming from the previous reports from her family and the supported 
accommodation. Interestingly Rose appeared to believe that Amber 
understands what is entailed in sexual intercourse and Rose also believed 
that Amber has the capacity to consent. However Rose also believed that 
Amber did not understand the emotional consequences of the consenting 
to sex. I said to Rose that I was raising the possibility, as a thought 
experiment, that Amber would say she was well aware of the risks, 
nevertheless, she still wanted to have sexual encounters. Rose said that 
were this to happen 'then we will have a big meeting with everyone to 
decide whether she can understand [to consent to profligate sexual 
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encounters]' and Rose added that a Best Interest assessment would be 
conducted (Field note, 13 July 2011). 
In the last sentence of the paragraph, Rose confirmed that capacity to consent was not 
the sole requirement for learning disability service users to engage in sexual relations. 
If Amber chose to have multiple sexual relations then a 'big' meeting would be held 
for professionals to decide whether Amber understood the 'emotional consequences' 
of a life of sexual profligacy. 
Contextualised within the MCA and service provision in Kotoka, Amber's 
case illustrates that around sexual relations, professionals and some families do not 
equate a cognitive ability to make decisions on a par with the right to lead a chosen 
lifestyle. Furthermore, the two cited data extracts in this section suggest that sexual 
relations and financial matters circumvent the 'unwise decision' principle of the 
MCA: professionals cannot allow 'unwise' decisions around sexual morality and 
money, and this is especially so if a service user's family agrees with officials' stance. 
Finally, the involvement of Amber's family in her first encounter with Kotoka shows 
that where interests converge, some families form an alliance with professionals as 
guardians of morality. Families play vital roles in the conceptualisation, 
acknowledgement (or denial), and guarding of service users' rights to certain 
lifestyles. 
Social relations: families, Kotoka, and service users' mental capacity 
In Kotoka, when professionals referred to 'the family', they often meant a biological 
relation, usually parents. During fieldwork I observed 'caring' as overwhelmingly 
genderised: usually professionals identified mothers or sisters as carers (most of the 
service users I observed were accompanied by their mothers), while fathers were 
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considered to be income earners. Because mothers 'cared' they knew the service user 
well and could tell professionals their capabilities. Where mothers acted as sources of 
knowledge about the service user, they were a useful resource that professionals could 
draw upon; thereby negating the need for a formal capacity assessment. Thus, because 
the family 'knows the person best', a formal capacity assessment was not always 
necessary, and the family could be cast into the role of providing proxy consent. At 
the same time, some families in Kotoka (especially ethnic minority families) were 
considered by professionals to be a threat to service users because they could usurp 
their right to make their own decisions and 'force' them into taboo areas such as 
'arranged marriage' or sexual relations as is discussed below. 
Families: threatening service users 
As I have shown previously, professionals and families sometimes agreed that the 
MeA's principle of 'unwise decision' could be circumvented around sexual morality. 
At other times, however, families and professionals disagreed on what is meant by 
'social capacity' leading professionals to label families as a threat to service users' 
capacity. These disagreements coalesced around 'taboo' subjects such as sexual 
relations mostly involving South-East Asian families who professionals believed 
wanted to 'force' service users into 'arranged marriages'. Therefore, the sub-category 
of the family as a threat intersected with ethnicity and risk (of which there is a fuller 
discussion in subsequent chapters). 
One way that professionals in Kotoka neutralised the family as a perceived 
threat was by the use of the formal powers of the MeA. Within Kotoka some 
professionals believed that mental capacity was indeterminable and, as such, it was 
incumbent on professionals to operationalise the legislation to protect service users. 
Thus, rather than viewing disagreements with the family merely as different opinions, 
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professionals resorted to the MeA to 'warn' families not to threaten service users' 
autonomy. In my conversations with social workers I learnt that one way of 'warning' 
was through issuing a letter from the local authority's legal department. 
The case of Ibrahim, a South Asian man who became known to the service 
because of concerns of him being 'forced' into an arranged marriage sums up the 
discussion up to this point. It illustrates how professionals informally assess mental 
capacity, how families take a holistic view of the service user and, therefore, see them 
as more capable than professionals do (Edwardraj et aI, 2010; Rao, 2006); and how 
professionals resort to the MCA where they see the family as a threat. My discussion 
about Ibrahim is based on informal interview data from shadowing Mavis, a social 
worker, which I present in three extracts below. Ibrahim was referred to the Duty 
Social Worker by a Community Nurse from Kotoka who, on a routine visit to the 
family home, was told that a marriage was being arranged for him. In the first data 
extract below, Mavis explains why the Community Nurse made the safeguarding 
referral: 
Mavis said that the reason why the community nurse had raised the 
safeguarding alert was because it was evident that the service user did not 
have capacity and that he would not understand an issue such as marriage 
(Field notes, 11 August 2011). 
From Ibrahim's presentation as learning disabled, the community nurse felt 'it was 
evident' that he could not understand 'marriage' with the corollary that the planned 
marriage would be against his will. Faced with this possibility, Kotoka felt duty-
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bound to 'protect' him. The next extract suggests, however, that in contrast to Mavis, 
Ibrahim's family believed that he understood the concept of marriage: 
Mavis said that one of the cultural issues involved was that the family 
were very open about the fact that they felt that Ibrahim required sexual 
fulfilment. Mavis said that she challenged the family that these [sexual] 
urges may not necessarily be fulfilled by Ibrahim being married because 
although the family felt that he had urges it may be that Ibrahim did not 
understand what was involved in sexual relations [ ... ] When Mavis said 
that I asked her whether Ibrahim masturbated and the thinking behind this 
was that if he did, then that could be taken as a demonstration of his 
understanding of how to fulfil his sexual urges (in contrast to Mavis' 
point). Mavis thought that the nurse 'was doing some work with him [on 
the issue]' which to me was a confirmation that she was implying that the 
service user masturbated (Field notes, 11 August 2011 ). 
In this second data extract, Mavis informs me that Ibrahim's family believe that he 
has the mental capacity to understand sexual pleasure. Of interest, however, is the 
response of professionals to the family's quest to help Ibrahim fulfil his sexual urges 
through marriage. Firstly, Ibrahim's sexual urges are pathologised as requiring 
medical intervention - that of a nurse. Secondly, Kotoka organised a meeting with the 
family at which they informed them that any attempt to travel with Ibrahim to meet a 
future bride would be legally contested by the local authority: 
Mavis was told by the legal team to inform the family that if they 
attempted to take Ibrahim out of the country then Kotoka would launch 
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legal action. Mavis said that she was keen to avoid legal action and tried 
to be 'flexible' in her work with the family, to accommodate and 
understand their point of view. Mavis repeatedly said that one of the 
hallmarks of working with this family is that they have been 'open' and 
have not resisted professionals working with them. Mavis said that had 
this not been the case the matter about 'forced marriage' might have 
ended up in the courts, which as the social worker she did not want to 
happen. (Field notes, 11 August 2011). 
The three data extracts presented in this section illustrate the ambiguous practical, 
moral, and legal space that families inhabited in the link between Kotoka, service 
users, and the MeA. It could be argued that families were resources used by 
professionals in the discharge of their duties to service users. In Ibrahim's case, Mavis 
said that his family had resisted statutory services for a long time because his mother 
and sister cared for him. Yet in the taboo subject of sexual relations and marriage, 
professionals claimed superior knowledge about Ibrahim's needs and felt it the moral 
duty of Kotoka to 'protect' him from being 'forced' into marriage by his family, who 
were relied upon to care for him in the first place. There are also hints in the data 
extract that the family ascribed more understanding to Ibrahim about sexual relations 
than professionals: for instance in the second data extract above I recorded Mavis as 
saying that Ibrahim's family believed he had 'sexual urges' but she 'challenged' their 
views. In previous conversations Mavis had told me that she thought of herself as a 
defender of service users' rights; however, her position in the case of Ibrahim was to 
see the family as a threat to his wellbeing. It is also notable that what started off the 
'alert' was an informal assessment by a community nurse that Ibrahim was not 
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capable of understanding marriage; an assessment formed on the basis of how he 
presented as learning disabled. 
The data I have presented up to this point arguably supports a proposition that 
mental capacity was not the sole yardstick by which professionals and families judged 
the efficacy of service users' actions. Whereas the MCA advises that formal capacity 
assessments be decontextualized from values (Dunn et ai, 2007), in Kotoka where 
actions did not conform to the societal norm, this could be taken as evidence of 
incapacity even though a formal capacity assessment had not been conducted. Aside 
from viewing mental capacity differently from the conceptualisation employed in the 
MCA, professionals in Kotoka at the time of fieldwork practised in a policy context 
described as 'something of a self-proclaimed 'revolution" (Duffy et ai, 2010; pI). 
The MCA was therefore one amongst a number of policies within the toolkit for 
practice. One other important policy for practice was Person-Centred Planning (PCP), 
which in policy terms overlaps with mental capacity (DOH, 2009; Fulton et ai, 2008), 
and could therefore diminish the number of MCA-related assessments. 
Person-centred planning and the MeA 
Given the link between the MeA and PCP I interviewed the PCP Coordinator about 
his role. Following the interview, I analysed documents that the Coordinator gave me 
to read, together with some internal local authority reports available on the Internet. 
These data painted a picture of the PCP as a policy imperative in the local authority 
because its widespread use led to the Council being given a nationally-recognised 
award for excellence called Beacon Status. Furthermore the cases that the PCP 
Coordinator discussed in our tape recorded interview were all akin to capacity 
assessments. 
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According to the Coordinator, in some instances in Kotoka where decisions had to be 
elicited from service users, their mental capacity was not assessed. Rather, a referral 
would be made to the PCP Coordinator for him to facilitate the service users' 
decision-making. However the Coordinator articulated a discourse of choice, rather 
than mental capacity assessment. The Coordinator gave an account of work with a 
service user with a persistent violent behaviour notwithstanding several interventions. 
The PCP Coordinator was thus asked to do some work with the service user to 
mitigate the violent behaviour. Through close observation, he was able to identify the 
trigger points for the violence, such as when things were out of place: for example, if 
a DVD or magazine fell off the table suddenly, or the service user's routines changed 
unexpectedly. The PCP Coordinator's conclusion was that the service user was 
demonstrating mental capacity through her behaviour: 
That demonstrates that person's capacity in that situation, so they are 
using their behaviour as their communication; they have the capacity to 
make a decision, they are communicating something. It is not a 
behavioural phenotype, it is not a random internal process; it is a rational 
reaction to a specific environment. (Taped interview, PCP Coordinator, 28 
July 2011). 
In the quote above, the Coordinator articulated a conceptualisation of mental capacity 
as communicating through behaviour. Another revealing point about the data extract 
above is that even though the Coordinator described his work with the service user in 
terms of mental capacity, at no point did he refer to an assessment under the MCA. 
During the interview. as the PCP Coordinator described his conduct of PCPs and the 
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overlap with capacity assessments, I explicitly asked him for the distinction between 
the two policy strands. I reproduce extract of our exchanges below: 
Godfred: So a good Person-centred Plan is 10 effect a good capacity 
assessment? 
Coordinator: Actually, look, I've not put them in quite those terms before, 
but yes, I will give you a few more [examples ... ] this is just a part of it 
'cos the decision-making came so early into Person-centred Planning, the 
two sort of strands go in parallel and they are very, very consistent [ ... ] 
To elaborate further, the Coordinator recounted a case in which he had been asked to 
facilitate decision-making as part of a care plan review for Blake (a service user). The 
Coordinator believed that Blake could make decisions based on the fact that, in the 
day centre, he 'shared' decision-making with others around food for lunch. However, 
Blake's relatives did not believe he displayed mental capacity in the day centre. Using 
Person-centred Planning tools, the Coordinator showed Blake's capacity: 
It [PCP] allows you to create that spectrum of choice often in a day-to-day 
thing [ ... ] so you have; it does link into capacity in that it gives you very 
situation-specific often quite time-specific situation [ ... ] but actually it is 
about increasing capacity too 'cos it's the choice, it's the skill of decision-
making [ ... ] by creating, making choices very easy, finding the choices 
that are well within the person's capacity, capacity increases. 'You say 
you are going to have toast or cereal for breakfast' there is a pressure that 
comes with it so by creating, making choices very easy, finding the 
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choices that are well within the person's capacity, capacity increases. 
(Taped interview, PCP Coordinator, 28 July 2011) 
It is noteworthy that in the above data extract the Coordinator paraphrased the MCA's 
'decision-specific' and 'time-specific' principles, thereby showing his familiarity with 
the legislation. Additionally, he demonstrated his conceptual grasp of mental capacity 
by noting that it could increase (in the MCA, it is noted that capacity 'fluctuates'). 
However the Coordinator couched his explanation within PCPs and choice, rather 
than the MCA assessments, even though in essence the two strands of policy overlap. 
The use of PCPs was prevalent in Kotoka, and their overlap with mental capacity 
assessments may explain why professionals in Kotoka told me that mental capacity 
assessments were rare. Furthermore an internal Council document attributed the 
achievement of Beacon Status to use of PCPs: 
Shared good practice with other organisations through the Beacon Status 
for the Council's work on promoting independence for disabled adults; 
continued to be an exemplar in the area of [PCP]. (Review of Learning 
Disabilities Section 75 Agreement, 2010; p5). 
The PCP Coordinator's role also exemplified the informalisation of work in Kotoka. 
Although the Council trumpeted the widespread use of PCPs there were no referral 
procedures for the service; according to the Coordinator: 'There is no referral process, 
they [professionals] just have my number'. Arriving in Kotoka on my first day for 
fieldwork, the Coordinator was one of the first professionals I was introduced to. I 
noticed that, unlike other professionals, he was not part of a sub-team, an observation 
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he later confirmed in our interview. As such, the Coordinator enjoyed wide autonomy 
to determine his responsibilities and roles. 
As a conclusion to Part Two, I wish to summarise the discussion up to this 
point. A counter-intuitive finding from my fieldwork was that in Kotoka, a learning 
disability service, mental capacity assessments were infrequent. Although, notionally, 
there was one integrated service, Kotoka was made up of different professions who 
had their own policy imperatives and identities. Thus there was no one professional 
who considered it their primary obligation to initiate formal mental capacity 
assessments. As shown in the preceding discussion, some policies such as PCP which 
overlapped with the MCA were drawn upon instead of the MCA legal framework. In 
any case, professionals articulated an understanding of mental capacity beyond the 
conceptualisation envisaged in the MCA. Such informal capacity assessments 
employed in Kotoka included 'mental capacity as communicating' and 'social 
capacity'. I have also shown that certain 'taboo' subjects were deemed by families 
and service users to be beyond the sole realm of mental capacity, and even where 
service users displayed mental capacity, as in the case of Amber, moral evaluations 
were employed by professionals. The discussions to date highlight the relevance of 
social constructionist ideas to the on-going deliberations about the MCA: I have 
demonstrated that professionals re-interpreted the MCA's conceptualisation of mental 
capacity in accordance with their own subjective viewpoints. Consequently, it may be 
argued that mental capacity exemplifies other 'social phenomena [ ... ] whose 
existence and qualities are dependent in a large part on people's meaning-making 
practices.' (Harris, 2008; p233). Having explained the infrequency of formal mental 
capacity assessments in Kotoka, I now identify the situations that led professionals to 
draw upon the MCA legal framework. 
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Part Three. Operationalising the 
MeA 
Here in Part Three, I examine professional practice that accompanied formal capacity 
assessments by describing two institutional spaces that I was granted access to 
observe, namely the Safeguarding Team (ST) and the Complex Cases Panel (CCP). 
The ST advised all professionals in adult services on safeguarding policy whereas 
CCP was specific to the integrated learning disability service (Kotoka). CCP was a 
fortnightly multi-disciplinary meeting chaired by Max, the Head of Service. During 
CCP meetings, professionals were encouraged to discuss difficult cases with 
colleagues. In this regard CCP was meant to be a form of peer-supervision and thus 
epitomised a key benefit of service integration, which is predicated on the supposition 
that pooling together expertise leads to better outcomes (Wistow, 2012). In Kotoka 
there was a close association between CCP and ST because most of the cases 
presented at CCP meetings were classified as 'safeguarding', on which the latter 
provided advice and training. I start this section by discussing the contribution of ST 
to formal capacity assessment. 
Mental capacity as indeterminable: the MeA 
and safeguarding 
Policy-wise, safeguarding and adult protection are attaining credence in the UK: 
'safeguarding and adult protection are connected but essentially different; with one 
relating to the prevention of abuse and the other relating to intervention once abuse 
has occurred' (Law Commission, 2011; pI9). Reflecting the evolving national policy 
context, in Kotoka safeguarding also featured prominently in my fieldwork. The 
Assistant Manager, Emma, when I interviewed her explained the role of the ST as: 
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'very much a strategic team is how we refer to ourselves rather than a frontline team. 
So we're very much involved in giving advice and we chair some safeguarding 
meetings'. Staff from the ST chaired safeguarding meetings in the local authority, and 
also acted as the point of call for advice on 'safeguarding alerts.' Additionally, staff 
from the ST wrote policy documents on conducting safeguarding investigations 
including: the timing of meetings, topics to discuss, and when mental capacity 
assessments should be conducted as part of the inquiry. Consequently, the central 
policy and practice role played by staff from the ST on safeguarding and the MeA 
meant that their conceptualisation of mental capacity was likely to be influential in the 
local authority. 
Within the ST, a view was articulated that mental capacity was 
indeterminable; therefore, an instrumental approach had to be taken towards the 
MCA. According to this view, the MCA should be conceived of as one of the options 
within a professional's toolkit to resolve cases. Thus 'mental capacity as 
indeterminable' was underscored by pragmatism and entailed professionals drawing 
on the MCA powers in casework. Below, I reproduce segments of a taped-interview 
with Abby (manager of the ST) in which she discussed her view that mental capacity 
was a complex concept to operationalise: 
I think they [professionals] find it [capacity assessments] hard ... The law 
doesn't specifically say when capacity assessments should be done. I 
think the guidance is there, the guidance is helpful but I think many 
practitioners think that it is something extra to do and people rely very 
heavily, I find, on the first principle of the Act that says 'presume 
capacity.' [Long pause]. And I always say to people 'behold the first 
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hurdle' and that is presume capacity because that is a very high and tall 
hurdle ... my view is that if somebody else is asking for a capacity 
assessment or like sometime you will have family raising concerns, if you 
have somebody raising a concern, I will always say to practitioners 'do a 
mental capacity assessment and record it, then you've safeguarded 
yourself and safeguarded the service user; so that you know if somebody 
comes to ask you questions, at least you can point to that point in time 
when you've completed a capacity assessment'. But I think practitioners 
find it a minefield, it is a really, really complex area of work and I think 
that especially if you are a newly qualified member of staff, I think that 
it's, it's difficult.' (Taped interview, Abby, 12 July 2011). 
The quote above by Abby captured neatly the view of capacity as indeterminable. 
Abby explained that capacity assessments were complex endeavours and statutory 
guidance provided few pointers as to the timing of assessments. As such, Abby 
advised that assessments should be avoided wherever possible - 'presume capacity 
because that is a very high and tall hurdle'. However if doubt arose about a service 
user's mental capacity, a professional should bear in mind that their decisions could 
face outside scrutiny so they should keep an audit trail of decisions about mental 
capacity. In the data extract above, Abby is here expressing the view that a formal 
capacity assessment accords to the debated bureaucratisation of social services 
(Evans, 2010). 
Whereas the ST was an independent team, CCP, which I discuss next, was a 
multidisciplinary panel and as such, different conceptualisations of mental capacity 
were manifested. In CCP, gender, ethnicity, organisational hierarchy, and power 
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intertwined to determine whether a formal capacity assessment was initiated within 
Kotoka. 
Complex Cases Panel (CCP) 
During fieldwork, I observed CCP on two occasions (12 and 26 July 2011) and took 
field notes. I also analysed documents minutes of previous CCP meetings. CCP was 
called 'complex' by professionals and was described positively to me as epitomising 
the benefits of services' integration, a forum for peer support, and an avenue for 
solving intractable cases. Reflecting work processes in Kotoka, there seemed no 
formal procedure for a case being brought to Complex. All that was required was an 
agreement between professionals working on the case and/or their manager that a case 
should be presented to CCP. Once decided, the female administrator of CCP was 
informed and the case was timetabled. Max usually occupied the apex of an oval-
shaped table during CCP meetings. The space he occupied meant that professionals at 
the table faced him and he could see everyone without being seen by all of them. 
Professionals from the same team tended to sit together; therefore, rather than being a 
forum for professionals from different teams mixing, CCP reinforced the feeling of 
distinct and separate professional identities. 
The data extract below, from my field notes of the 26 July CCP meeting, is 
about a service user, Malcolm, who has worn his shoes for so long without taking 
them off that they have become stuck to his feet, leading to the possibility of their 
amputation. The case in the extract was presented by Mavis (social worker). 
Professionals' deliberations revolved around Malcolm's mental capacity to decide to 
wear his shoes balanced against the risk of amputation. In the extract, SU and SW 
refer respectively to service user and social worker. I counted 15 females (including 
both Assistant Social Work Team Managers) and 3 males - Max, Alex (Acting Head 
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of Psychology), and David (psychiatrist). The gender of the professionals present 
make it more striking that, in the data extract below, I have recorded only two 
contributions from female professionals, including Mavis. 
1. Malcolm (Duty Case) and Mavis presenting. 
2. Professionals meeting yesterday [at which Malcolm was discussed]. 
Lives at 104. Not engaging with staff [at the unit]. Scared of what he 
was told. Bad feet in danger of losing feet. Finance (does not want 
support). Would rather buy DVDs. Mavis -'He is a hoarder; how do 
we get him to engage?' SW [Mavis] thinks [that he] need[s] capacity 
assessment. 
3. Psychiatrist - These issues are historical. 
4. Max - Clear there are significant risks. '[Max asks] anyone knows 
him?' 
5. He [SU] sits on the fountain by Nando's. 'He is independent person. 
He gets himself out. ' 
6. Relationship with support workers poor - won't let them in. Not 
changing his clothes, has sores on his feet, won't change socks and 
shoes. Not known to nursing, social care. 
7. Psychiatrist - On-going for six years. The psychiatrist was saying that 
these issues are not new and that the service user drops on and off of 
the radar. He seemed not be considering the issues as urgent as Mavis 
was implying. 
8. Not eating properly. Flat needs a 'blitz' (clean up) housing wanting to 
evict him due to uncleanliness. 
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9. Max - 'Clearly there may be issues of capacity but clearly we have 
gone overboard [with concerns about his freedom to choose]'. Max 
made it clear that he felt that professionals should have seen the 
seriousness of the issue earlier. He felt that notwithstanding the 
person's [mental] capacity professionals should not have allowed his 
health and living conditions to deteriorate to the point where he might 
require an amputation. 
10. Alex - What has been done before? [Someone responded that] OT 
involved before. 
11. Max - Mental Capacity Act assessment required. 
12. Psychiatrist - Communication issue [difficulties] as well 
13. [SU] lives with Geoffrey (classified as learning disabled) but 
independent and volunteers to cook two meals for them 
14. Max - Need to explore how Geoffrey can be used [maybe through 
Direct Payment]. Case needs to be allocated to social worker and 
Community Nurse. Need to have a plan. Convene Planning Meeting 
with Treeline [accommodation provider] to know why it has got this 
far [without the Integrated Team being alerted]. OT to be involved. 
15. Query [by another professional about] communication which is 
relevant to capacity assessment. 
16. Max - Speech and Language to be involved [to deal with 
communication issues relevant to capacity]. 
17. Alex - If this is a repeated pattern time boundary needs to be drawn 
18. Max - [If service user is] dropping out [of engagement with services] 
then it needs to be picked up at the next Review. Max was continuing 
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with his theme of being surprised that the service user's condition has 
been allowed to diminish for so long without professionals noticing. 
19. Social Worker [Mavis] - What about capacity assessment? 
20. Max - Speech and Language should be at the [Planning] Meeting to 
help with communication. 
21. Alex - Is he [SU] sleeping in his shoes?: Alex wanted to know why 
the staff in the supported accommodation have not noticed that the 
service user's shoes are stuck to his feet [ ... ] Alex also wanted to 
know how service user sleeps on his bed in his shoes. 
22. Social worker [Mavis] - Sleeps on couch because [he is] hoarding on 
[his] bed. 
23. Psychiatrist - service user tends to engage now and then, maybe 
engages with certain individuals. There was a lady sitting opposite the 
male and next to Max who contributed a lot to the discussion about the 
service user but I did not have her name. 
24. Max - Come back with plan in two weeks. (Field notes, CCP, 26 July 
2011). 
Mavis started the discussion by highlighting that since the case was brought to her 
attention, she has escalated it by convening a Professionals' Meeting (point 2). 
Throughout the discussion about Malcolm, three white male managers contributed 
and scrutinised Mavis, with noticeable silence from the two female Assistant Social 
Work Team Managers. Max had to know the intricacies of cases being dealt with 
because he sat in a large office alone, and was therefore removed from the routine 
conversations between professionals in the service. Thus, CCP was an avenue for 
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Max to be informed of the on-going cases in Kotoka instead of being primarily for 
peer to peer support as indicated to me by the professionals. 
Besides acting as a source of information for Max, CCP may be seen as an 
avenue for him to adjudicate on the tension between professionals' roles: whether to 
enhance and respect service users' autonomy (mental capacity) or prevent them from 
engaging in risk. Judging from the last sentence in point 2, Mavis had already decided 
that Malcolm required a capacity assessment but it wasn't until Max assented to this 
request (point 11) that other expertise such as speech and language therapy could be 
mobilised to conduct the assessment. At point 14, Max deployed further expertise, 
directing joint-working between social worker, community nurse, and occupational 
therapist. Max also expressed his surprise at the state of Malcolm's feet, admonishing 
professionals for going 'overboard' with their concerns to guard Malcolm's autonomy 
and capacity to choose to wear his shoes to the detriment of his feet (point 9). In so 
doing, Max also pre-judged the outcome of the formal capacity assessment; therefore 
an intervention would have to occur irrespective of the outcome of the formal 
capacity assessment. 
Since the conversation was dominated by three white males, it is worth 
analysing their opinions further because their views prevailed. Alex appeared to share 
Max's frustration at the apparent deterioration of the service user's situation: at point 
10 he asked about previous interventions, and in point 17 proposed a strict timetable 
for intervention, lest the case drifted. The psychiatrist, on the other hand, appeared 
relatively unconcerned about the 'deterioration' of the service user, noting it was a 
regular pattern of behaviour with Malcolm. But the psychiatrist also made a key 
intervention, different from Alex and Max. At point 7, the psychiatrist positioned 
himself as the one who 'knows the service user best' by reflecting on the fact that 
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Malcolm's case had been on-going for six years. By putting a time span of six years, 
he claimed familiarity with the case and, therefore, power to direct its trajectory. As a 
further elaboration of his knowledge of Malcolm, the psychiatrist is recorded, at point 
12, as saying that Malcolm had communication difficulties, which was the salient 
issue, rather than any questions about capacity. This theorisation would have been 
accepted as legitimate by the other professionals because he is also a psychiatrist who 
is formally recognised as an authority to assess capacity in the MCA Code of Practice 
(2007). Consequently, it is following the psychiatrist's intervention that the discussion 
agreed the need for a speech and language therapist to be involved in the assessment 
of capacity, and Max obligingly directed this outcome at points 16 and 20. 
The discussion to date shows that CCP was a forum for making decisions to 
assess a service user's capacity. The discussions about capacity were steered by three 
males who were white and from a health background. In CCP the ambiguous position 
of the social work team within Kotoka was also demonstrated. In the minutes of the 
three CCP meetings, the social work team stood out as involved in the most complex 
cases: more social workers attended CCP than any other profession and they are 
allocated the cases on which most contributions are garnered at CCP. 
At the same time as they are considered indispensable to achieving good 
outcomes, the social work team (and managers) appeared to lack the confidence to set 
a clear pathway for working on capacity-related issues. In point 2 above, for instance, 
Mavis was certain that a capacity assessment was required; an issue which could have 
been authorised by one of the social work managers. Yet Mavis also felt the need to 
have her recommendation rubber-stamped by CCP; it is notable from the data extract 
above that, although both assistant managers of the social work team were present, 
neither is recorded as making a significant contribution to Mavis' discussion. Thus, 
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despite being the lifeblood of Kotoka, social work's distinct contribution to the 
formalisation of capacity issues remained invisible in the data from CCP, and the 
observational and interview data. 
Finally, it may be concluded from the data extract discussed here that within 
Kotoka, social workers' moral concerns about autonomy were likely to be subsumed 
by concerns about minimising risk and 'protection'. This latter point arises from the 
fact that those with power to make decisions about whether a mental capacity 
assessment should be conducted, such as Max, take a 'protection' rather than 
autonomy stance. 
Conclusion 
Exemplified by the preceding discussions about Complex (CCP), in this chapter, I 
have presented data on the configuration of services in Kotoka. The data shows that 
Kotoka consisted of NHS and social care staff, delivering services to people 
categorised as learning disabled, and whose needs were assessed as 'substantial' or 
'critical' (DOH, 2003; 2010). A hallmark of professional conduct in Kotoka was 
informality, whereby staff decided on the trajectory of cases through routine 
interactions. Because most NHS staff are 'specialists' and formally diagnose medical 
conditions, in Kotoka they could specify the contours of their duties. Social work is, 
however, hard to delineate; as such in Kotoka, social workers drew their professional 
identities from the moral worth of their roles. Having relatively fluid disciplinary 
boundaries, social workers were indispensable to the work of Kotoka and were 
involved in most statutory work, including assessments of mental capacity. I have 
presented data in this chapter showing that professionals sometimes pre-judged the 
outcome of a capacity assessment before the formal procedure was initiated. One 
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reason for informal capacity assessments is that (self)classification is an indispensable 
aspect of human relations (Zerubavel, 1996). Consequently, instead of being solely an 
outcome of cognitive activity, that which was identified as mental capacity in Kotoka 
was the product of human relations. 
Humans make judgments about each other's characteristics and behaviour as 
part of the routine empirical necessity to socialise. Within the domain of statutory 
services, mental capacity assessments may, therefore, be conceptualised as one 
instrument among many that professionals and their managers employ to meet their 
legal duties. In statutory services, notwithstanding the on-going policy drive towards 
personalisation, risk prevention and/or enablement also remains a pre-occupation of 
professionals (Taylor, 2005), which is echoed in the data presented about CCP. To the 
extent that data in this chapter substantiate a social constructionist take on mental 
capacity, they also highlight the need for examining how the MCA interacts with 
other embodied categories associated with risk. The next chapter picks up the theme 
of categorisation to discuss how ethnicity, mental capacity, and learning disability 
interacted in Kotoka, and the accompanying professional responses. 
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CHAPTER SIX. SAFEGUARDING: 
RISK, ETHNICITY, AND THE MeA 
IN KOTOKA 
In this chapter I address my research question 'the literature review showed that risk 
is a prime concern of statutory services: how does this relate to the MCA? What 
understandings of risk are propagated by professionals and service users?' 
Contextualised within the MeA's statutory duties, I analyse data on how risk was 
articulated and operationalised and in Kotoka, and the institutional mechanisms for 
doing so. The chapter is divided into two parts: Part One discusses how risk is 
identified, categorised and managed, and Part Two outlines how people seen as 
ethnically or culturally different (the Other) were managed by professionals. 
Part One. Implementing policy for 
'vulnerable adults' 
Within the MCA Code of Practice, incapacitated adults are conceptualised as 
vulnerable and in need of protection from abuse (MCA Code of Practice, 2007). As 
such, the MCA links into the policy framework 'safeguarding' and accompanying 
professional practices for 'protecting' adult users of social services. As an 'outsider' 
new to Kotoka I was surprised by two issues: (I) how much risk identification and 
categorisation dominated the routine conversations of professionals and (2) the extent 
to which 'safeguarding' was casually employed by professionals in their descriptions 
of practice and social situations. The abundance of safeguarding in conversations 
between professionals on my first day surprised me even with my previous social 
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work experience in a Disabled Children's Team, during which I participated in many 
child protection investigations. Stemming from this observation, it was clear to me 
from the outset of fieldwork that safeguarding would be important to my research; a 
point I reflected on in my Reflective Diary: 
I would need to get a good idea of the workflow of the team pretty soon so 
that I can focus the research. Talking about [the] focus [of my research] 
from my first day I can say that safeguarding will also feature prominently 
in the research. I was really surprised by the number of times safeguarding 
was discussed within the hour that I sat with Annika, and furthermore 
during the shadowing of Adwoa. (Reflective Diary, 8 June 2011). 
I noticed that professionals used 'risk' and 'safeguarding' interchangeably although I 
heard 'safeguarding' more often. Safeguarding in Kotoka was used as a noun and a 
verb: it firstly referred to the type of statutory work carried out to 'protect' service 
users; and secondly, safeguarding also involved the process of identifying and 
'protecting' the service user. 'Risk' on the other hand was used in specific 
circumstances such as changes in the life course. 
Identifying and assessing risk 
Risk assessments arose out of exceptional occurrences to service uses or around the 
routine tasks of assessments, care planning, and or reviews. Exceptionally, 
professionals used the term 'risk' if they meant that service users were in danger at 
the present time and that intervention was required immediately (Smith, 2010). 
Reports of immediate danger were received through the Duty Desk. If the service user 
had an allocated social worker then they would coordinate the organisation's 
174 
response, otherwise the report would be dealt with by the Duty Social Worker. 
Usually when information was received that a service user was at risk, professionals 
managed events from the office: they either contacted the police or informed others 
and later visited the service user to (re)assess their social care needs. At other times 
the police would call Kotoka if, after responding to an emergency call, they felt that 
the adult in question displayed signs of learning disability. For instance, I was 
shadowing Duty Social Worker, Audrey, on 2 August 2011 (and taking field notes) 
when she received a referral in an email that the police had found a man on the 
motorway and that Bed and Breakfast accommodation (B&B) should be provided 
whilst his address in Belgium was located: 
Man from Belgium, [reported] missing, and police requesting B&B 
placement: this was an email from the Emergency Duty Social Worker. 
The person had been found on a motorway and the police thought that he 
might have learning disability. (Field notes, shadowing Audrey, 2 August 
20ll). 
The data extract above shows that initial referrals to Kotoka could be a request for 
risk assessment. Implicit in the police's approach to the social work team was an 
assessment that the man faced risks if left alone. In this instance, risk was 
conceptualised as the here-and-now, as a matter that required immediate action by the 
social work team lest a service user remained in danger. Looking beyond the present, 
in Kotoka, a risk assessment was conducted routinely as part and parcel of service 
provision. For instance, the primary document for determining and recording 
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eligibility for servIces called 'Comprehensive Assessment' had a section titled 
'Personal Safety' with the following questions as prompts for professionals to ask: 
• Have you had any accidents inside your home? 
• Are you alone for short/long periods? 
• Do you feel unsafe in your home 
• Are you frightened to leave your home? 
Arguably, the questions above show that Personal Safety was conceptualised as a 
need because they were an intrinsic part of the needs assessment to judge eligibility 
for services. The questions above also implied that everyday living involved dangers, 
intended or not, and irrespective of whether one was at home or in the community. As 
such, professionals in Kotoka attempted to foresee and predict future harm in their 
routine interactions with service users during home visits, needs assessments, and/or 
care plan reviews. Thus every impending change in service users' lives was 
associated with risks, which professionals had to forecast and mitigate (Kemshall, 
2002; Webb, 2006): this could be around service users' life course - for instance 
becoming an adult at 18 years, or reaching retirement age - or there could be 
adjustments to care packages. It is in this regard that some writers have suggested that 
preoccupation with risk in statutory services means that risk and needs assessment are 
now symbiotic (Kemshall, 2010; Warner and Sharland, 2010). Taken from the 
viewpoints of parents or carers, risk assessments extended the power of professionals 
into family lives because parents could be told how to keep their children safe, and by 
corollary, they became responsible for possible harm to their children. In the next 
section I expand further on this preceding point by presenting some field notes from 
176 
observing a meeting between a social worker, Adwoa, and a service user's father, Mr 
Crabtree. 
Risk assessments and caring 
Risk assessments created a nexus of responsibility between Kotoka, parents (or 
carers) and outside agencies, as exemplified by the data extract that I now discuss 
below. The extract is taken from field notes I made on 22 June 2011. There were two 
important backdrops. Firstly, Mr Crabtree had been granted a Power of Attorney 
mandating him to make decisions on behalf of his daughter (it was not clear from the 
meeting I observed the range of activities over which he had legal powers). The 
second background issue was that of the Community Alarm. In Kotoka, these were 
issued to service users to be activated if they or their carers felt in danger. Mr 
Crabtree's daughter had a Community Alarm because of previous epileptic seizures. 
In the meeting with Adwoa, Mr Crabtree reported that the alarm was defective; 
however, he did not think that he could remove it without Adwoa's permission. 
1. Mr Crabtree - Second thing [on the agenda] is the Community Alarm 
system - it is not working. [Mr Crabtree] wants to pull it out and 
replace it with something else. Engineer has been told. 
2. Mr Crabtree - Does not want the alarm but does not [want] to be told 
that he has been irresponsible for taking the alarm off. Mr Crabtree 
said that in the past he had been accused, he implied, by statutory 
services for being 'irresponsible' with his daughter's safety. 
3. Mr Crabtree: The alarm is waking people up [even when it has not 
been activated]: I recall Mr Crabtree saying here that on the Sunday 
the Community Alarm technician claimed that they called him and 
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because he did not answer they had to attend to the house. As a result 
they would be charging Mr Crabtree the call-out fee, which he felt was 
unfair especially as he was in church and the alarm had erroneously 
self-activated. 
4. Talk about seizures and service user having 'rare' seizures: Adwoa felt 
that taking the alarm off was a question of risk assessment and that as 
the service user had 'rare' seizures then Mr Crabtree would be 
justified in replacing the Community Alarm. 
5. Risk assessment required by Maples: I recall Adwoa saying that as 
Maples provide the sleeping-in care, if the community alarm is 
removed then Maples would have to conduct a risk assessment on how 
the removal of the alarm would impact on their services (Field notes, 
shadowing Adwoa, 22 June 2011). 
It is noticeable that at point 4, Adwoa provided the authorisation for Mr Crabtree to 
remove the alarm, citing his daughter's 'rare seizures' and thereby conceptualising 
risk as low. Adwoa further indicated that with the removal of the alarm, the private 
care provider, Maples, would have to conduct a risk assessment as they employed the 
carer who stayed overnight in the service user's home. In the interaction between 
Adwoa and Mr Crabtree, there were elements of risk in the here- and-now, such as 
having seizures, but also risk as prospective, such as what was to be done in the future 
if harmful circumstances arose. 
Moreover, the data extract shows that, once risk was identified by 
professionals, parents assumed a moral responsibility for their child's safety, even if 
their child was now an adult, or even, as in the case of Mr Crabtree, a parent had the 
legal powers to make decisions on their children's behalf. The latter point throws into 
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sharp focus some legal ambiguities in respect of risk, mental capacity, and caring. 
Based on the MCA's principle of presumption of capacity, parents (or carers) cannot 
tell service users how to lead their lives. Yet, as I have demonstrated in point 2 above, 
Mr Crabtree has in the past been held responsible for his daughter's safety, and he still 
felt such an obligation during his conversation with Adwoa. Additionally, Mr 
Crabtree thought that the authorisation for his actions had to be provided by a 
professional (i.e. Adwoa). Therefore on the present discussion, a conclusion can be 
drawn that Mr Crabtree's moral duty to keep his daughter safe continued into her 
adulthood, even in the face of her statutory right to make 'unwise' decisions under the 
MCA. 
The tension between the MCA's unWIse decision principle and parental 
obligation for their children's safety, exemplified above in the case of Mr Crabtree 
and his daughter, is unexplored in the literature. Unlike the prolific literature on child 
protection in which it is assumed that families are central to assessment and 
mitigation of risk (Brandon et aI, 2(08), with adult services, families' role in 
safeguarding is less discussed. In the face of policy evolution in adult protection (Law 
Commission, 2(08), the literature on Safeguarding Adults policy and practice tends to 
focus on guidelines and institutional structures (ADSS, 2005; SCIE, 2011), service 
users' involvement in risk assessment (Wallcraft and Sweeney, 2011), and how the 
introduction of new policies, such as personalisation, relates to risk in adult services 
(Manthorpe et aI, 2(08). The informal attribution of responsibility to protect adults 
that accrues from contact with statutory services remains unexplored in the literature. 
The aim of Part One of the present chapter was to explain how professionals 
distinguish between risk and their invocation of the broader safeguarding policy 
framework. I have begun by showing that risk was considered as part and parcel of 
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everyday life, as according to the risk society thesis, and 'safeguarding' was part of 
the routine conversations of professionals. My initial surprise at the repeated 
discussion about safeguarding in Kotoka was to be sustained throughout fieldwork. I 
observed several meetings investigating allegations of abuse, interviewed 
professionals about safeguarding practices, and read several local policy documents. 
Based on these fieldwork observations, in the next section, I discuss how safeguarding 
policy was operationalised in Kotoka as a further way of showing its distinction from 
risk assessment. 
Localising safeguarding policy 
Borough-wide, there were two organisational channels for implementing 
Safeguarding Adults policy and practice (henceforth referred to as a dual structure). 
One was the local authority-wide Safeguarding Team - the ST - (discussed in Part 
Three of Chapter Five); the second was individual specialist services: for example 
older people, mental health, and integrated learning disability services (Kotoka). Each 
specialist service in the local authority where I conducted fieldwork had its own 
system for safeguarding alerts - mirroring national policy; the social work team took 
the lead: firstly, the Duty Social Worker was the point of contact for all alerts; 
secondly, the social work team coordinated the subsequent investigative work. In 
Kotoka all alerts were called Safeguarding Referrals - they came to the team verbally, 
through reports at reception, telephone calls, or sometimes as documents through the 
completion of referral forms. On receiving an alert, the Duty Social Worker consulted 
with the Duty Manager (Monica) whose role was to decide whether the alert should 
be pursued. At the point of alert, Monica judged whether the alert was credible and, if 
so, whether it was a criminal matter to report to the police. Another decision that 
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Monica made (sometimes in conjunction with colleagues) was whether the alert was 
an 'institutional concern' in which case she involved colleagues from the ST. 16 
The concept of 'institutional concern' was widely used in the service, however 
a succinct definition was provided by Emma, Assistant Manager of the ST, when I 
interviewed her: 
So [ ... ] we [from the ST] chair some safeguarding meetings but we chair 
those where, if there's been a death [which is unexpected], if it's an 
institutional concern, if the alleged perpetrator is a staff member [of the 
local authority] [and] potentially one of our partner organisations (Taped 
interview, Emma, 4 August 2011). 
From the quote above Emma confirmed the borough-wide dual institutional 
arrangement around Safeguarding Adults policy and practice in Kotoka. During 
fieldwork with social workers, they agreed with Emma's distinction between their 
roles, although some professionals in Kotoka used the term 'establishment concern' 
instead of 'institutional concern.' Where there was an institutional concern, the 
safeguarding process would be overseen by the ST. In the main, because the specialist 
teams such as Kotoka received referrals, the ST relied on them to be informed of 
whether an 'institutional concern' had occurred. The specialist teams such as Kotoka, 
on the other hand, had an interest in informing managers within ST because they were 
more knowledgeable of local and national safeguarding policies. 
16 In Part Three (Chapter Five) I showed that among other duties, the ST's staff role 
included writing safeguarding policy, training on MCA best practice and chairing 
safeguarding meetings. The current discussion about 'institutional concern' is one 
way by which the ST staff drew the contours of their duties vis-a-vis specialist teams 
such as Kotoka. 
181 
Whether supervised by the ST or the social work team, another key decision to make 
was whether the alert constituted a 'criminal' matter, in which case the police were 
informed. In line with statutory guidance, if the police acknowledged that the 
information they had received indicated a possible crime then their investigations took 
precedence. Otherwise, professionals in Kotoka convened a multi-professional 
Strategy Meeting (SM) to decide whether the alert warranted further investigation and 
to determine the accompanying task of each professional. It can be seen from the 
present discussion in the preceding paragraph that the social work team's Duty 
Manager, Monica (and her colleagues), had the power to decide the trajectory and 
category of safeguarding cases. For instance if Monica decided that the alert pertained 
to criminality, she curtailed the involvement of Kotoka. Thus the general category of 
'safeguarding' involved several (sub)categorisations by professionals. To illustrate 
further, at the point of an alert, Monica could (re)categorise the matter as an 
'institutional concern' or as 'criminal', thereby placing the piece of information on a 
different institutional trajectory. In the next section below, I present data to show how 
the specific institutional arrangements, whereby responsibility for safeguarding 
'vulnerable adults' was split between the specialist teams and the ST, shaped 
categorisations of risks. 
Shaping case categories 
To contextualise the forthcoming discussion, it is worth outlining some important 
backdrops to this section. Policy-wise, after safeguarding investigations, statutory 
services decide whether the alert is proven (or not), and if so, the category of abuse 
perpetrated (abuse can be financial, physical, sexual, psychological, neglect and 
'neglect and acts of omission' (DCA, p245). Thus, whether the ST staff or specialist 
teams chair safeguarding investigations, the abuse has to be categorised. Another 
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noteworthy background to this section is that decisions about the trajectory of 
safeguarding cases in Kotoka are made by white women. As explained in the previous 
chapter, Monica, the (safeguarding) Duty Manager in the social work team was a 
white woman of Polish origin and all the practitioners in the ST were also white 
women. Lastly, a commonality between the ST and Kotoka in terms of safeguarding 
is that all the managers with powers to decide the trajectory of these cases were 
qualified social workers. Both Assistant Managers in the ST were formerly employed 
as social workers in Kotoka. Thus there was a close relationship between the social 
work team and the ST staff. Additionally, because two of the Assistant Managers of 
the ST worked as social workers in Kotoka, they were (in)formally acquainted with 
the mental capacity of some of the service users discussed in safeguarding meetings. 
Below, I present data to show how the dual institutional arrangement on Safeguarding 
Adults in Kotoka impacted on the (re )categorisation of cases. 
The ST staff: (re)categorising safeguarding 'alerts' from historic know/edge 
The data presented in this section is from my field notes of a safeguarding meeting 
chaired by Martina from the ST. During the meeting Martina relied on her knowledge 
about the service users gained from previously working in Kotoka to (re)categorise 
the case. There is an underpinning principle in the MCA that assessors should seek 
the views of the person 'who knows them [person undergoing assessment] best' when 
conducting formal mental capacity assessments (MCA Code of Practice, 2007; p32). 
One reason for this advice is that the person 'who knows the service user best' 
understands their means of communication or their life history and can therefore offer 
guidance on their possible choices. Furthermore, as I showed during my analyses of 
CCP in Part Three (Chapter Five), within a multidisciplinary setting, claiming to 
know the service user best conferred power on a professional to decide service users' 
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(informal) mental capacity (as was done by the psychiatrist). With Martina, because 
she worked as a social worker in Kotoka and was acquainted with the family, she too 
claimed to know the service user best to categorise the safeguarding case. 
In addition to Martina, the following professionals were present at the 
recorded safeguarding meeting: social worker, Annika, a community psychiatric nurse 
(ePN), and the manager of a private care agency. The meeting was called because of 
concerns about three service users: Tracey and her parents, Damien and Anouska. 
They lived with Michael who was involved in a relationship with Tracey. Tracey had 
children from different relationships who were all Looked After Children (LAC)l7. In 
the past, Damien and Anouska had reported that Michael physically assaulted all three 
of them; however, during previous safeguarding investigations, Tracey denied any 
abuse. Damien was diagnosed with depression and diabetes but refused to take his 
medication, a matter of concern to the health staff in Kotoka. Professionals at the 
meeting acknowledged that Tracey and her parents all had capacity to make decisions 
for themselves. The service users' informally assessed capacity was, however, a 
source of frustration for professionals in managing the family situation because a care 
package could not be arranged without their consent. As a last resort, the local 
authority temporarily relocated Tracey and her parents to Brighton (to escape 
Michael), which Martina in point 10 below felt was a good thing 'because they have 
seen a different life.' After the family'S temporary relocation to Brighton, Michael 
followed them, prompting the local authority to return them to their original home. 
Since the family's return, further concerns have arisen, including one from the police 
that Tracey was pregnant, implying that the unborn child might be at risk of harm. In 
17 Under the 1989 Children Act a child could become Looked After if their parent(s) 
voluntarily asked a local authority for them to be accommodated or if sanctioned by a 
Court. 
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the meeting from which I have extracted field notes data presented here, Martina 
(from the ST) seemed to be grappling around for further statutory powers to manage 
the situation. 
1. Martina (Chair) - Purpose of meeting to 'consider' investigation, make 
decisions on alert, listen to the wishes of the service users, to decide who 
feeds back [to service users]. 
2. Annika (Social worker) (background of case): Two alerts raised following 
reports from neighbours that Michael ('partner' of Tracey) had been 
threatening another person. Someone from contact centre raised alert that 
Tracey had not been attending contact [to see her Looked After Children]; 
on one occasion bruises seen on Tracey. Damien (Tracey's father) came 
and disclosed information. 
3. Chair: For the purposes of the minutes MARAC [Multi-Agency Risk 
Assessment Conference]18 referral made and support given to them 
[service user and parents] to go to the police ... For the purposes of this 
meeting there is no further action because they [service user and parents] 
have refused to go to the police. Let's go [move on] to the adults at risk 
[Damien below]. 
4. Damieo 
5. Community nurse said that health are concerned about his [Damien's] 
general health; concern about whether he is taking medication properly. 
18 MARAC comprises the police, probation, voluntary organisations and all statutory 
services in the local authority. MARAC receives referrals where a person is deemed at 
risk of domestic violence. I observed during fieldwork that in instances where 
professionals considered the risks of domestic violence 'unacceptable' the service 
user's consent was not sought before a referral was made to MARAC. 
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6. Chair: All this is coming back to capacity because he has capacity to 
detennine not to take the medication, then there is nothing to do. Could 
the MHA [Mental Health Act] be used? 
7. CPN said that diabetes may be one route. 
8. Social worker made the observation that she has seen Damien's capacity 
fluctuate: he has been able to explain his medication. 
9. Chair 'we've known this family for a long time and they have always 
been chaotic; house is dirty; this is the way the family live. ' 
10. Chair feels that family being removed from their home was a good thing 
because they [have] seen a different lifestyle. 
11. Review of case planned for three months. (Field notes, shadowing 
Annika, 14 June 2011). 
In the extract above, the safeguarding 'alert' is (re)categorised by Martina from 
domestic violence, to nothing - 'no further action' - to mental health. This latter point 
highlights how power is exercised in effecting social categories; more specifically, it 
shows the close relationship between the social classifications mental health and 
mental capacity. Martina exercised her power as Chair to direct the classification of 
this case. The key issue here is point 9, in which Martina showed exasperation with 
the family'S protracted situation. At point 9, Martina asserted her historical 
knowledge about the family, 'they have always been chaotic; house is dirty; this is the 
way the family live', and concomitantly a claim of knowing them best. On the basis 
of her claim, Martina felt mandated to pronounce on the likely trajectory of the case. 
Because Martina knew the family previously from her period as a social worker in 
Kotoka, she sought to re-categorise the case from 'safeguarding' to 'mental health' in 
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order to imbue professionals with more powers to manage the situation. For instance, 
Martina asked, in point 6, whether the CPN could make a case for the Mental Health 
Act being drawn upon for diabetes medication to be forcefully administered to 
Damien. At other times, Martina expressed her frustration by curtailing further 
professional responses: in point 3, for instance, she ruled that there was no further 
action required because previously, when Tracey and her parents were referred to 
MARAC for support, they refused to go to the police to report the abuse from 
Michael. Martina's moves between points 3, 6, 9 show that, within statutory services 
where legal powers and duties are attached to specified social categories, the latter 
could acquire unintended status or implications. For instance, if the CPN made a case 
for the Mental Health Act, it was likely that professionals would attempt to forcefully 
medicate Damien, even though he had been informally assessed as mentally capable 
to refuse medication. The data extract therefore also shows the close overlap between 
the MCA and MHA. Through this present discussion I have demonstrated how the ST 
members' close relationship with professionals in Kotoka, as well as their prior 
knowledge of cases, impacted on the categorisation of safeguarding cases. Building 
on these discussions, I show in the next section how the ST's role in writing local 
safeguarding policy affected practice within the specialist teams (for example the 
integrated learning disability service, Kotoka). 
Safeguarding policy and MeA practice in the integrated learning disability 
service 
In the MCA, Safeguarding Adults is a key policy aim because incapacitated adults are 
also seen as vulnerable (MCA Code of Practice, 2(07); therefore, during fieldwork, I 
sought data on how this is implemented in Kotoka from the viewpoint of the ST's role 
as local policymaker. In data extract 1 below, Emma (Assistant Manager, the ST) is 
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reflecting on her previous position as a social worker in Kotoka to explain why the 
latter received so many safeguarding alerts. Emma distinguished between learning 
disability service users and 'physical disability', and secondly, disabled people from 
the broader category of 'private citizen(s).' Emma suggested that learning disability 
service users were 'vulnerable' and presented 'a lot of capacity issues' making them 
mentally (in)capable of reporting crimes to the police, hence professionals invoked 
the safeguarding process on their behalf. The connection between safeguarding and 
mental capacity is explored further in Extract 2 by Abby, Emma's line manager. Abby 
noted that where professionals (in)formally believed that a service user lacked mental 
capacity 'they are reluctant to allow much risk. ' 
Extract 1. Yes, simply because the client group is very vulnerable and 
there are a lot of capacity issues. As I was saying to you earlier, if you or I 
get mugged we don't need a safeguarding process, we go to the police and 
if I had a physical disability I might still just be able to go to the police 
and deal with it as a private citizen without involving a safeguarding 
process. But someone with learning disabilities might find it that much 
harder which is why a lot of these issues come, come to the team 
[Kotoka]. (Taped interview, Emma, 30 June 2011). 
Extract 2. I think that sometimes you know, these best interest decisions 
that people make are very complex and you know the first principle of the 
Act say presume capacity but I think professionals are reluctant to allow 
much risk if they think that there is a possibility, you know that the person 
lacks capacity. (Taped interview, Abby, 12 July 2011). 
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The two quotes above could be seen as explanations as to why there were so many 
safeguarding alerts in Kotoka because arguably, policymakers in the ST expansively 
interpreted the policy framework. Implicit in Emma's statement was the assumption 
that learning disability service users lacked mental capacity to ensure their safety 
and/or seek justice. Here Emma categorised learning disability service users as a 
distinct group of people who provoked concern in professionals. By linking service 
users' apparent inability to protect themselves or report crimes to Safeguarding Adults 
policy and practice, Emma (and her colleagues) made service users' mental capacity 
central to the process. Through the latter statement Emma echoed statutory guidance 
that incapacitated adults are, by corollary, in need of 'protection', thereby bringing 
into sharp focus the need for professionals to 'protect' people (in Chapter Five, I 
demonstrated through the case study of Amber that one way to 'protect' service users 
from risk is to increase their care package to ensure supervision at all times). The 
significance of extract 2, by Abby, is that she confirmed that the process of adult 
protection began with an informal assessment of capacity because, if professionals 
had doubts, they constrained service users' actions. The two data extracts above also 
suggest a wide(r) interpretation of the concept of safeguarding. For instance, arguably, 
Emma imbued safeguarding with therapeutic qualities by her statement above: people 
classified as learning disabled needed help to access the justice system and this could 
be provided once the broad policy framework had been invoked. It is in relation to 
this latter point that Buchanan (2013) has argued that due to tightening eligibility 
criteria, safeguarding could displace traditional social work with service users by 
acting as a gateway to services. 
From the viewpoint of professionals in the ST, the local dual institutional 
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arrangement on Safeguarding Adults policy ensured the centrality of formal mental 
capacity assessments to the process. To support these claims, staff from the ST 
directed me to two separate policy guidance documents they had written. For 
purposes of anonymity, I have withheld the titles of the documents. The first 
document was written in March 2010 as guidance for chairs of safeguarding meetings. 
Little prominence is given to capacity in this guidance - for instance, there is no 
explicit reference to mental capacity. Instead the word consent is used: 'Consent to 
investigation - is there a public interest need to investigate?' In contrast, the second 
document, authored in March 2011, about empowering service users in safeguarding 
investigations advised professionals to assess mental capacity, if in doubt: 
If there is a question of capacity regarding the individual's ability to 
understand and participate in the safeguarding adult process, protection 
measures, consent to information sharing and investigation, a capacity 
assessment must be undertaken as soon as possible (capacity assessments 
must be time and decision specific). 
There was a discrepancy between the two documents because, whereas one referred 
explicitly to capacity, the other pointed to consent. This is significant because 
theoretically capacity precedes consent; hence the rationale for mental capacity 
assessment is to decide whether people can consent. In this respect, the March 2010 
document which referred to consent was either presuming that all service users would 
have capacity or that capacity did not matter to the process. In the course of my 
interview with Emma, the March 2010 document which referred to consent was 
discussed. She explained that capacity was implicit in the notion of consent; however 
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sometimes the former could be impaired by the stressful condition that service users 
had been placed under: 
There will be things like 'do they consent to the investigation.' Now 
implicit in that is do they have capacity to consent to the investigation? 
[ ... ] and of course capacity in a safeguarding situation can be a slightly 
different thing 'cos if someone usually has capacity but they are severely 
intimidated, for example, then perhaps in this circumstance they lack 
capacity (Taped interview, Emma, 30 June 2011). 
In the above interview quote, Emma provided another conceptualisation of mental 
capacity by suggesting that 'intimidation' could impair a person's ability to make 
decisions. The quote from Emma, in addition to the documents and interview data 
from Abby presented in this section, show a complex picture of mental capacity and 
safeguarding policy within the ST. Firstly, the two ST staff (Abby and Emma) agreed 
that learning disability service users were vulnerable because of their likelihood to 
suffer harm as a result of their incapacity to protect themselves. However, the policy 
documents reflected a contrasting picture from the managers' views in that there were 
no specific requirements for capacity to be assessed during safeguarding meetings, 
although one document carried the proviso' if [capacity is] in doubt.' One explanation 
for the discrepancy between the interview data and policy documents might be that 
the latter was meant as generic guidance whereas the interview quotes were answers 
about learning disability service users (who are presumed in the MeA as more likely 
to lack capacity.) Finally, Emma's quote suggested that in adult protection, service 
users' mental capacity to consent to their participation in an investigation was not the 
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primary concern of professionals. The policy document, authored in March 2010, 
provided a public interest test - 'Consent to investigation; is there a public interest 
need to investigate?' - meaning that professionals had some discretion on whether 
service users' mental (in)capacity should be taken as paramount in safeguarding 
investigations. 
To conclude this section on the institutional arrangements on Safeguarding 
Adults in the integrated team, I make some remarks on the broader implications of my 
observations in Kotoka. Whilst 'safeguarding' was regularly invoked and I observed 
many meetings and conversations on the subject, I rarely witnessed service users 
participating in the process. My findings therefore echo the following commentary by 
Fyson and Kitson's: 'it is perhaps worth reflecting that safeguarding often appeared to 
be being constructed as a professional "problem" to be solved, in the course of which 
service users may sometimes cause irritating additional difficulties' (2012; plOl). 
Whilst a helpful contribution, Fyson and Kitson's point does not fully explain the 
discrepancy between professionals' anxiety to 'protect' service users whilst also 
excluding the latter from the process. A fuller explanation may lie in socio-cultural 
perceptions of risk: for instance my fieldwork commenced immediately after the 
airing of a television documentary reporting the abuse of learning disabled service 
users in a care home. During fieldwork I found the documentary overshadowing the 
work of professionals, making them more sensitive to risk perceptions. Socio-
culturally, certain people elicit concerns about safety, and translated into statutory 
social care, attempts are made to mitigate risks such service users face (Kemshall et 
aI, 1997). That the Panorama programme had such a profound impact on the political 
debates on the safeguarding policy framework reinforces the argument that risk 
interpretation and sensitivity emanate within a socio-cultural milieu (Douglas, 1985; 
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1992). Paying attention to socio-cultural ideas, I now discuss a surprising finding 
from fieldwork. Some service users in Kotoka were neither classified as learning 
disabled nor mentally incapacitated; yet, they evoked concerns about their safety and 
received substantial care packages. 
Liminality: 'vulnerable adult', mental 
(in)capacity, and risk 
Using the concept of liminality as an analytic tool, I describe the situation of Dwayne 
and Alan, respectively black and white males who both had folk status in Kotoka. 
Widely used in the anthropological literature to signify rites of passage in certain 
cultures, liminality is useful in conceptualising contingency: 'In liminality there is no 
certainty concerning the outcome [ ... ] events and ideas, and "reality" itself, can be 
carried off in different directions' (Thomassen, 2009; p5). Liminality is a helpful 
heuristic device in this section because both Dwayne and Alan occupied an unusual 
categorical space: they were not viewed by professionals as either learning disabled or 
mentally incapacitated, yet both provoked anxiety among professionals about their 
safety. Two sharply contrasting models of safeguarding were employed in managing 
their care. In the case of Dwayne, professionals supported his detention in a 
psychiatric unit under the 1983 Mental Health Act (as amended in 2007), whereas 
with Alan, he was encouraged by professionals to partake in advocacy services 
organised by the local authority.19 Dwayne and Alan's cases may therefore also be 
seen as indicators of unequal treatment that result from ethnic and disability 
categorisations. 
19 This fonn of advocacy initiated by local government has been tenned 'closeness to 
power' (Buchanan and Walmsley, 2006; p136) with some writers questioning its 
underpinning claims to empowerment (Redley and Weinberg, 2007). 
193 
To attain my aims in this section I will analyse the following data: field notes of a 
multi-disciplinary meeting held to discuss his behaviour, my Reflective Diary entry 
following a home visit with Rose (Alan's social worker) and Rose's Comprehensive 
Assessment of Alan's needs. To analyse Dwayne's situation using the concept of 
liminality I will present two sources of data. The first source of data is two official 
minutes of Complex Cases Panel (CCP) meetings; the second data source is my field 
note recordings of a CCP meeting that I observed on 12 July 2011 at which he was 
discussed. 
Dwayne: categorising liminality as risk 
Dwayne, a young black man, was not known to statutory service until the age of 17. 
Living together as a 'single parent' family unit, it was on the cusp of Dwayne's 
adulthood that his mother contacted children's services to report her struggles with 
managing his relationship with local 'gangs'. For reasons unclear to me, he was 
assigned to the Disabled Children's service. By the time Dwayne became known to 
professionals at Kotoka, he was involved with the police for violent offences. Within 
Kotoka, Dwayne was seen as a clever man. The consensus on Dwayne's cognitive 
capacity is evidenced by the two data extracts (official minutes) below from separate 
CCP meetings: 
Extract 1. Quite high functioning. Needs to learn how to behave (CCP 
minutes, 28 June 2011). 
Extract 2. ?Autism. Has capacity to make decisions and say where he 
lives. Mum very anxious about risks [ ... ] Easily influenced, does not 
comply or engage with services [ ... ] (CCP minutes, 12 July 2011). 
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Both data extracts above evidence that professionals at the CCP meetings highlighted 
Dwayne's high cognitive capacity. The query in data extract 2 about whether Dwayne 
could be categorised as autistic - '?autism' - is worth further exploration in the 
context of data extract 1 where it is said that '[Dwayne] [n]eeds to learn to behave.' 
As professionals struggled to explain or understand Dwayne's apparent 'anti-social' 
behaviour, various possibilities were sought, including psychopathology (in this case 
autism). Furthermore, in data extract 2, it is said that Dwayne's mother shared 
professionals' anxieties about his 'behaviour' - 'Mum very anxious about risks' -
thereby reminding us that, as in the case of Amber (Chapter Five), in Kotoka, the 
interests of families and professionals periodically aligned in the management and 
pathologising of (mis)behaviours as 'risk'. 
Continuing with Dwayne's life story, by the time he was allocated to a social 
worker in Kotoka, he was facing a police charge for 'violent behaviour'. At the 
ensuing trial, the judge referred Dwayne to a psychiatric hospital for a mental health 
assessment whereupon he was 'sectioned' under the Mental Health Act (MHA) on 
reports that he 'threatened' to kill his mother. Subsequently when told of his right of 
appeal to a Mental Health Tribunal (MHT) against the section, Dwayne acquired a 
solicitor on his own accord. He was discharged by the tribunal because of lack of 
evidence of mental illness. The data below is extracted from my field notes of CCP 
meeting on 12 July 2011 where Dwayne was discussed following his discharge from 
hospital. I recorded concerns about the risks Dwayne faced in the community and 
belief among professionals that his mental capacity prevented any mitigating care 
planning: 
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Max implied at this point that it would have been better if Dwayne had not 
won his MHT appeal. There was a discussion about the appeal process. 
Apparently members of the MHT said that they thought that by 
discharging Dwayne they were exposing him to more risks and the 
possibility of him ending up in the criminal justice system, nevertheless 
they felt that they did not have the power to detain him [ ... ] DOLS20 is out 
of the window because he has capacity. Has capacity to make decisions on 
accommodation. Refusing to go to residential placement. [Dwayne] wants 
to get out of hospital; lives in Kotoka [and wants to remain here]. 
Aspirations: wants to go to college, wants to live in a hostel. (Field notes, 
observing CCP, 12 July 2011). 
Dwayne presented complex legal and moral quandaries for professionals around risk. 
His mother was anxious about his safety and professionals similarly felt that he was 
'vulnerable' and would become further involved in violence on discharge from the 
Section. Based on these assessments, professionals grappled around for legal powers 
to 'protect' him as indicated in the data extract above. Care planning for Dwayne's 
'protection' was, however, complicated because he clearly demonstrated capacity, as 
exemplified by his choices of accommodation, a solicitor, and his avowed aspirations 
to go to college. As such, a care plan could not be arranged without Dwayne's 
consent. Furthermore he did not have a mental illness so professionals could not draw 
20 DOLS refers to Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards and is part of the MCA. DOLS 
legalises the detention of people assessed as lacking mental capacity for 'treatment 
and care'. The DOLS Code of Practice proposes it as 'protection' for 'vulnerable' 
people (Ministry of JusticelDOH, 2008; p9), thereby linking the MCA to 
safeguarding. DOLS mandates institutions offering care or treatment (such as a care 
home or hospital) to apply to a local authority for licence after exploring 'least 
restrictive' options besides detention (Dwyer, 2009). 
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on MHA powers to enforce a care plan. Thus without any legal powers mandating 
Dwayne to follow a care plan, professionals felt powerless. This led Max (Head of 
Service) to make the morally dubious point in the above data extract that Dwayne 
would have been better off in a psychiatric unit, notwithstanding his mental capacity 
and the potential illegality of detaining a mentally healthy person under the MHA. 
Noticeably, despite Dwayne being 'high functioning', during the CCP meeting of 12 
July 2011, professionals were unanimous on his right to services even though the 
eligibility criteria in Kotoka were 'critical' and 'substantial'. 
One explanation for Dwayne meeting the eligibility criteria, notwithstanding 
his 'high functioning', was the application of the concept of 'vulnerable adult'. On 21 
July, I was shadowing Adwoa, when Danielle (Assistant Social Work Team Manager) 
and I started a conversation about Dwayne. Danielle was unaware that I was present 
at the CCP I have just discussed. She initiated the conversation with me perhaps as a 
result of exasperation with managing the case or because she felt I was an expert, 
given my research interests. Below are excerpts of my field notes below about the 
conversation: 
Danielle said that Dwayne met the [eligibility] criteria because he was 
'vulnerable' so this led me to ask whether 'vulnerability' was another 
eligibility criterion. Danielle then explained about FACS - did I know 
what it was? - I said that I did not fully grasp her explanation of where 
vulnerability came in the eligibility criteria. Nevertheless her explanation 
of the interaction between FACS, eligibility criteria and 'vulnerability' led 
her to say 'that's why people fall through the cracks'. (Field notes, 21 July 
2011). 
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In the field notes above, Danielle's phrase 'people [service users] fall through the 
cracks' can be inferred as referring to liminal spaces because she is suggesting that 
those service users did not fit any categories. Furthermore she enveloped liminality 
within the concept of vulnerability. In Kotoka, 'vulnerability' therefore acted as 
an(other) eligibility criterion for services but 'vulnerability' was operationalised as 
potential harm to the body. It was unlikely that someone who claimed to be poor, or 
was 'confused' about the spiritual essence of life, would be provided services: there 
had to be a threat to, or by, the embodied person. For instance, in the case of Amber, 
who was considered to have mental capacity and where doubts were expressed about 
whether she could be classified as learning disabled, her social worker Rose described 
her as 'vulnerable'. In the data extract below, Rose explained why Amber became 
known to the service: 
I asked then how Amber had become known to the service. Rose said that 
she had become known to the service as a result of being a 'vulnerable 
adult' through the interaction between her being in the mental health 
system and the report from her family that she had been 'sold' for sex 
(Field notes, shadowing Rose, 13 July 2011). 
Thus in Kotoka one way that professionals addressed the needs of service users who 
could not be fitted into the social category of learning disability or mental incapacity 
(i.e. liminality) was through the operationalisation of the concept of vulnerability. 
Dwayne and Amber were not regarded as fitting the classification 'learning disability' 
yet they offended social norms: the former did not 'learn to behave' and the latter was 
deemed to be sexually profligate. By being classified as vulnerable, Dwayne and 
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Amber became subject to control through complex care packages. With Dwayne one 
dimension of control was his withdrawal from everyday life to keep him safe. In sharp 
contrast to this, with Alan, who I now discuss, every effort was made to avoid his 
social exclusion, even though he engaged in racist behaviour and threatened some 
staff. 
Alan: dealing with Iiminality through closeness to power 
Alan was well-known within the service because he was a member of the self-
advocacy group formed by the PCP Coordinator to train social workers in user 
perspectives on PCPs. Alan's self-advocacy role in the integrated service was 
discussed when I visited him with his social worker Rose, as I later wrote in my 
Reflective Diary: 
We were talking about the PCP Coordinator in the office who runs a 
training program that is delivered by service users to social workers about 
how to do PCP assessments. Alan remembered that he was delivering 
some of the training (starting 11 July) and invited me to attend (Reflective 
Diary 14, June 2011). 
One of the reasons for Alan's role as a self-advocate (as shown from the data extract 
above) was his social presentation. In his Comprehensive Assessment, Rose 
recorded that Alan could understand all verbal communication, he could read, and 
he could also self-advocate. The relevant passage from the Assessment form is cited 
below: 
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Alan has a good level of verbal communication and understands 
everything that is said to him. He is confident of giving his views on all 
subjects and will let professionals know [ ... ] Alan can read simple texts 
and look for words that he recognises to get the overall meaning. 
(Comprehensive Assessment Form (Alan), 13 October 2010; p3). 
The data extract above from Alan's Assessment form is Rose's (informal) 
assessment of his capacity. In the first sentence, the social worker conceptualised 
mental capacity as communicating (as I have discussed in Part Two, Chapter Five). 
The data extract above also evidenced that Alan displayed capacities which defied 
the connotations of the labels of learning disability or incapacity: Alan could 
understand, remember, explain complex concepts, and communicate his thoughts. 
On 24 August 2011, I attended a Professionals' Meeting with Rose, which was 
arranged to discuss Alan's apparent racism to staff in his supported accommodation. 
The backdrop to the meeting was the civil disturbance in London during August 
2011, which resulted in arson at several London local authorities, including the site 
of my fieldwork. Coinciding with the day of civil disorder, support workers had 
promised Alan and his friends a street party but this had to be cancelled in the face 
of the disturbances. Eight professionals were in attendance at the meeting I observed 
including staff from Kotoka: Toush (trainee clinical psychologist), Rose (social 
worker), Morris (domiciliary care coordinator), and staff from the Housing 
Association (owners of Alan's accommodation). All professionals had known Alan 
for a while, and believed they had insight into his level of understanding. Below are 
extracts from my field notes of the meeting: 
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1. Riots, police decide that planned street party should be cancelled 
because they could not provide officers ... Alan would not agree with 
the police's stipulation, became agitated and verbally abusive. On 
seeing the reports of the riots on TV he claimed that the riots were 
caused by black people and blamed them for cancellation of the 
party ... remarked whenever he saw TV 'you see it's the black people 
doing it.' When black support staff approached him he would respond 
'F-offyou black so and so.' 
2. Does he understand it [his racist behaviour]? Professionals from 
Housing Association at the meeting felt that Alan understands; that he 
is aware that his opinions are racists - 'that it is measured 
[premeditated]'. Maxine [support worker] said that another tenant has 
told her that Alan has told him that if they got together they could kick 
out 'all the monkeys [black staff]'. 
3. Morris: What about his capacity to understand? We [referring to the 
group of professionals at the meeting] know that he has capacity to 
understand what he is doing; we know that he knows what he is doing. 
4. At this point of the meeting I [Godfred] made these observations in 
my notebook which I cite verbatim here: 'Care Coordinator [Morris] 
to my surprise was defending Alan. Said that if he [Alan] does not 
want black staff then it's the role of the service to find white staff -
'that's diversity'. 
5. Toush: PCP [proposed] Yes last time [when Alan manifested such 
behaviours] he was referred to the psychiatrist so maybe medication 
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can [also] be helpful (Field notes, Professionals' Meeting, 24 August 
2011). 
At line 4, Morris (a black male staff) defended Alan by reinterpreting Alan's racism 
in the official discourse of 'diversity.' The fact that a black person is employing the 
discourse of 'diversity' to defend white racism is worthy of note because the official 
parlance is ostensibly designed for the opposite: to 'protect' black people from 
statutory discrimination. Throughout the meeting Morris was keen to have the charge 
of racism re-categorised as one of psychopathology. In this, Morris was successful 
because the meeting decided that, rather than charge Alan for breaking his Tenancy 
Agreement because of racism, PCP work would be carried out and medication 
administered, as was done in this case last time (point 5). 
The data on Alan and Dwayne illustrated two sharply contrasting responses to 
'high functioning' service users with capacity who nevertheless were deemed to 
present risk. In the case of Dwayne, he was categorised as a 'risk' although he was 
neither learning disabled or mentally incapacitated and attempts were made to confine 
him away from society; firstly through the Courts, and secondly, through the mental 
health system. Alan's case was entirely different; professionals attempted to maintain 
his connections with established networks, including self-advocacy in Kotoka. 
Although both were considered vulnerable by professionals, Dwayne's potential to 
cause physical harm provoked more anguish and he was considered more of a risk. 
The professional responses were thus markedly different. In Dwayne's case, the head 
of service, Max, thought his confinement in hospital would have been better, whereas 
in Alan's situation, there was a plea for 'diversity' and medication. 
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Up to now I have taken the view in this chapter that risk is a given in social care and 
on this basis, I sought to explain on the one hand, how moral responsibilities for 
'protection' accrued to service users' social networks (including their parents and 
carers), On the other hand, I have also shown in this chapter that practice in Kotoka, 
under the ever-present shadow of safeguarding practice, was curious. Under the 
category and statutory duty of safeguarding, professionals moved along a continuum 
of non-intervention (as in the 'no further action' stipulation by Martina in the case of 
Tracey and her family), full incarceration (Dwayne), and a middle ground of 
'protecting' even where service users engaged in socially and morally frowned-upon 
activities (as in the case of Alan). At times in Kotoka, professionals moved along this 
continuum in the same meeting (in the case of Tracey, for instance, Martina moved 
from non-intervention to confinement with her appeal to the MHA). The issues that 
accounted for professional decision-making about risk discussed here can be summed 
up thus: a combination of power, historic knowledge about service users, moral 
positioning, and the configuration of services between local authorities as 
'purchasers' and private agencies as 'providers' of care. One other issue which 
provoked my inquisitiveness as an 'outsider' in Kotoka was ethnicity because it was 
apparently invisible to professionals yet evident to me as a researcher. Professionals 
were uneasy about discussing ethnicity, yet it featured prominently in some cases and 
institutional spaces such as CCP or safeguarding meetings. In what follows (Part 
Two) I discuss practice with minority service users in Kotoka. 
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Part Two. Wrestling with cultural 
differences: professional practice 
with ethnic minorities 
Presenting and analysing data about practitioners' understanding of the concept of 
ethnicity, I have framed Part Two around the overarching theme of 'culture as deficit' 
(Park, 2005). Given the multi-faceted conceptualisation of 'ethnicity' here, in Part 
Two, I use 'culture', 'ethnicity', 'minority', and 'Black and Minority Ethnic (BME)' 
interchangeably. 
The (in)visihility of ethnic minorities 
In a statistical analysis of the 2001 census, a local strategic planning paper described 
the ethnic make-up of the borough comprising Kotoka thus: 
The most demographically distinguishing feature about [the borough] is 
its combination of particular ethnic groups. Compared to the 'typical' 
situation in Outer London boroughs it has a large 'Other White' group 
(12.9%), a relatively high, though small, Bangladeshi group (1.3%) and, 
though less exceptional, Black Caribbean's (5.3%) - all %s from the 2001 
Census figures. The 'Other White' group is composed largely of Greek 
and Turkish Cypriots and Turkish. (Local Implementation Plan, undated; 
p5). 
Specifically within the Kotoka, ethnic diversity was given prominence. On entering 
the reception area for instance, I noticed a large body of literature publicising services 
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written In minority languages. There was also a concerted effort to engage BME 
advocacy groups in service provision by linking them to service users. For instance, 
on a visit to a local carers centre with close connections to the local authority, I 
collected assorted literature signposting service users to BME social care 
organisations. Regarding my encounters with BMEs (which I broadly define to 
include white non-British people), I met very few service users fitting such a 
classification. I did not meet any black service users; however, I met one service user 
from Poland who had recently immigrated to the UK. As I illustrate below using a 
data extract from my Reflective Diary, initially, the invisibility of ethnic minorities 
caused me some anxiety, given ethnicity is a key substantive concern of my research: 
I have returned miserable and downbeat because I really can't figure out 
the overall strategy of my research yet. I am supposed to be finding out 
MeA assessments and ethnicity and yet I have barely seen an assessment 
let alone observed a BME service user! (Reflective Diary, shadowing 
Ofira, 21 June 201l). 
The data extract above shows how in my reflections on fieldwork, I became 
concerned that I was not meeting the substantive aims of my research because of the 
invisibility of ethnic minorities. In an attempt to remedy the situation and observe 
ethnic minority service users in Kotoka, I spent many hours in the waiting area. 
Sometimes I arrived early to hang-out in the reception area because I felt that being 
the 'face' of the service, the use of that space reflected the image that the service 
wanted to project to outsiders. In the reception area I rarely saw black or other ethnic 
minority service users although I saw many professionals who fitted the latter 
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descriptions. Another noteworthy issue is that only one of the service users I visited 
with professionals was an ethnic minority (the Polish family described above). My 
findings described here about the invisibility of ethnic minorities in Kotoka, therefore, 
echo recent calls for empirical explanations of 'missing bodies': 'there has been 
limited sociological or other attention to the [in]visibility of bodies, including their 
deliberate erasure, their unanticipated disappearances and elisions, and their 
celebratory objectification.' (Casper and Moore, 2009; p9). 
Related to the (in)visibility of ethnic minority service users was that professionals 
appeared to struggle with understanding and articulating the concepts 'ethnicity', 
'ethnic minority', or 'Black and Minority Ethnic'. To elucidate further on this point, I 
now present a data extract from an interview with Jessica, a white occupational 
therapist, who had worked in the local authority since 1991. The interview was an 
uncomfortable experience because Jessica seemed reluctant to answer any questions, 
and she asked not to be tape recorded. It was therefore a breakthrough of sorts when 
Jessica took an interest in my research and questioned me about the concept of an 
ethnic minority: 
[Jessica] mentioned that she thought that my project was worthwhile and 
she asked what I thought an ethnic minority was - did I think a Greek 
person was a minority? I said that her question exposed the complexity of 
the concept and said that I had been asked the same question at the ethics 
review. Jessica then said that she had not worked with many minorities 
whether in her role as an OT or as a Best Interest Assessor. She said that 
she tended to work with whites and Asians but a majority of the service 
users are white. (Field notes, 02 August 2011). 
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Of particular interest to the present discussion is Jessica's question about whether 
Greeks constituted a 'minority' because she appeared to accord majority status to 
Asians, even though in popular usages and by the census data I presented earlier, the 
category' Asians' referred to minorities (Cole, 1993). However, at the same time, 
Jessica also exposed the limitations of the nomenclature 'ethnic minority' because in 
certain spaces and locations, a minority group would be the majority if more 
numerous. This latter point also highlights the difficulties in operationalising the 
concept of 'ethnic minority' in empirical research because the researcher and their 
participants may not share the same views of the meaning of 'minority' or 'majority'. 
Being a black male, I had hypothesised that ethnic minority professionals 
would display a better understanding of the concept of ethnicity. However in my 
fieldwork, there was no relation between a professional's ethnicity and whether they 
were willing to (or could) explain ethnicity and its related concepts. In the main, 
professionals were uneasy about discussing ethnicity; some denied having case 
responsibility with ethnic minority service users even though I had observed the 
contrary. My fieldwork experiences in this regard echo previous findings by Keating 
and Robertson (2004) and Gillies (201l), which I discuss briefly to contextualise the 
rest of the chapter. From their mixed-method study using focus groups and interviews 
of mental health professionals and ethnic minority service users and their carers, 
Keating and Robertson (2004, p444) found that' A striking issue to emerge from 
professionals was that there seemed to be a fear of talking about issues of "race' and 
culture in a safe and honest manner'. Similarly, in her ethnography of a Pupils 
Referral Unit for young people excluded from secondary school, Gillies (2011) found 
an over-representation of black children at the same time as professionals were 
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unwilling to discuss issues of 'race' because of a mistaken assumption that they 
would be accused of racism. 
In the next section, I discuss the question of BMEs' (in)visibility through the 
prism of culture, an allied concept to ethnicity. I draw attention to culture because, 
within Kotoka, it was not so much that concerns emanated around the embodied 
category BME. Professionals seemed anxious about what the category BME signified 
in terms of people's (risky) lifestyles rather than their presence qua presence. Thus 
BMEs were visible around discussions about risk. 
Making people visible: culture and the presumption of 
risks 
At the time of fieldwork, all the cases that the integrated learning disability service 
had initiated under proceedings in the Court of Protection (COP) for service users to 
be removed from their families involved people described as 'Asians' by 10, a 
manager. My understanding of the legal proceedings developed from two main 
sources: routine conversations with professionals and a taped interview with Jo, who I 
have described previously in Chapter Five. According to Jo, when senior managers at 
Kotoka realised that all the cases submitted to COP involved only' Asians', there was 
consternation. In the data extract below, Jo reflected on a meeting called to discuss the 
cases in COP: 
As a management group we were of like 'oh we've got three people at that 
level of COP stuff with mental capacity and Best Interest and they've 
come from an Asian background' and so sort of we all looked round the 
room and sort of 'oh OK I'm Italian but I'm not Asian there's another 
person who's sort of ... we were all white European at that time as a 
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management group you know. We were making decisions on families that 
weren't from the white European background you know you question 
yourself, you have to. (Taped interview, Jo, 4 August 20 II). 
In the quote above, Jo recounted that as a 'management group' senior managers were 
alarmed at the realisation that all cases to COP involved' Asians'. In response there 
was a meeting held - 'like a group supervision' to discuss the cases, but as the quote 
above shows, that meeting provoked more anxiety because managers realised that all 
of them were white. One reason for the developments discussed above was that there 
was arguably a pre-occupation with surveillance of ethnic minorities - especially 
'Asian' families - in Kotoka. 
The case of Nima can be used as an illustration of one aspect of surveillance. 
According to Adwoa, a social worker, local authority-employed staff reported that 
Nima's father stopped her from attending day care services, and he had also been 
abusive to staff. Adwoa and a colleague were asked to investigate the report. Initially 
Nima's father told the two professionals on the home visit that Nima no longer wished 
to attend day care. Explaining further, Adwoa said that when she challenged his 
account Nima's father changed it and said that Nima had reported being hit by another 
service user. The implication here was that Nima's father was protecting her from 
other service users. Professionals did not believe him and were suspicious that he was 
abusing Nima at home. In response domiciliary care services - 'dom care' - were 
arranged to 'monitor' the home situation: 
[Adwoa] intimated that 'dom care' had been arranged as a way of the 
local authority observing the home for safeguarding purposes. I recall that 
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when we discussed this I felt 'this is what we used to do in children's 
services - infantalisation'. Sitting here now I wonder whether there is an 
emerging convergence between children and adult learning disability 
practice with safeguarding the course of convergence. (Field notes, 
shadowing Adwoa, 21 July 2011). 
The noteworthy aspect of the data extract above is that domiciliary care was arranged 
to observe the family home even though this was not the explicit aim of the service. 
Whilst Nima's case is one illustration of surveillance, in other cases, professionals 
observed BME families' interaction and reported what they deemed 'suspicious' 
behaviour. During one session of shadowing Audrey (social worker) when she was on 
Duty, a Support Worker emailed to report possible 'financial abuse' of Kiela (a 
service user): 
The email from the Support Worker reported that when Kiela's father had 
visited them Kiela requested £ 1 0 to buy take-away to eat with her father 
and no change was submitted although the receipt indicated cost of £8.60. 
I felt that the Support Worker was hinting at "financial abuse" by the 
father but it is an example of what may constitute 'governing at a 
distance' and the surveillance of service users. It also shows the extent to 
which safeguarding could constitute control. On this occasion Audrey felt 
that there was no need for the information [investigation] (Field notes, 
shadowing Audrey, 02 August 2011). 
Some implications can be drawn from the data extracts I have presented in this 
section. In no other instances during fieldwork did I hear or observe that services had 
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been arranged for a white service user to 'monitor' their home. Nima and Kiela's 
cases, therefore, provide prima facia evidence of surveillance of ethnic minorities. 
Furthermore, the data extracts can be used to support an argument that professionals' 
assumptions about certain cultures, together with their discretionary use of power, 
could alter the trajectory of cases. In Nima's situation, Adwoa and her colleague 
followed up their suspicions that her father might be abusing her and arranged 
surveillance in the form of 'dom care', whereas Audrey ignored the hint of financial 
abuse in the Support Worker's email about Kiela and did not conduct a follow up 
investigation. Thus stigmatisation matters because it impacts on the service packages 
that professionals implement for service users taking into account the care/control 
function of statutory services. Altogether the topics discussed in this section point to 
the emotion of fear (Zinn, 2(06) that certain people and cultures elicit in 
professionals, leading to risk evaluations. Through this present discussion, I am 
drawing attention to the transparency of institutional practices in Kotoka geared at 
'protecting' people such as occurs in the CCP. As a final note, the data presented in 
this section highlight how ethnicity was simultaneously present and absent from 
Kotoka. Ethnicity was invisible because, as demonstrated by the data extract 
involving Jo, it was not always apparent that all managers were white or that ethnic 
minorities were over-represented in 'complex' cases. 
Policing the visible: ethnic minorities and CCP 
A part of the integrated service in which ethnic minorities were disproportionately 
(and arguably more visibly) represented was at the CCP. As a researcher observing 
CCP I heard more instances of service users' culture and ethnic origin being discussed 
than when I listened to routine conversations between professionals in the office. CCP 
meetings may therefore be conceptualised as material and temporal safe spaces for 
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discussing ethnicity within the context of risk. Of the CCP meetings I witnessed, there 
were relatively more unprompted references to the dimensions of culture: for instance, 
to the food service users ate at home - 'he is no longer eating his mum's Greek food' 
- or people's origin - '24 year old Indian male'. At other times people or ethnic 
groups were stereotyped - 'It's quite a cultural thing within the Asian community'. 
Arising from these discussions about lifestyles, at CCP meetings, I was able to discern 
service users' ethnicity from professionals' narratives. My assignment of such service 
users' ethnicity is defensible, especially given the fact that I rarely encountered ethnic 
minority service users in Kotoka. However, it is also potentially problematic because 
those I have categorised may not regard themselves as BME if I asked them (Bradby, 
2003). 
Nevertheless my research, which is committed to principles of social justice, 
would be on dubious ethical grounds for two main reasons if I neglected to report that 
where stereotypes were deployed by professionals, the service users in question 
appeared to have non-English (or British) sounding names. Firstly, analyses of the 
minutes from CCP show that a disproportionate number of names were non-English 
sounding - an intrinsically important finding. Secondly, the list of names in CCP 
arguably reflects practitioners' attitudes towards culture in Kotoka and this needs 
reporting. As proposed by Aspinall (2001), researcher-assigned ethnicity is justified if 
there is evidence that ethnic classification is leading to unequal treatment: 
There remain only a few contexts in which such [researcher] assignment 
[of ethnicity] can be justified from a conceptual viewpoint. They include 
the need to obtain the wider society's perception of ethnicity, as 
exemplified by Singh, Croudance et al (1998)'s study of risk of 
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compulsory admission, in which a measure 'specifically of socially 
perceived ethnicity' or the way ethnicity is constructed in everyday social 
interaction was required.' (Aspinall, 2001; p839; original emphasis). 
In one exceptional case in CCP, on 26 July 2011, during a discussion of someone with 
a non-British sounding name, ethnicity intersected with class. Below, I reproduce a 
field notes extract of my observations of the CCP meeting. The exchanges I recorded 
were between Audrey (social worker, Black British), Sandra (Assistant Social Work 
Manager, Turkish) and Max (Head of Kotoka, White British) about a female service 
user called Mo. Before the CCP meeting I knew about Mo because she had, 
fortuitously, come up in a conversation I had with Audrey on 22 July from which I 
had obtained Mo's biography. Mo became known to the service when professionals 
found that her mother kept her in a 'darkened room'. When asked to explain the 
rationale for her actions, Mo' s mother said that she kept her in a dark room to prevent 
her coming into contact with stimulation as she believed that sensory perceptions 
aggravated Mo' s epilepsy. 
After a safeguarding meeting, professionals wrote to Mo's parents imploring 
them to desist from their actions. When parental 'cooperation' was not forthcoming, 
the local authority initiated legal proceedings for judges to decide whether her 
parents' actions were in Mo's 'best interest'. Authorisation was granted by COP for 
the local authority to remove Mo from her parents' care, but perhaps one of the issues 
that affected the judges' decision was that the local authority undertook to find Mo a 
local placement were the COP to authorise her removal from home. As a result Mo no 
longer lived with her parents. Audrey was her social worker throughout the duration 
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of court proceedings. During my conversation with Audrey on 22 July, I had asked 
her about Mo' s ethnicity and noted the following in my field notes: 
I asked Audrey whether there were any cultural issues. She said in 
response that Mo' s parents said that they could not speak English even 
though mother was once a teacher and father a housing officer (Field 
notes, shadowing Audrey, 22 July 2011). 
Based on the data extract above, by the time of CCP at which I recorded the 
interactions between the professionals, below, I knew therefore that Mo' s family were 
at the very least not 'White British'. 
I. Audrey - Alternative placement being sought. Audrey said that she has 
contacted manager of Alexander Road [another provision]. 
2. Max - So Mo is still in Pinetree [residential placement]. But we need 
to keep this up because we do not want to lose parents' cooperation. 
3. Sandra - Can Mo talk? Has she got an advocate? 
4. Audrey [in response to Sandra] - She can't [talk] but enjoying it 
[current placement]. 
5. Max - Would be helpful to have an IMCA [Independent Mental 
Capacity Advocatefl involved 
6. [Current placement] Costs £2000 
21Where people are assessed as lacking mental capacity, they have a right to IMCA 
services in the following: changes in accommodation, medical treatment, 
safeguarding investigations, and applications under the DOLS. 
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7. Max - Supported living means that family [would] feel they have 
control. 
8. Max - And culturally? [Max was asking whether the current 
placement met Mo's cultural needs] 
9. Sandra - No its middle class White British (Field notes, observing 
CCP, 26 July 2011). 
From his response at point 8 above, where Max asked 'and culturally?' it seemed that 
like me, Max also believed that Mo (and her family) were an ethnic minority family. 
Sandra's response at point 9 that the family was 'middle class White British' is 
interesting in a number of ways. For one thing she was not acquainted with the case 
(Danielle was supervising Audrey on the case) so Sandra could here be interpreted as 
assuming the service user's ethnicity and class from the preceding discussion about 
Mo's parents. In one of the few qualitative studies involving 'Black Middle Classes', 
Rollock et al found that BMEs firstly associated class with whiteness and secondly, 
they conflated assertiveness and accent with middle classness: 'Accent is conflated 
with comportment, in this case composure and politeness as an embodied form of 
capital, along with persistence and knowledge that enables her [research participant] 
to take her complaint to the highest channels and obtain the outcome she seeks.' 
(2011; P 1087). 
Based on Rollock et aI's findings, a more plausible explanation for Sandra's 
answer in point 9 is that Mo's parents were displaying behaviours (assertiveness, 
insistence on their rights as parents) associated with white middle class people in 
Kotoka. For instance, according to Audrey, Mo's parents challenged professionals' 
decisions at every tum, and as the data extract above suggests, Mo' s parents have 
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continued to do so since her removal from home. Mo's parents' persistent challenge 
of professionals is exemplified further by point 2, where Max urged professionals to 
'keep this up' (i.e. attempts to find her a local placement) to maintain Mo's parents' 
co-operation. Given the conflation of whiteness with middle classness (Archer, 2011), 
Sandra's presumptions about Mo's parents' class are explicable, especially given how 
other professionals described the family. Mo's parents' advocacy was in sharp 
contrast to some BME families (such as Ibrahim discussed under 'Families: 
threatening service users' in Chapter Five) who, on being presented with a letter from 
the local authority's legal department, offered to 'co-operate' with professionals. 
The analysis of the CCP discussion about Mo shows how class, ethnicity, 
gender, parental rights, and professional power combined to affect service users' care 
in Kotoka. Furthermore, they show that at the coal face of practice, professionals 
assigned ethnicity on the basis of visible and easily identifiable markers of difference. 
Folk concepts about difference such as 'Asians' or 'White Europeans' involving 
grouping together people of similar skin tone were readily deployed, yet at the same 
time when I asked professionals questions about ethnicity (or ethnic minorities) they 
signalled their discomfort with such inquiries. With this realisation, in the latter half 
of fieldwork, I refrained from questioning professionals about 'ethnicity' and instead I 
asked professionals how they felt that service users' culture impacted on their work. 
Managing (an)Other: intersections of culture, 
disability, and risk 
Primarily, professionals involved in my research at Kotoka conceptualised culture as a 
property of the Other, and in these terms, it was only ethnic minorities who practised 
culture. In the UK, writers have recognised the inherent assumption that white people 
do not have culture (Jeyashingham, 2012) because culture has traditionally been 
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conflated with the exotic, on the one hand, or 'as deficit' (Park, 2005) on the other 
hand. The novel finding of my research, however, is that the conceptualisation of 
'culture as deficit' was propagated by ethnic minority professionals in Kotoka. There 
was also an interesting contrast between the attitudes of two white women in the ST. 
Abby, manager of the ST, told me in interviews that her ethnicity was Afrikaans. 
Abby stressed that she considered herself an ethnic minority in the UK (although she 
was white). Abby displayed a reflective understanding of culture. She viewed culture 
as the 'normal' things that ethnic minority service users did in their daily lives: food 
eaten, music listened to, and religion. Furthermore, Abby perceived cultural practices 
as beneficial to service users. Abby felt strongly that issues about discrimination of 
the Other did not receive the attention required in the local authority and, as such, she 
had devised policies requiring the inclusion of BME advocates in MCA cases 
involving ethnic minorities: 
[W]hat our policy does say is that someone can have an IMCA but they 
can also have another advocate. So for example there's the National 
Equalities Council who or Equalities National Council, yeah, they do an 
odd way round; Equalities National Council, they provide advocates from 
there. [Their] speciality is dealing with cultural concerns [ ... ] so they're 
not IMCA's [ ... ] and they're a charity as well so they're neutral. (Taped 
interview, Abby, 12 July 2011). 
In the quote above Abby is explaining that, in addition to statutory IMCA provision, 
service users could also access more 'neutral' advocates. She mistrusted the 
(im)partiality of the IMeA service available locally because it was commissioned by 
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the local authority (similarly Buchanan and Walmsley (2006) identified a potential 
conflict of interest from 'closeness to power' of advocacy groups funded by local 
authorities). Abby's keenness to ensure independent advocacy for BME service users 
contrasted with her colleague, Emma, who felt that culture was a property of the 
Other. The context of the data extract from our interview, below, was that I asked 
what cultural issues would be considered in safeguarding work with ethnic minorities: 
There's no way that anyone can hope to become an expert in all the 
cultures represented within [the borough]. So what we have to do is be 
open-minded and know where to go for the information. (Taped interview 
with Emma, deputy safeguarding manager, 1 July 2011). 
In the above statement Emma pointed to the apparent ethnic diversity of the borough 
as making it impossible for any professional to be 'an expert in all cultures'. Emma 
could also be interpreted as implying a multiplicity of cultures in the borough and, in 
the face of difference; professionals could be absolved of their responsibility to know 
about different cultures. Consequently, the onus fell on the Other to provide 
information about the culture when sought by the professional. Emma thought that it 
was the less powerful in the borough - that is minorities - who had to form advocacy 
groups to provide information about their culture, whereas her colleague Abby took 
the opposite view. 
Moving from the level of service provision to the conceptualisation of culture, 
professionals displayed varying understandings. A more sophisticated understanding 
was that of Adwoa, a Black British social worker of Ghanaian origin - 'culture is a 
construct. .. maybe I am going too deep.' Adwoa's social constructionist stance on 
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culture was an exception. More commonly, professionals in Kotoka described culture 
as historic - 'things that identify with their background' - or a heritage that people 
wished to maintain. Even amongst the ethnic minority professionals (other than 
Abby), culture was always a property of the Other but there were variations on this 
theme. For instance, a professional would accept that in the UK they were a minority 
and, therefore, would describe themselves as Black British (Grenadian ancestry). Yet 
when they spoke about Grenadians living in Grenada, they positioned themselves as 
'outsiders' and described people living there as 'they' instead of 'we' or 'us'. By 
describing Grenadians vis-a-vis themselves as 'they', professionals in this sense were 
self-classifying as British simultaneously as they positioned themselves as minorities 
in the UK, given their blackness. This multiple positioning was evident even amongst 
the workers who were not UK citizens. For instance Mavis (American of Hispanic 
origin) said that her parents still spoke Spanish but talked about Guatamala as a 
faraway land - 'in Guatamala they ... ' although she visited the country of her parents' 
birth regularly as a child. 
Highlighting that minority professionals positioned BME service users as the 
Other is important because, in the social work literature, there is increasing stress on 
cultural competence. By cultural competence, it is meant that providing professionals 
with knowledge about a culture led them to treat service users with dignity or respect 
(Harrison and Turner, 2011). Another underpinning assumption of cultural 
competence was that minority professionals would better understand BME service 
users' needs. The data I have presented above, suggesting that professionals 
positioned minority service users as the Other, undermines this assumption of the 
concept of cultural competence. In the next section I illustrate this further by 
presenting the life story of Abdullah. 
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Abdullah: culture as risk 
The case of Abdullah (a Somali migrant) epitomised how positioning of BME service 
users as the Other and conceptualisation of 'culture as deficit', become enmeshed in 
care planning and risk management. Of particular interest in Abdullah's case was that 
it involved Annika, who described herself to me as an Australian national with 
Nicaraguan roots (her family migrated to Australia when she was 7 years old). Annika 
became involved with Abdullah's family following a referral from the Probation 
Service requesting that a social worker be present during the risk assessment of 
Abdullah's brother Buba. Buba was due to be released from prison on licence for 
murder and professionals were assessing his family home as one of the places that he 
could live on licence. Preceding the referral from the Probation Service, Abdullah was 
awaiting a Core Assessment by professionals in Kotoka having just turned 18 and 
now classified as 'adult'. 
Being the first social worker from Kotoka to meet Abdullah, a visit billed 
initially as a risk assessment turned out to be a Comprehensive Assessment of him. 
Annika thought Abdullah to be 'the most disabled' service user she had ever met. On 
the face of it, however, Annika did not have cause for concern about Abdullah. 
Though he was diagnosed as having cerebral palsy, learning disability, had to be 
nourished through a gastro-peg, and could not exercise independent physical 
movement, Annika had learnt from professionals acquainted with the family that they 
provided exemplary care for Abdullah and that one of his sisters was a nurse. These 
'protective' factors notwithstanding, Annika felt that Abdullah could be at risk 
because of his ethnicity. Interpreting Somali culture as 'we look after our own', 
Annika felt that the family's heritage would prevent them from seeking statutory 
intervention. 
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Annika distrusted the family. During the risk assessment, Abdullah's father was 
present but Annika presumed polygamy and thought that he lived with another wife at 
a separate address. Furthermore, Annika speculated that the family were not using 
Direct Payments' (DP) allocation of 15 hours from children's services to pay for a 
carer and were instead supplementing their income with DP. Annika also felt that 
Abdullah's mother had to be 'educated' that care in the UK was formalised: 
In the course of the discussion I asked Annika what she felt the cultural 
issues were and her answer was 'we look after our own.' Annika felt that 
she would need to let the family understand that they should welcome 
services and professional intervention. Annika said that Abdullah's sister 
needs to 'educate' [Annika's word] her mother about the formalisation of 
the system in the UK as her mother had the misconception that things 
were informal [ ... ] Annika felt that this reluctance to welcome 
professional intervention stems from the family's culture ... they believed 
that Abdullah would get better when this was not the case. Intriguingly, 
Annika based this assessment on the stigmatisation of disability in the 
culture of the 'Horn of Africa' ... As disability is stigmatised, people have 
to believe that one would get better. (Field notes, shadowing Annika, 22 
July 2011). 
In the data extract above, Annika identified two cultural beliefs around disability in 
the 'Horn of Africa' where Somalia is located: firstly that it is stigmatised and 
secondly, people believed erroneously that disability could be cured. An undertone of 
Annika's distrust of the cultural belief that disability could be cured was that it flew in 
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the face of 'science' and medicine which both decreed the opposite. Also Annika's 
stereotyping of Somali culture as 'we look after our own' prevented her fathoming the 
possibility that some families did not want statutory intervention, especially in the 
case of Abdullah, whose care had been described as 'exemplary' by other 
professionals. Previous research has shown that professionals presume' Asians' will 
seek to 'look after their own' (Mir and Tovey, 2002). However, the case of Abdullah 
shows that cultural stereotypes could also be the basis for intervening as the Other's 
way of living is assumed to pose risk. 
Annika's views on risk discussed in the preceding section epitomise the view 
of 'culture as a deficit' held by professionals in Kotoka. That these views were 
expressed by professionals who themselves may be classified as BME, and who also 
maintained that their practice was underpinned by values, made the discussions 
uncomfortable for me, a black researcher. On a different note, the data I have 
explored here go to the heart of the conceptualisations of culture; that people take 
multiple positions on the subject on the basis of their own values. 
Conclusion 
Adopting safeguarding as an analytic standpoint, I have examined professional and 
institutional responses to risk in Kotoka. In Part One of this chapter, using evidence 
from the Comprehensive Assessment form, I showed that risk in Kotoka was 
'observer-independent' (Searle, 2006), because the assessment and mitigation of risk 
was constructed as part of the job of social workers through various government and 
local authority guidance, and that this would be the case irrespective of subjective 
interpretations by professionals. This brought into sharp focus safeguarding, which 
was the broader policy framework for assessing and mitigating identified risk. At the 
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same time as considered 'real' in Kotoka, the policy framework of safeguarding 
nevertheless also epitomised the 'epistemic subjectivity' of risk. The data I have 
presented in this chapter show that professionals took divergent viewpoints on risk 
interpretation, or on how to heuristically apply their duties and powers (Searle, 1996). 
Thus while institutions matter to the discussions on policy, mainly, in this chapter; it 
is the role of powerful actors that I have shown. I evidenced how Martina, as chair of 
safeguarding meetings, used her knowledge of service users to categorise cases, 
especially when solutions to service users' 'complex' problems were not readily 
identifiable. Thus in the assignment of risk categories powerful actors (such as team 
managers) can override the views of service users. 
Another issue that this chapter has shown is the methodological and 
substantive difficulty of operationalising social categories in applied research. Starting 
with ethnicity, professionals appeared reluctant to discuss the topic for various 
reasons. One important reason may be, however, that in everyday language other 
equally complex concepts could operate as proxies for the concept of ethnicity -
examples include BME, culture, and minority. But while in everyday interactions 
there is a common or shared understanding of these three latterly cited concepts, 
arguably, they lack the sense of wholeness researchers aim to convey when they 
deploy the concept 'ethnicity'. This may also be said of learning disability or mental 
capacity: both concepts tell us something at the same time as leaving us with an 
imprecise picture of the people being described. As a result, a strong case can be 
made that, when studying social categories, there will be disjuncture between the 
researcher and research participants' understandings of the issue at hand. In the case 
of my fieldwork, for instance, this latter point was evidenced by how often 
professionals shifted their ethnic identities. Arguably, therefore, paradigmaticall y, 
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there is the need for qualitative research whereby researchers attempt to gain a fuller 
understanding of people's interpretation of social categories, noting what they say 
and/or do about phenomena. There is also the need to research the lives of people who 
embody social categories to understand how they shape and are affected by these 
statutory categories. In the next chapter, I address the issues outlined in this paragraph 
by presenting the case study of Abrax. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN. ABRAX: LIVING 
WITH SOCIAL CATEGORIES 
This chapter (re)presents my case study of Abrax who was simultaneously classified 
as learning disabled and an ethnic minority by professionals. Because of Abrax's 
status as learning disabled, he was concomitantly a person falling within the remit of 
the MCA. During fieldwork I modified my ethnographic methodology to incorporate 
a case study to gain breadth and depth of the substantive concerns of my thesis. 
Although in lived experience the past, present, and future interplay (Adam, 2010), by 
necessity this chapter is thematically organised around childhood and adulthood. This 
is because in statutory services the label learning disability is acquired during 
childhood (DOH, 2001) while a person's capacity to make decisions is formalised in 
adulthood. Therefore in Part One, under the theme of childhood, I draw 
predominantly on life story interviews with Abrax's parents to identify three key 
incidents in his infancy which still resonated in his life or in the narratives told about 
him in adulthood. The three incidents were (a) Abrax acquiring the label of learning 
disability (b) the first time Abrax was given a wheel-chair at the age of ten (c) and 
finally, his time at Marigold (an SEN school). In Part Two, I discuss Abrax's life in 
his supported accommodation, Y arlow, based on observations, interviews, and 
documentary analyses. 
Abrax: painting a portrait 
Abrax, a 19-year old man of Greek-Cypriot origin, was classified as learning disabled. 
At the time of fieldwork, Abrax required care at all times to meet his physical needs. 
He was assisted with 'personal care' such as using the bathroom, washing, dressing, 
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and eating. Abrax could not control his muscles; consequently, he was not able to 
keep his torso upright or stand unaided. Therefore, Abrax wore a vest prescribed by a 
doctor to keep his torso straight-up (his carers called the vest 'bodysuit') and he used 
a wheelchair permanently. Due to these requirements, Abrax was classified as 
needing 24-hour one-to-one support provided as part of his tenancy in a newly 
converted supported living accommodation, Y arlow. The house was owned by a 
private company (hereafter referred to as care provider) which was contracted by the 
local authority to provide day care and accommodation services. Adjacent to another 
learning disability-licensed accommodation owned by the same company, Abrax's 
home was authorised to accommodate five service users. However, at the time of 
fieldwork, Abrax lived with two flatmates Alexander and Naomi. Noticeably, unlike 
the other tenants in both houses, Abrax was supported by a designated team of five 
men who co-incidentally were all Black Africans. During my field work I was 
regularly told by both female and male carers that Abrax insisted on being supported 
by male carers because he was mindful of his privacy, however I found no evidence 
of when and how Abrax communicated this wish. 
Key to communicating with Abrax was other people's willingness to recognise 
his ability to make his views known. Abrax had a unique way of communicating: he 
did not construct sentences and he only vocalised single syllable words. As such, to 
communicate with him, one used closed questions - for example 'should we go to the 
cinema?' In response to closed questions Abrax made sounds, which the listener 
interpreted as either 'yes' or 'no'. If the person was uncertain, they asked Abrax a 
follow-up question - 'is that what you mean?' Generally Abrax's carers talked to him 
as if he would respond verbally (although he did not) and they told him about future 
events. I heard Abrax addressed in the third person along these lines: 'And then Abrax 
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will have his cup of tea and then when he finishes that he would go out for the day ... ' 
Abrax's carers, in addition, anticipated certain situations where they believed he 
would like to exercise choice, and asked him 'yes and no' questions to which he 
gestured or vocalised his responses. 
Occasionally Abrax's responses were not decipherable or he responded 'yes' 
or 'no' to the same question in a different format or tone, which led his carers to run 
through a list of possibilities. Furthermore, Abrax's use of single syllables suggested a 
limited vocabulary (for instance when he was asked my name he would say 'ta' after 
being told that I am 'Godfred'); however he expressed strong views through loud, 
continuous noises if his wishes were not acceded to. Even so, Abrax required his 
carers to decipher whether the noise was an expression of displeasure or happiness. 
All these issues made it seem as if communication with Abrax was, to some extent, 
informed by inferences from Abrax's previous choices, his family history, and his 
demonstration of his strength of feeling on a matter. Predominantly people within 
Abrax's social network believed that they could understand his sounds. 
At the time of fieldwork, Abrax's social network encompassed his family, his 
care provider, Kotoka (local integrated learning disability social services) and his old 
school Marigold. These aforementioned institutions were important to Abrax because 
their actions resonated in his life. When I met Abrax, he had known the care provider 
for less than six months, but in that period, the service had assumed centrality in his 
life. In addition to accommodation, through his five male carers at Y arlow, the care 
provider planned Abrax's life: Abrax attended day services on separate company-
owned premises; he visited social clubs in the evenings; and he had frequent contact 
with his parents. In contrast to Abrax's regular contact with the care provider, he had 
little engagement with Kotoka, although it funded his services. Similarly, Abrax had 
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little contact with Marigold where he was a pupil between the ages of 4 and 19 but 
Marigold resonated in Abrax's life. For instance, Abrax still attended his annual 
physiotherapy sessions in Marigold and a few school staff visited him at Yarlow. It 
was also at Marigold that Abrax's birth name was replaced by staff so that at the time 
that I met him, he was routinely called Eric, even by his parents. 
The final notable feature of Abrax's social relations was his family: his parents 
Mr and Mrs Chantos, his brother and sister, his maternal grandparents, his uncles, 
aunties and their children. Abrax' s family had a strong sense of its Greek -Cypriot 
origin. Although both of his parents were born in the UK, they observed Greek-
Cypriot traditions, which according to them included: closeness to family, celebrating 
the birthday of the patron saint one was named after, and going to church. At home 
Abrax's parents and siblings spoke English, but Abrax's grandparents spoke little 
English. Abrax's parents described the language their respective parents spoke as 
'Greeklish' - implying a mixture of Greek and English. Mr and Mrs Chantos said that 
as a result Abrax understood Greek because that's how his grandparents 
communicated with him. Abrax's dual heritage as Greek-Cypriot and British, 
therefore, epitomised the current consensus that ethnic (self)categories are variable 
and contextual (Nayak, 2005). 
Part One. 'Critical moments' in 
Abrax's childhood 
My discussions here are influenced by the concept of 'critical moments' defined as 
'an event described in an interview [or research data] that either the researcher or the 
interviewee sees as having important consequences for their lives and identities' 
(Thomson et ai, 2002; p339). The 'critical moments' concept was developed by 
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Thomson et al (2002, 2(05) from their longitudinal study of how the choices young 
people and/or their families make within their prevailing socio-economic 
circumstances impact on their future lives. Elsewhere the writers have emphasised 
that 'critical moments' are extrapolated from the narratives told by people or by 
others about them within the research context (Holland and Thomson, 2009). Based 
on the latter theorisation, I commence Part One with an account of how Abrax 
became categorised as learning disabled. I subsequently show that, although Abrax's 
parents exercised some agency in his acquiring this label, they resisted its full 
connotations by delaying Abrax's use of the wheel-chair. Another form of resistance 
was that Abrax's parents sometimes refused to 'accept' that he was not capable of 
deciding for himself. In the last section of Part One, I discuss Abrax's time at school 
and how narratives developed about his character resonated through to adulthood. 
Acquiring 'learning disability' 
Mr and Mrs Chantos told me in an interview, tape-recorded at their house, that Abrax 
was born after a 'normal' 40-week gestation period. Aged six months, Mr and Mrs 
Chantos noticed that Abrax did not exhibit capabilities similar to their friends' 
children. In the data extract below from one of the research interviews, Mr and Mrs 
Chantos explained the physical signs that initially alerted them to seek medical advice 
about Abrax' s development: 
Data extract 1 
Godfred: I was hoping that you could tell me like about him, and, like as 
much as you can from when he was born until [ ... ] but obviously tell me 
what you want to tell me. 
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Mrs Chantos: He was born normal birth, [ ... ] we started noticing there 
was something wrong with him at six months when he wasn't doing what 
he was supposed to do: hold his head up, smile, do things that six months 
babies should be doing and that's when they started to investigate ... 
hospital after hospital [ ... ] yeah, he wasn't holding his head, I mean he 
could lift his head but it was like, lift it. 
Mr Chantos: It was quite floppy. 
Mrs Chantos: And then it would drop again. He wasn't able to hold it and 
sort of look at you and just be strong. 
Mr Chantos: We had concerns so we went to the .. .I'm not sure we went 
to the GP initially or [Mrs Chantos: health visitor] and we said 'look, we 
think this is not right. We were expecting him to be doing this' and we 
had friends that had kids around the time, didn't we? So there was an easy 
comparison. Plus as parents we noticed as well didn't we? And they 
should be doing a little bit more at that age (Taped interview, Mr and Mrs 
Chantos, 26 November 2011). 
In data extract 1 above, Mr and Mrs Chantos explained that they sought advice from 
their GP after noticing that at six months of age, Abrax was still 'floppy.' Unable to 
explain Abrax's physical condition, the GP referred him to Great Ormond Street 
Hospital (GOSH) (Abrax remained under the care of GOSH until the age of 16.) Later 
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on in the same interview (data extract 2) Mrs Chantos said that in an attempt to 
diagnose Abrax, doctors at GOSH conducted several tests to ascertain his level of 
understanding: 
Data extract 2 
[I]t was just test after test, ability test just to see how his mind works, and 
see if he can understand what they're saying, and what they're not saying 
and if I'm not mistaken, they gave him, I think he was 8 or 9 at the time 
and they said that from what they can understand his ability was for a 
child that was probably three or four years younger than him (Taped 
interview, Mrs Chantos, 26 November 2011). 
In data extract 2 above, Mrs Chantos explained that doctors at GOSH diagnosed 
Abrax's mental abilities as lower than his chronological age (but Mrs Chantos also 
said in the same interview that Abrax's mental capacity confounded all expectations). 
It is, however, worth comparing data extracts 1 and 2 because whereas in the former it 
was a physical issue - 'he wasn't holding his head up' - that initially prompted 
Abrax's parents' 'concerns', subsequently in 2, medical examinations became focused 
on his mind. In extract 1, Mr and Mrs Chantos referred to Abrax being 'floppy' at 6 
months, but in 2 Mrs Chantos explained that by the age of 8 or 9, tests centred on 'if 
he [Abrax] can understand what they're saying'. Notwithstanding frequent 
examinations, Abrax' s condition was not diagnosed at GOSH as, according to Mrs 
Chantos in the same interview, 'there wasn't a diagnosis; they haven't actually said 
what's wrong with him' (taped interview, Mrs Chantos, 26 November 2011). 
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Interpreting Mrs Chantos' quotations above, Abrax did not acquire the label learning 
disabled through the health system. 
Abrax's categorisation as learning disabled occurred within the education 
system. At the age of three, his parents were advised by a health visitor to send him to 
a private nursery with a reputation for helping disabled children. Nursery staff 
subsequently advised Mr and Mrs Chantos to seek a Statement of Special Educational 
Needs (SEN) for Abrax so that their local authority would fund his place. Accordingly 
it was through SEN that Abrax acquired the label 'learning disability'. Abrax's 
categorisation as learning disabled, therefore, reflects the materialist orientation of the 
social model, wherein it is said that the label 'disability' is acquired as people attempt 
to access resources or social spaces (Gabel and Peters, 2004). In the case of Abrax, his 
parents aimed to access education that they felt would meet his needs. Through the 
SEN assessment, Abrax became known to Marigold. 
Abrax's life story draws attention to the education system: firstly, as an 
institutional context for classifying certain social presentations as indicators of 
learning disability, and secondly, for identifying and fitting individuals into learning 
disability categories (Gerber, 2007; Keogh, 2005). More broadly, Abrax's life story 
demonstrates that classification by state institutions potentially resonates through the 
life course. Once categorised as learning disabled and 'Statemented', Abrax would 
become subject to regular statutory assessments which culminated in his being given 
supported living accommodation just before I met him. Marigold was an important 
aspect of Abrax's life. Apart from education, it would seem that a narrative about 
Abrax as a person and character was co-constructed by Marigold staff and Abrax's 
parents. 
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The story so far throws into sharp focus the interplay of structure and agency through 
which social categories become embodied. Abrax' s entry into a key social structure -
the education system - led to his classification as learning disabled. Although Abrax' s 
categorisation as learning disabled may be seen as structure impacting on lived 
experiences, Abrax's parents told me that they wanted him classified so that he could 
access private nursery education. Thus it may also be concluded that Abrax was 
classified learning disabled through his parents exercising their agency. But 
simultaneously, as they played agential roles in Abrax's categorisation, Mr and Mrs 
Chantos resisted the accompanying material and spatial (re)configurations associated 
with learning disability. 
Resisting categories: objects and narratives 
of (in)dependence 
Mr and Mrs Chantos associated key developments in Abrax's life with material and 
spatial changes. Aged 10, Abrax first received a wheel-chair, which according to his 
parents changed their lives because until then, Abrax relied on others to take him from 
place to place. Before obtaining the wheel-chair, Abrax also watched his siblings 
running and moving without being able to do the same. However, being given a 
wheel-chair increased his awareness of his physical and mental capacities to move 
through spaces independently. On Mr and Mrs Chantos' part, Abrax using a wheel-
chair made them see him in a different light, as a person capable of making decisions 
about which part of their house he wanted to explore without his parents' consent. To 
illustrate further the theme of space and capacity in this section, I introduce below 
some interview exchanges between myself and Mr and Mrs Chantos. 
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Godfred: [Tell me] like really key things that stick out for you in Abrax's 
life and for him. 
Mr Chantos: You know the fact that he ended up having a wheel-chair -
we knew it was gonna happen. 
Mrs Chantos: Yeah. 
Mr Chantos: But making that decision to have a wheel-chair, I think that 
was, I think that was a milestone. 
Mrs Chantos: Yeah. 
Mr Chantos: Because he was getting older, we could, we couldn't use the 
pram to wheel him round here, you needed to move the next step up, and I 
think that was a milestone, definitely! Cos then, its saying 'yes, you have 
acknowledged that he is disabled' or he is; but I think that was a milestone 
in our head; it was; it gave him the freedom. 
Mrs Chantos: His freedom, wasn't; it gave him the freedom to move 
around the house. 
Mr Chantos: Cos he took to the wheel-chair. 
Mrs Chantos: Like duck to water. 
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Mr Chantos: Yeah (Taped interview, Mr and Mrs Chantos, 26 November 
2011). 
In the interview exchanges reproduced above, Mr and Mrs Chantos explain the 
symbolic value of Abrax acquiring a wheel-chair. For Mr and Mrs Chantos the wheel-
chair was the point at which they 'acknowledged' the medical prognosis that Abrax 
would not be able to walk unaided. Up to then they resisted the full implication of 
'disability' by delaying Abrax's use of the wheel-chair even though they were told 
about its inevitability - 'you know the fact that he ended up having a wheel-chair -
we knew it was gonna happen'. Their leaving the decision about the wheel-chair for 
as long as possible suggests a deliberate strategy on their part to defy medical 
prognosis. 
It is also instructive that, before he was given the wheel-chair, Abrax's parents 
put him in a pram, a device which is used to mobilise babies and toddlers. Thus, the 
pram and wheel-chair powerfully illustrate how material objects link into key life 
transitions, and their emotional impact on people. On the basis of the freedom that 
Abrax demonstrated on getting his wheel-chair - 'it gave him freedom to move 
around the house' - the wheel-chair may be said to be the point at which he separated 
from his parents, from being a child to becoming a teenager, when Abrax was given 
the opportunity to demonstrate both physical and mental abilities previously 
unrecognised by his parents. Where beforehand he needed his parents' consent before 
being wheeled in the pram to new locations, with the wheel-chair Abrax could 
demonstrate to other people his mental capacity to think through his spatial 
positioning, and secondly, enact his will to get to that location. For Mr and Mrs 
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Chantos, on the other hand, the wheel-chair had an emotional impact because it was 
the point at which they yielded to the 'inevitable' medical advice that Abrax would 
need additional aids for his mobility. 
Another interesting revelation from my interviews with Mr and Mrs Chantos 
was that they moved between descriptions of Abrax as having 'disabilities' or 
'abilities'. One way that Mr and Mrs Chantos reconciled the conceptual space 
between 'disabilities' and 'abilities' was through the use of narratives about Abrax's 
personal character and his high levels of cognitive capacity, which they believed, 
defied the full connotations of learning disability. To further elucidate these latter 
points, I now introduce some interview data in which Mr and Mrs Chantos described 
Abrax's time at Marigold. It was during his time at school between the ages of 4 and 
19 years old that the institutional and personal significance of the label learning 
disability was realised, thus making the school an important domain of Abrax's life. 
In my interviews with Mr and Mrs Chantos, their narration of Abrax's Marigold 
experiences was one of a 'popular' student who 'loved' going to school, and who 
over-achieved academically in spite of his 'disability': 
Data extract 3 
Godfred: How would you describe Abrax going through Marigold, how 
would you describe his experiences from Marigold? 
Mrs Chantos: He loved it [ ... J towards the end of his school years he 
didn't want to come home [ ... J He was waiting by the door for the bus to 
come and get him [in the mornings]. He loved it at school because he 
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became so popular with everybody, everybody knew who he was, all the 
teachers loved him, he loved everyone, you know, it was just. .. 
Mr Chantos: He's just popular ... he's so popular isn't he? 
Mrs Chantos: And the learning aspect, they did say to me that you know 
he's doing well! He was, considering the abilities that he's got and his 
disabilities, he was doing well at school. (Taped interview, Mr and Mrs 
Chantos, 26 November 2011). 
The above data extract shows movements between the past and the present, coupled 
with a slide in and out of acceptance of Abrax's categorisation as 'disabled' on the 
part of Mrs Chantos. Mrs Chantos talked in the past tense - 'he didn't want to come 
home'; 'he loved it at school' but her husband on the other hand spoke of the present 
- 'he is so popular'. The overlapping uses of past and present tenses by each parent 
demonstrated that the narratives developed about Abrax's personality in childhood 
still resonated with both parents. Specifically with Mrs Chantos, in the la<;t sentence 
she talked in the present to affinn Abrax's apparent disability ('and his disabilities') 
simultaneously as she confinned his abilities ('considering the abilities that he's got'). 
and then moved on to characterise Abrax's time at school as successful ('he was 
doing well at school!'). 
Mrs Chantos 'accepted' in the last sentence that Abrax was not able to 
perfonn certain actions, or that he was disabled in some respects. However, in his 
everyday life, Abrax displayed abilities which defied the essence of the term learning 
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disability. For instance, Abrax's parents observed that he had a good memory, as Mrs 
Chantos explained later in the interview: 
Like I'd say to him today 'next week its baba's [your father's] birthday'. 
During the week I would say, 'whose birthday is it this week?' [He would 
answer] 'Baba'. Things like that, you know, that's when we realised 'well 
hold on a minute, you know, he's got a very good memory'. (Taped 
interview, Mr Chantos, 26 November 20ll). 
Since a good memory is not usually associated with learning disability (or mental 
capacity), in the last sentence of data extract 4 above, Mrs Chantos pulled back from 
the full implication of her acknowledgement of Abrax's disability. Instead she 
qualified that Abrax performed better than implied by his SEN category. 
The discussion to date about how Mr and Mrs Chantos simultaneously resisted 
and welcomed the education system's categorisation of Abrax shows that, in their 
everyday lives, people can display more capacities than conceptual classifications 
capture. Furthermore, the interview data I have presented in this section show that 
Abrax was regarded by his parents as contesting social categories through the 
personal character he displayed; for example, his adjudged sociability, even 
temperedness, and memory. Mr and Mrs Chantos, on the other hand, moved between 
acknowledging and resisting learning disability, sometimes through the narratives 
they deployed about Abrax. In the next section, I discuss one narrative that both 
Abrax and his family appeared to accept unconditionally - his unofficial name Eric -
which was constructed by staff at Marigold. 
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Marigold: becoming Eric and transitioning to 
Yarlow 
'Eric' still resonated in Abrax's life when I met him because he was routinely called 
by that name. Indeed, after my first visit to Yarlow, I left with the impression that Eric 
was his official name. When I realised Abrax's name, I formed a hypothesis that the 
point at which he became Eric was a 'critical moment' because peoples' names were 
part of their cultural identity. I therefore focused on understanding the circumstances 
that led to Abrax becoming Eric. One day I accompanied Abrax and his care worker 
Robert to Marigold for a physiotherapy session. On this visit to Marigold, I met 
Dominic (Abrax's old teacher) and took the opportunity to ask about the origin of 
'Eric'. Below are the extracts of the field notes I recorded from my exchanges with 
Dominic on the subject: 
Throughout fieldwork I have been intrigued by how Abrax came to be 
known as Eric. On this trip to the school I took the opportunity of meeting 
Abrax's old class teacher Dominic to ask where the name came from. 
Dominic said that he did not know for sure but he thought that Abrax was 
given the name after he was called Eric by one of the students and he 
appeared to like it. Dominic said that as his parents did not seem to mind 
him being called Eric, it has now become his de facto name. (Field notes, 
3 February 2012). 
In the data extract above, the 'critical moment' in Abrax's life (Thomson et ai, 2(02) 
could be identified as the point where a member of staff reported that he liked being 
called Eric. Inherent within the name Eric is also an informal assessment of Abrax's 
mental capacity. For the member of staff to accept that Abrax liked the new name, 
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Eric, they needed to believe that Abrax had the mental capacity to process such 
information: Abrax heard the sound, interpreted it as a name being given to him, and 
lastly, demonstrated to an audience that he liked being called Eric. Situating the past, 
as recounted by Dominic, into the period of my fieldwork at Y arlow, I witnessed 
Abrax refer to himself as Eric. An illustrative account from my field notes (presented 
below) is when I accompanied Abrax cycling and he was asked his name by the 
attendant Ken. Ken, however, believed that Abrax could not tell his name, judging 
from his physical appearance and his monosyllabic communication on our arrival. 
Based on this stigmatisation of Abrax, Ken addressed his question to Anthony 
(support worker) and me but, as indicated below from the field notes, Abrax 
responded to the question from Ken: 
I saw Ken ask 'what's his name' and Abrax said 'Er' which I took to 
mean Eric. I felt that this was significant because: firstly, that Abrax 
understood the question; that Ken addressed the question to Anthony, and 
[ ... ] when Abrax said that his name was Eric, Anthony told Ken that his 
name was Abrax. (Field notes, 07 December 2011). 
The preceding data extract can be read as Abrax displaying an understanding of his 
personal identity. More specifically, Abrax evidenced an understanding of his 
unofficial name Eric. On this occasion, however, his support worker Anthony 
corrected Ken, telling him Abrax's official name. While showing that Abrax 
understood questions about his subjectivity, another interpretation of the data could be 
that he had internalised 'Eric' as his own. A feasible interpretation of the preceding 
data extract therefore is that Abrax liked being Eric and wanted to be called so. Thus, 
arguably, by adulthood Abrax accepted that he had become Eric. The fact that 
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Abrax's parents not only agreed to Eric but called him so in my latter conversations 
with them shows how much of the school's narrative about Abrax was acceptable to 
Mr and Mrs Chantos. Alternatively Mr and Mrs Chantos felt that the school's 
narrative was so powerful that they could not resist the name' Eric' . 
From the perspective of ethnic identity, it is instructive that 'Eric' was 
arguably a more British (or English) name than Abrax. On the part of Mr and Mrs 
Chantos, accepting their child being renamed Eric would have been unproblematic 
given that they saw themselves and Abrax as having a dual Greek-CypriotlBritish 
heritage. Thus attention focuses on the intention of the person who first proposed the 
name - whether they sought to impact 'Britishness' to Abrax. 
I end this section about critical moments in Abrax's childhood by highlighting 
that, in my interviews with Abrax's parents and his carers, it was agreed that staff 
from Marigold played a significant part in his living at Yarlow. For instance, in my 
field notes from a separate visit to Mr and Mrs Chantos on 17 November 20 II, I 
wrote that they recounted how their interest in supported living originated from advice 
by staff at Marigold: 
In the discussion I recall inquiring about how Abrax came to move to 
Y arlow. His parents said that it was staff at the school who told them that 
they thought that Abrax could live in 'supported accommodation' (their 
words) [ ... J Abrax's parents said that when they were told this [about 
Yarlow] by the school they requested it from social services (Kotoka). 
Interestingly they did not remember that the Integrated Team are based at 
[address withheld] so this perhaps exemplifies their distance from 
statutory [social] services. (Field notes, 17 November 2011). 
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In the above data extract, Mr and Mrs Chantos are recorded as implying that the 
statutory work around Abrax's transition to adulthood was conducted by school staff 
instead of social workers, as is usually the case in disabled children's services. The 
data extract above also exemplifies the narratives of trust which Mr and Mrs Chantos 
employed when they talked about school staff. It was through the advice of Marigold 
staff that Abrax first became known to the local children's services and Abrax's 
parents employed professionals from Marigold using Direct Payments. There was, 
therefore, a strong bond between Mr and Mrs Chantos and Marigold as an institution. 
With respect to the MCA, accompanying guidance advises that mental capacity 
assessments be conducted during accommodation changes (Harker, 2012). However, 
neither Abrax' s parents nor professionals at Yarlow recalled a capacity assessment 
being conducted before he moved to Y arlow, although the MCA had been 
implemented by that time. 
My analytic discussion so far has shown that 'critical moments' (Thomson et 
aI, 2002) is a useful conceptual tool to identify key incidents in the story people told 
me about Abrax's life which resonated into his adulthood. As a baby, Abrax's parents 
had 'concerns' because he was 'floppy', leading to his being classified as learning 
disabled through the education system. I posited in my accounts that Abrax's 
classification draws attention to the binary nature of disability categories, especially in 
relation to service provision. Although Abrax required a wheel-chair as well as 
physical support, it was his mind that became the focus of categorisation. That Abrax 
was classified as learning disabled mattered because it led to his being assigned to a 
SEN school, Marigold, where he was given a new name Eric. It was also at Marigold 
that narratives about Abrax as 'popular', 'able', 'high achieving' with a 'good 
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memory' developed. In a different less empowering environment than Marigold, 
Abrax's life might have been different. By the time I met Abrax, it was a well-
established part of his life story that he could make his own decisions. Moving now 
into Abrax's adulthood when I became acquainted with him, in the following section, 
I discuss how the notion that Abrax could make his own decisions was 
operationalised at Yarlow. 
Part Two. Abrax: recognising his 
mental capacity 
Framed around my explorations of narratives told about Abrax's mental capacity to 
make decisions, in Part Two, I address my observations of Abrax's life in Yarlow. I 
have themed the first half of Part Two 'Recognising Abrax's Mental Capacity' to 
show how daily interaction with Abrax started from the premise that he could make 
decisions for himself. To contextualise the forthcoming discussion, I now provide an 
overview of Abrax' s care in Yarlow. Abrax moved to Yarlow in August 20 II. When I 
first met Abrax, he was supported by four men - Anthony, Robert, Helder, and Aba~si 
- who all described themselves to me as Black Africans. This four-person team 
worked on rotation throughout the day: a morning shift was SAM - 3PM, an 
afternoon shift lasted between 3PM and lOPM, while a night shift ran from lOPM 
until SAM. At the beginning of fieldwork Abrax lived with Alexander (also of Greek-
Cypriot heritage) and they were both joined by Naomi towards the end of my 
fieldwork. Abrax's dependence on other people's physicality meant that, in his life, 
mental capacity extended beyond cognition to issues of physical (in)dependence. 
Although decision-making in Abrax's life at Yarlow followed a relational model, 
formal records of Abrax's care painted an individualistic picture of his decision-
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making. Through the use of the first person'!', Abrax's carers (mis)represented his 
mental capacity in documents called the Learning Log. I expand further the theme of 
documentation in the next section. 
Staff recordings of Abrax's mental capacity 
In their work with Abrax, his team of four men were required to formally record their 
shift activities. Such documentations were made at the end of each shift, in addition to 
verbal exchanges of information. The handover points of staff were, therefore, an 
important aspect of their work with Abrax because they were key moments in 
planning for his life: staff talked about the activities that Abrax engaged in during the 
day, significant events that could impact on the next shift, and changeover staff 
received suggestions about what they could do with Abrax. The Learning Log, 
however, was viewed by managers as written evidence of Abrax's routine. During 
fieldwork I was allowed to photocopy about two months' worth of entries in the 
hardcopy of the Log, which I have analysed together with interview transcripts and 
field notes. It is interesting to note that nearly all the Learning Log entries were 
completed in the first person'!' - in Abrax's voice - as if he had solely made the 
entries. Noticeably, whereas Abrax's official name was usually written at the top of 
the Log, in the free-text section he was frequently referred to as Eric, thereby 
highlighting that his time at Marigold still resonated in his life in practical ways at 
Yarlow. The entry that I have shown below was written by one of Abrax's care 
workers, Helder, (date unspecified although the 18/10/11 was written and struck 
through), and in it he described his visit with Abrax to a Further Education (FE) 
college to seek Abrax's enrolment. 
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LEARNING LOG 
Name: Abrax 
Date Who was 
Supporting 
me? 
18/10/11 Helder 
Open 
document 
please 
Summary of activities What What did not 
through the day worked well work well 
forme 
I and Eric decided to The news of 
follow up the me starting 
appointment at Lola college made 
college that we initiated me 
in 16/1012011 [ ... ] we happy 
very 
and 
called again Stephanie I'm looking 
the course director [ ... ] forward to it 
we then went for a 
walk in the local 
community to get to 
know people around 
my area [ ... ] when I 
came back home, I and 
Helder called Stephanie 
again [ ... ] 
with 
Activity 
the 
The entry which I have reproduced above is a microcosm of how Abrax's mental 
capacity was depicted by his care-workers in the Learning Log. By using the first-
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person 'I' and writing in Abrax's voice, his care-workers implied that all the decisions 
were made by Abrax. The above extract from the Learning Log, for instance, could 
also be interpreted as: Abrax was recounting his decision to go for a walk without any 
prompting, or that Abrax was explaining his happiness at the possibility of starting 
college. Thus on paper, the written record created an Abrax who made his own 
decisions: the role of the support workers centred on helping Abrax enact his choices. 
There is, however, an interesting move between the third and the first person, 
exemplified in the column titled 'Summary of activities during the day' in which 
Helder began in his own voice 'I and Eric' until 'my' and 'I' in which Helder reverted 
to the voice of Abrax. Also, under 'What worked well for me', Helder adopted the 
first person 'me' to symbolise Abrax's voice. The reproduced Log, above, reflects the 
overall tone of the entries. Staff generally wrote in the first person but sometimes they 
started in the third person and shifted into using 'I' . 
Noticeably, the columns of the Learning Log invited authors to use '1'. As 
Abrax lived in supported living accommodation, the narratives around service 
provision included 'independence' and 'normality' (DOH, 2002); therefore training 
and company policy could explain the use of 'I' in the Learning Log. Staff espoused 
the view that supported living was better than residential accommodation because 
tenants chose their daily activities in contrast to the service-led approach in residential 
accommodation. Consequently, Abrax had to be depicted as choosing instead of 
merely being a recipient of services on offer. The more experienced staff were aware 
of policy and procedure requirements in Yarlow and, therefore, completed the 
Learning Log using 'I', a voice that depicted Abrax as in control. That training and 
experience influenced voice in completion of the Learning Log was illustrated by 
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Abbassi's entries who consistently wrote in the third person, an example being his 
entry on 8 September 2011: 
When staff came on Eric was already smartly dressed @ 10: 15am, his 
mum called to inform that she was coming and would like to see Eric 
before he goes out. 
The above data extract reads that Abbassi wrote in a markedly different voice than 
Helder, when he described his visit to the Further Education College with Abrax. 
Helder was a more experienced care worker than Abbassi, as such their different 
usage of voice suggests that with further training, staff learnt to write in the first 
person to symbolise the mental capacity of a service user to make decisions about 
their daily routine. In this way staff constructed Abrax's mental capacity in official 
documents. However, it would be inaccurate to characterise the documents as 
fabrications because I witnessed some of the events described in the Learning Logs. 
For instance, Abbassi's entry, cited above, corresponded to my observation that Mrs 
Chantos (and the rest of the family) telephoned and visited Abrax frequently at 
Yarlow. Also I am mentioned in the Log entry on 10 October 2011: 'Godfrey Open 
University Researcher to involve Eric in research'. Therefore, while it may be said 
that through 'I' Abrax's care workers constructed his mental capacity the events 
logged were not mere inventions because I witnessed some of them. 
The depictions of Abrax and the use of 'I' are so powerful that they invite a 
contextualisation of the Learning Logs within the broader debates about mental 
capacity research methodology. In the psychiatry literature, ethnographic work has 
shown that the symptoms depicted about patients on paper sometimes differed from 
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the narrative accounts of their conditions they provided to psychiatrists. As Barrett 
(1996) evidenced from his long-term anthropological work of a psychiatric hospital, 
textual accounts were usually formulated by professionals out of patients' accounts in 
order to fit predefined psychiatric categories. Moreover, textual accounts serve a 
particular function within organisations: 'written records are permanent, more highly 
institutionally regulated and constitute sites of demonstration of professional 
expertise, competence and accountability' (Georgaca, 2013). Based on Barrett and 
Georgaca's works cited it may be argued that it was not that Abrax's carers sought to 
deceive through their entries in the Log; rather, they made their inscriptions bearing in 
mind organisational expectations to 'empower' Abrax accomplish certain tasks. Thus 
for researchers to grasp the complexities of people's mental capacity, multiple 
accounts from documents, observations, and interviews have to be analysed to attain a 
more rounded picture of service users' (dis)abilities. In my fieldwork, on the 
substantive issue of mental capacity, I witnessed more complex interactions between 
Abrax and his carers than depicted in the Learning Log. 
'Come and make a cup of tea': a relational 
approach to decision-making 
Contrasting the individualised accounts of Abrax's decision-making depicted in the 
Learning Log, Abrax's carers told me that in their interactions with him, they started 
from the position that he could understand and make choices, and they frequently 
facilitated his decision-making by involving him in actions even when they knew that 
he lacked the physical capacity to enact his will. As further illustration, I now present 
data here from my field notes written after I shadowed Abrax on 18 October 2011. So 
that I can adequately contextual the data extract, it is necessary to provide a brief 
overview. I arrived at Yarlow around 8:05AM and I was let in by Natalie (support 
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worker assigned to Abrax's flatmate Alexander). Natalie said that Abrax was having 
his personal care. As I waited for Abrax, and we spoke about why I was shadowing 
him, Natalie said 'Abrax can make a lot of decisions but he [Alexander] can't'. (Field 
notes, 18 October 2011). The statement cited here shows that Yarlow professionals 
recognised Abrax's capacity: they believed and expressed the view that Abrax could 
make decisions about his care. Not long after, Abrax came into the room in his wheel-
chair pushed by Robert. Robert said that Abrax would make a cup of tea so he walked 
ahead into the kitchen from where he urged Abrax to join him. In response, Abrax 
wheeled himself independently, an interaction that I captured in my field notes below: 
He [Robert] was in the kitchen when he told Abrax to 'come and make a 
cup of tea' and I noticed Abrax respond by turning himself around in his 
wheel-chair and heading towards the kitchen. He then went towards the 
kettle and manoeuvred himself in such a way that the kettle was on the 
wooden [kitchen work] surface to his left. I recall that by this time Robert 
had filled the kettle with water and Abrax was to press the button on the 
kettle for it to start boiling. (Field notes, 18 October 2011). 
In the data extract above, Robert encouraged Abrax to make a cup of tea. He 
recognised Abrax's capacity to understand verbal communication and drew him into 
part-making the drink. Robert was aware that Abrax did not fully control his physical 
body nevertheless he eschewed the easier option of simply making the cup of tea for 
Abrax. Instead he opened up two avenues through which Abrax could demonstrate his 
capabilities. Firstly, he spoke to Abrax as if the making of tea was a joint-action. 
Secondly, Robert offered Abrax the opportunity to demonstrate his physical 
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capabilities by encouraging him to start the kettle. Robert here may be said to be 
initiating the interaction from the premise that Abrax was capable of contributing. 
Similarly when it came to Abrax eating his breakfast, it was from a starting 
point that Abrax was able to choose. Firstly, Abrax was asked for his choice, and then 
the food was placed in front of him whereupon he was allowed the time and space to 
eat: 
I noticed that Robert would usually pick something out [of the cupboard] 
and say along the lines of 'oh look at X, do you want some?' and then 
Abrax would make a sound which would be interpreted by Robert as 
either affirming or disaffirming his question. When Abrax sat around the 
table to have breakfast, he had porridge and croissant. Robert cut the 
croissant up into pieces and encouraged Abrax to eat them. I noticed that 
Abrax responded to this. He stooped with his head very close to touching 
the table. He stooped so low that I thought that he would be picking the 
croissant with his mouth from the plate but then he used his left hand to 
pick the croissant and then slowly bring it to his mouth at which point he 
returned to an upright position. (Field notes, 18 October 2011). 
The two data extracts I have presented show that, firstly, Abrax understood verbal 
communications directed at him because he responded to Robert's call from the 
kitchen, the injunction to press the kettle switch, and finally to eat. Concomitantly, the 
two data extracts show how rich personal relationships fostered decision-making in 
Abrax's life. Robert's interaction with Abrax recorded above is symptomatic of how 
his care team related to him: they spoke to him on the assumption that he fully 
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understood, and they involved him in activities that they knew he could not fully 
engage in because of his physical dependence. But Abrax's reliance on his carers' 
physicality to enact his will was sometimes deployed by them to make him engage in 
actions to which he was opposed. For instance his carers knew that Abrax enjoyed 
daily bus rides and therefore used this as bargaining points. One day I accompanied 
Abbassi and Abrax to the day centre during which I made some field notes about how 
Abrax was encouraged to do something he initially refused to: 
Abbassi offered him a yoghurt which he declined but by this time he had 
been saying 'bus' repeatedly which Abbassi thought meant that Abrax 
wanted to go on a bus ride. So when Abrax refused the yoghurt Abbassi 
told him that he should eat it first and then they would go for the bus ride. 
I recall that after this exchange I wondered whether Abrax' s dependency 
on the carers to meet his physical needs meant that decision-making 
between them was a form of bargaining: 'if you do this then you can have 
this.' (Field notes, 4 November 2011). 
The data extract above is one illustration of the numerous times that Abrax was 
'convinced' to do things against his will. A commonality of these instances was that 
his carers felt that, based on their understanding of his needs, they knew what was 
best for him. In this way, their actions may be said to accord to the 'best interest' 
principle of the MCA: 'So sometimes it may be necessary to choose an option that ;s 
not the least restrictive alternative if that option is in the person's best interests .. 
(MCA Code of Practice, 2007; p27; emphasis added). For instance, I was told by 
Robert that when Abrax first moved into Yarlow, he was extremely reluctant to ride 
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tricycles, however, with 'encouragement' Abrax learnt to use them. I witnessed Abrax 
seemingly enjoying the experience of cycling in the park on several occasions as in 
the case involving Ken described in Part One of this chapter. However 
notwithstanding their 'best interest' intentions, witnessing Abrax's carer 'convince' 
him to do certain things left me with several moral quandaries. I wondered, for 
instance, if Abrax was being forced into actions against his will, and whether as a 
researcher, there was an onus on me to report what I thought was malpractice. At the 
same time I was in little doubt that Abrax and his carers had a great relationship and 
they had his best interest in mind, as indicated in my reflections below: 
Having left the field for the Christmas break I felt heartened by what I 
thought to be the excellent care that Abrax received [from his carers] 
(Field notes, 2 January, 2012). 
As a contribution to the emerging literature on MCA practice, I have presented data 
here to challenge the conceptualisation that mental capacity is solely a matter of 
cognition. Even if Abrax chose among alternatives (as implied by the MeA's tests of 
capacity), he still required his carers to fully enact his will. Additionally, his need for 
his carers' physicality meant that his desires and theirs were linked in practice - a 
further challenge to the individualistic model underpinning the MCA. Another way in 
which Abrax demonstrated his capacity was movement through space instead of 
'passing' a mental capacity assessment (as implied by the MCA). For instance, when 
Robert called Abrax from the kitchen, Abrax's movement of his wheel-chair into the 
space called 'kitchen' illustrated that he understood what Robert said. In a more 
spatially restricted environment where Abrax could not use his wheel-chair to 
252 
mobilise, his interaction with people would be curtailed, and the opportunity to 
demonstrate his capacity would be denied. Similarly, when given time and space, 
Abrax was able to eat his croissant. Thus, in Abrax' s life, space mattered in relation to 
his mental capacity. I illustrate this point further in the following section by 
discussing how Abrax occupied certain spaces in the day centre and how this 
restricted his interaction with his peers. 
Abrax: using space, demonstrating mental 
capacity 
Space is 'a dynamic between social and material relations, which are characterised by 
power' (Tsolidis, 2008; p273). Whereas currently, in the social sciences literature 
increasing attention is devoted to space (Holland et aI, 2011), there is contrasting 
silence in debates about the epistemology of mental capacity. In a recent paper aimed 
at drawing attention to space as a useful analytic category in empirical research, 
Logan (2012) identified the explanatory power of space to account for human 
behaviours and choices. This is because space determines distance, which in turn 
impacted on social relations andlor access to resources. To reinforce his thesis, Logan 
cited Abbott (1997; p 1152) "one cannot understand social life without understanding 
the arrangements of particular social actors in particular social times and places [ ... ] 
Social facts are located.'" (Logan, 2012; p508; original emphasis). Abbott's cited 
point here applied to Abrax because, in certain areas with fewer obstructions, he 
mobilised more freely, thereby reducing the instances he called on other people to 
enact his will. 
Yarlow was recently renovated specifically for wheel-chair users in contrast to 
the day centre which had more confined space (in the day centre, several service users 
used wheel-chairs in a constrained space). The tight spatial configuration of the day 
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centre curtailed Abrax's ability for spontaneous action; therefore, it also reduced the 
possibility of him demonstrating his capacity. In the day centre I observed that Abrax 
used specific spaces. Usually he was separated from the main room where most 
activity took place. After one such observation I made this entry in my field notes: 
What is noticeable (as I have observed on two or more occasions) is that 
while the other users sat together in the 'living area' Abrax was with his 
carer in the backroom alone besides one female service user who had very 
high needs and could not communicate nor engage physically with anyone 
(Field notes, 16 December 2011). 
Separated from the living area in the day centre, I rarely observed Abrax interact with 
his peers other than one young man who always called him 'Eric'. Also, as he was 
unable to manoeuvre his wheel-chair unencumbered, Abrax typically sat facing one 
direction, and he often had to make loud noises to be noticed by staff. As I spent more 
time with Abrax and his carers, I noticed that, in the day centre, I was often left alone 
with him, as if I were a support worker providing the one-to-one support stipulated in 
his care plan. I sought to make sense of this realisation and as evidenced in my field 
notes below, the only explanation that seemed credible to me at the time was that I 
had earned trust: 
In this visit I was left with Abrax for some time. Sitting here now I think 
that being left with Abrax for long periods by the staff [ ... ] suggests that 
the staff trust me or that roles are being blurred to the extent that staff 
consider me one of them. On the other hand it may be that my being 
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around affords staff time to leave Abrax supervised [by me] to attend to 
other duties. (Field notes, 21 November 2011). 
The data extracts presented in this section suggest that space, which includes the 
configuration of material objects and human relations, impacted on how Abrax 
demonstrated his mental capacity. At Yarlow, Abrax inhabited an open-plan 
kitchen/diner. This open space meant that Abrax could see and be readily seen by 
staff. Furthermore, he could mobilise with relative ease at Yarlow because the spatial 
design accommodated his wheel-chair. Within the day centre on the other hand Abrax 
was restricted because he could not move freely. Besides, the day centre was 
crowded, noisy, and busy. In the day centre I rarely saw Abrax initiate interaction 
with his peers; therefore, in that day centre space, he did not display the character to 
sustain the narrative of 'sociable' constructed by staff at Marigold. Interestingly 
whereas at Yarlow support workers said Abrax could make decisions or that he was 
capable, I did not hear carers in the day centre use the same expressions. The 
conclusion to be drawn here is that the two spaces with their different orientations 
placed separate demands and, in the process, (dis)empowered him in divergent ways. 
Increasingly, the conceptual underpinnings of the MeA, that mental capacity 
is solely cognitive and individualistic, are coming under intellectual attack, with 
growing preference for relational models (O'Connor, 2010). Arguably, relational 
models by necessity require attention to spatial configuration as I have shown above. 
O'Shea (2012), on the other hand, has proposed an ecological model in which mental 
capacity is an interaction of the physical and social environments, rather than solely a 
cognitive function. By drawing attention to the physical environment, O'Shea's 
postulation is close to the spatial model that I propose here. However, O'Shea's use of 
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the term 'ecology' suggests that mental capacity is a living organism that grows or 
dies, whereas strictly speaking, in the MCA capacity changes with time and decision, 
hence the decision and time-specific principles. Capacity is not a living thing but a 
concept, so 'space' which denotes a non-living entity, is a better term for mental 
capacity than O'Shea's 'ecology', which is arguably more applicable to living 
organisms. One other concept which any discussion of relational ideas on mental 
capacity draws attention to, is culture (or ethnicity), which also emanates from social 
relations, and as such, influences the decisions that people make (McCracken, 1986). 
Part Three. Culture and decision-
making in Abrax's adult life 
This section discusses the important role of culture in Abrax's life generally and 
decision-making in particular. Firstly, I analyse how Abrax lived as a Greek-Cypriot 
in Yarlow, his awareness of his Greek-Cypriot heritage, and how that impacted on 
(co)decision-making. Subsequently I discuss the subject-matter from the viewpoint of 
Abrax's carers. To accomplish my task in Part Three, I deliberately use 'culture' 
instead of 'ethnicity' as an explanatory tool. I recognise the symbiotic relationship 
between ethnicity and culture; however, I operate the former as mobilisation of the 
latter: culture operates at the level of lived experience whereas ethnicity is located 
within institutional or organisational parameters (Malesevic', 2011). Abrax required 
other people to recognise firstly that Greek culture was relevant to his choice-making, 
and based on this realisation, to present him with options. Consequently, the culture of 
people within Abrax's network is also relevant to the discussion because they too, 
arguably, relied on their cultural frames of reference to interpret his sounds and 
gestures: 'culture is the "lens" through which the individual views phenomena; as 
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such it determines how the phenomena will be apprehended and assimilated.' 
(McCracken, 1986; p72). Because Abrax relied on other people's physicality to fulfil 
some wishes, the cultural prism through which his carers viewed the world is 
important to my analyses (O'Dell et ai, 2004). 
Abrax: living as a Greek-Cypriot 
Caughey (2006) advised that one way for researchers to identify people's culture is to 
note the artefacts in their living spaces, but in the case of Abrax there were no obvious 
signs of his cultural heritage. In Abrax's room at Yarlow, there were many 
photographs of him and his family on the wall: images captured of him engaged in 
leisure activities with his family, using physiotherapy equipment to mobilise, and 
being on holiday. There were also Arsenal Football Club scarves on the wall. If the 
artefacts surrounding people's houses signalled their cultural identity then, one would 
conclude from observing Abrax's home that, the important issues in his life were 
family, music, and supporting Arsenal Football Club. 
In his everyday life at Yarlow, however, I observed Abrax's cultural heritage 
manifested in several ways. At the time of fieldwork, Abrax shared Yarlow with 
Alexander, who was also of Greek origin. Alexander's mother Lola visited the house 
so often that initially I thought that she too was a member of staff, and it was later in 
fieldwork that I realised her role. Lola interacted with Abrax, and spoke Greek-
Cypriot to him daily. Because she visited Yarlow every day, Lola also taught Abrax's 
support workers, who were all of African origin, how to cook Greek food for him. Her 
influence on Abrax and his support workers was noted by Robert when I asked him 
during an interview how he had been influenced culturally through his work with 
Abrax: 
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Godfred: When you see, Abrax use different language for instance and eat 
different food for instance, does it make you think differently as a 
Ugandan? 
Robert: Yes it does in a way. First of all I've got to learn and understand 
their diet, food type, how to prepare it, you get what I mean? It's quite 
different from mine, it's quite different from where I come from, do you 
know what I mean? Like the preparation and everything. Because since 
I've been with Eric I've learnt a lot, the cooking, the cooking type, Greek 
cooking, the parents have helped [ ... ] Lola has helped me a lot in cooking 
the Greek food, you know what I mean? Now I can cook Greek food. 
(Taped interview, Robert, 2 January 2012). 
As a way of explaining how working with Abrax influenced his cultural identity, 
Robert in the above interview extract credited Abrax's parents and Lola for teaching 
him about Greek food preparation. The presence of Lola and Abrax' s parents in the 
quote from Robert illustrates the relational nature of culture for it shows that people 
learn to live like others who they interact with. In the case of Robert who was 
originally from Uganda, working with Abrax resulted in his learning to cook Greek-
Cypriot food and even speaking certain words in Greek. Apart from showing the 
relational aspect of culture, Robert's answer above shows that, in his everyday life at 
Yarlow, Abrax ate Greek food and this can be seen as one way in which Abrax lived 
his cultural heritage. The presence of Lola and Alexander in his home, together with 
regular visits from his parents and grandparents, ensured that Abrax remained in 
contact with important dimensions of Greek-Cypriot culture. 
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Although I could not directly ask Abrax about his understanding of his Greek-Cypriot 
cultural heritage, I inferred from some of his interventions in the interviews and from 
my observations during field work that he understood Greek language. A case in point 
was 16 December 2011, when I accompanied Abrax and his support worker to the day 
centre. By now, responding to the advice in the literature that ethnographers should 
prepare research participants for the end of their fieldwork, I had started the 'getting 
out' work by reminding Abrax and his support workers about the last date of 
fieldwork (Iversen, 2(09). It was in the context of this conversation with me making 
'small talk' that I asked Abrax where he would spend Christmas. On the surface of it, 
the issues of Christmas and 'getting out' are unrelated but the two became linked in 
the conversation because I could not tell whether Abrax understood my explanation 
about 'getting out'. The question of Christmas was therefore my test of his 
understanding. In my field notes from the encounter, cited below, I wrote about my 
surprise at Abrax telling me his answer about his location for Christmas in Greek. 
Having been engaged with Abrax for a number of weeks now, I have 
learnt to speak as if he understood me, so I proceeded to ask him whether 
he would be spending Christmas with his mother. Then he said 'yaya' and 
I said 'oh you are spending Christmas with yaya' and he said 'yes.' There 
is absolutely no doubt in my mind that he was telling me that he would be 
spending Christmas with yaya and that it was not a case of chance. If 
Abrax understood my question about Christmas, then he must have an 
understanding of the concept of Christmas; making it likely that he also 
understood me when I said that I would not be coming to see him again. 
(Field notes, 16 December 2011). 
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The data excerpt above shows Abrax responding to my question in English using a 
Greek word for grandmother, 'yaya'. From my previous interviews with his parents, I 
had learnt that the Greek word for grandmother is 'yaya' and I also heard Abrax say 
the word several times during fieldwork. The spontaneity with which Abrax said 
'yaya' when I asked about Christmas convinced me that he understood my question. 
Consequently I did not feel the need to cross-check the information with his parents. 
In the above data extract from my field notes in which Abrax and I discussed 
Christmas, he could be said to have displayed the MCA yardsticks of mental capacity: 
understanding, retaining, using and weighing-up information to make a decision 
(MCA Code of Practice, 2007; p41). This was because Abrax showed that he heard 
what I said through his response to my question in Greek. By demonstrating that he 
heard my question through his answer, Abrax also evidenced that he processed the 
question. Finally because Abrax provided an answer fitting within the conversation 
topic at the time - i.e. his location for Christmas - Abrax may be said to have 
appreciated the question. The first data extract about Christmas is more akin to the 
test of capacity proposed in the MeA whereby the assessor proposes the information 
and makes a judgement on the person's capacity based on their responses. 
On another occasion, Abrax demonstrated to me that he could choose between 
two options presented respectively in English and Greek languages. The data 
presented below to explain my latter point was recorded from a taped interview with 
Anthony at which Abrax was present. An interesting methodological point is that, 
even though Abrax could not communicate in sentences, his carers referred questions 
I asked about his culture to him. On my part these interviews caused me some ethical 
discomfort because I talked about Abrax in his presence without addressing questions 
directly to him. This particular interview with Anthony became centred on the topic of 
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food and he explained that Abrax was told daily at meal times whether there was a 
choice of British or Greek-Cypriot food: 
Godfred: And, and, if you were getting him to make the choice, would 
you have to present it to him, would you have to say ... 
Anthony: Oh yes! Oh yes! Or even if you haven't presented it to him and 
you've told him isn't it Eric? [Abrax makes sound] If I told you that 
'would you like fasolaki or, or mash ... what is it called? Mash and bangers 
for example, wouldn't you chose what you liked?' 
Abrax responds 'yeah'. 
Anthony: What would you like? [After long pause] Do you see? He 
knows I said 'fasolaki?, 
Godfred: So he's pointing to your right hand side which was [British 
cuisine and] left hand which was the fasolaki. 
Anthony: Now, he has pointed to the right which [he] is identifying with 
and fasolaki is a Greek dish. 
Godfred: What's fasolaki? 
Anthony: It is just sort of like a casserole but they put runner beans in it, 
so it is sort of a speciality and the way they cook it. (Taped interview, 
Anthony, 28 February 2012). 
Our discussion about the choice of food captured in the data extract above is arguably 
more akin to a relational model of culture and decision-making. From his relationship 
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with Abrax, Anthony knew that Greek-Cypriot food mattered to Abrax. 
Consequently, he included falosaki in the options presented to Abrax, and 
furthermore, Anthony made it possible for Abrax to exercise his choice. An 
individualistic model would place the onus on Abrax to demonstrate the falosaki was 
important to him, whereas in the relational model, Anthony presented the choices to 
Abrax based on his prior understanding of Abrax's culture. The data extracts I have 
discussed in this section illuminate how culture and mental capacity interacted in 
Abrax's life. Due to its individualist underpinnings (O'Shea, 2012), a case may be 
made that the concept of mental capacity cannot account fully for how culture impacts 
on decision-making because culture is principally a relational (or social) concept: 
'culture is universally constitutive of social relations and identities [ ... ] in 
contemporary societies culture plays an unprecedented role in constituting social 
relations and identities' (Nash, 2001; p78; original emphasis). 
A conceptualisation of culture as relational adequately explains some of the 
decisions made in Abrax's life by his parents. For instance in my interviews with Mr 
and Mrs Chantos, they told me that they self-identified as both British and Greek-
Cypriot: they navigated between these two identities depending on who they were 
with. With their Greek-Cypriot relatives, their Greekness came to the fore and vice 
versa with their British friends. The dual cultural positioning of Mr and Mrs Chantos 
is one aspect of the relational model: those that we associate with determine the 
cultural frames of reference we draw upon in our lives. In another respect the 
relational approach of culture and decision-making captures instances in which in 
choosing between options, we take into account the expectations, privileges, and 
moral requirements of our culture. As an example of this second aspect of a relational 
model of culture and decision-making, Mr and Mrs Chantos told me in an interview 
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that in Greek-Cypriot culture, family members lived together irrespective of age. As 
such some of their relatives found it unpalatable that Abrax lived away from home. 
Yet Mr and Mrs Chantos said that even though it was going against their cultural 
heritage, they chose that Abrax lived at Yarlow because it became increasingly 
difficult to look after him at home: 
Their relatives would not be happy with them allowing Abrax to go [to 
Yarlow] because their cultural tradition revolved around 'family' meaning 
that Abrax should have remained at home. I remember clearly Abrax' s 
father saying 'even some of our family are not happy [with Abrax at 
Yarlow].' They said that in the end they felt that it would be the best 
course of action for him [ ... ] I recall Mrs Chantos saying that despite 
going against their cultural tradition, Abrax appears happy to be living at 
Yarlow thereby vindicating their decision. (Field notes, 19 November 
2011). 
The data extract above depicts my field recording of Mr and Mrs Chantos reflecting 
on what they thought their relatives made of Abrax living away from them. They 
recognised that within their Greek-Cypriot culture, their relatives did not welcome 
news about Abrax living away from home. Even though they took into account the 
cultural expectations of their relatives, Mr and Mrs Chantos made a different 
(unexpected) decision because they were struggling to look after Abrax. Secondly, 
based on their knowledge of him, Mr and Mrs Chantos felt that he would be happier 
in Yarlow. Their family's views and his wishes were important aspects of Mr and Mrs 
Chantos' decision-making even if familial views did not ultimately influence choice 
of accommodation for Abrax. 
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Thus culture is important to the decisions Abrax makes in two respects: he needs 
people to recognise that his Greek-Cypriot culture matters to him; as such, the options 
people present to him to exercise choice should take account of his cultural heritage. 
Secondly, those offering alternatives to Abrax also draw on different frames of 
reference, one of which is their culture. Based on these postulations, I explain in the 
next section what Abrax' s carers told me about their culture, and how it impacted on 
their work with him, including the choices they offered him. Strikingly, Abrax's 
carers told me that they hailed from cultures in which age signified seniority and 
power to be respected by those younger. Given that they were all older that Abrax, 
working within a culture in which Abrax made decisions that they had to respect was 
an inversion of their cultural upbringing. However, as I show later on, in their 
accounts, the carers argued that their formal education made them understand the 
superiority of Western notions of choice over their culture in which decisions were 
made collectively. The life stories of the support workers, therefore, show the multi-
faceted nature of culture and ethnicity: how these two concepts are mediated by 
education, class, place, and employment, and how these impacted on decision-
making. 
Caring in a different culture 
Operating with a hypothesis that contextual factors such as culture, biography, and 
social relations influence individual decision-making, I now briefly paint a portrait of 
the support workers. 
Portraits of Abrax's support workers 
At start of fieldwork, there were three male support workers - Anthony, Robert, and 
Helder - and they can be said to know Abrax best, having worked with him since he 
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moved to Yarlow in August 2011. By the time I completed data collection at Yarlow 
the team had increased to five men: Abbassi began in the same month that I 
commenced fieldwork while Tom joined the team towards the end. Abbassi worked 
part-time and Tom was hired principally because Anthony, Robert, and Helder 
complained to management about their high workload. Until Tom's appointment. 
Helder, Robert, and Anthony individually clocked over 60 hours weekly on l2-hour 
shifts. To alleviate their high workload, Tom was hired to work designated hours from 
SAM - 3PM daily with the other workers doing the late shift (3PM - 10PM) or night 
duties (1 OPM - SAM). 
Noticeably all the support workers were highly educated and their reasons for 
immigrating to the UK varied: Helder, Abbassi, and Anthony emigrated to complete 
their Master's degree, Tom to escape civil war in his home country of Democratic 
Republic of Congo, and Robert to increase his income. In their interviews all five 
support workers said they were middle class professionals in their countries of origin. 
Tom and Robert, for instance, told me in different conversations in November and 
December 2011 that they were respectively university lecturer and accountant: 
During the discussion about his biography when he fed Abrax lunch, at 
my asking, Tom said that he had been a psychology lecturer in Kinshasa 
and that times were good then. He said that Kinshasa now looked like a 
village even though it was once one of the great cities of Africa (Field 
notes, 16 December 2011). 
Prior to emigrating Robert said that he worked as an accountant in [a 
mobile phone company]. He appeared to have a good life. He said that he 
travelled regularly with work (mostly in first class) and he came to the UK 
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and Amsterdam regularly [ ... ] It was on one such visit to the Europe (I 
think that he said Amsterdam) that he saw a recruitment advert for nurses 
and he completed the form on behalf of his wife (Field notes, 16 
November 2011). 
Tom and Robert's exposition of their pre-immigration lives as, respectively, 
university lecturer and accountant, show that in their current role, the support-workers 
were overqualified. At the same time, being highly educated they could be re-trained 
to familiarise themselves with the policy context of their role with Abrax, including 
the need to enhance service users' decision-making. 
Based on my (auto)biographical interviews with the support workers, I have 
produced a table below summarising their personal information. All the support 
workers hailed from Africa and migrated to England within the past decade. During 
fieldwork, although I saw Helder several times with Abrax, I was not able to conduct 
a biographical interview because of the pressures of work. All my attempts to arrange 
interviews in his home were unsuccessful; as such, in the table I have not included the 
number of years that he has lived in the UK. However, from our previous 
conversations Helder told me that he was born in Angola but moved to Portugal at 
nine years of age. 
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Name of Country of Years in the Length of Family status 
Support Origin UK engagement 
Worker with Abrax 
Robert Uganda 10 Since August Married, two 
2011 children 
Anthony Uganda 8 Since August Living with 
2011 white 
Australian 
girlfriend 
Helder Angola Unknown Since August Unknown 
2011 
Tom Democratic 3 December Married, four 
Republic of 2011 children 
Congo 
Abbassi Nigeria 2 years October 2011 Living with 
girlfriend 
There were two common responses by the support workers to my questions about 
how (or whether) living in the UK had affected their cultural identity. Irrespective of 
the length of time in the UK or whether they held British passports, all of them denied 
being (or feeling) British. A case in point is Tom whose response to my question is 
shown below: 
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I learnt that Tom had four children and I asked whether they thought of 
themselves as British. He said that though the children all had British 
passports they did not consider themselves as British and implied that the 
children did not feel British because of the racism that they faced in 
society. (Field notes, 16 December 2011). 
Tom's explanation about why his children (and he) did not feel British because they 
suffered racism illustrates the common theme in the data about what culture the carers 
felt they belonged to. Contravening the current understandings of culture as multiple 
and permeable (Soysal, 2009), the support workers reported being conscious that 
Abrax and they were of different cultures. In one sense therefore, Abrax reminded 
them of the black/white dyad. However at the same time, the support workers 
maintained that Abrax had a dual British/Greek Cypriot cultural heritage which had to 
be respected in their work. Thus the support workers saw their culture as monolithic 
and impermeable yet they thought of Abrax as simultaneously living in two cultures 
(British and Greek-Cypriot). 
One person who epitomised the positions held on culture by the support 
workers discussed here is Anthony. Anthony was of Ugandan origin, lived with his 
white Australian girlfriend and had a Master's degree. He said in our interviews that 
he was keen to maintain Abrax's culture, which he thought were British and Greek-
Cypriot. Nevertheless, despite maintaining that Abrax had a dual heritage, and even 
though he himself lived with a white Australian, Anthony did not think that working 
with Abrax had altered his cultural identity. Anthony said that he separated himself 
from his Ugandan culture when at work with Abrax. Anthony also explained that 
universal values underpinned all cultures: 
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Godfred: How do you think it's [your work has] made you think about 
your culture? 
Anthony: Working with him does not influence anyway how I think about 
my culture because for me they are two different things, I do not bring it 
into the mix when I am working. Although as a person, I was brought up 
in certain ways as well there are certain values that it doesn't matter which 
culture you are from or who you're working with, if you're brought up 
properly and you're treating people with respect and you value people, 
and in my culture that's how it is; it is something that I will still be using 
to work with him. (Taped interview, Anthony, 28 February 2012). 
In the above interview extract, Anthony confirmed that when at work he was mindful 
of the differences between his Ugandan cultural identity and Abrax's culture. 
Anthony noted that being Ugandan was separate from Abrax's culture - 'they are two 
different things' - and he avoided conflating or, in his words, 'mixing' the two when 
working. Even though he claimed cultures to be separable, Anthony also maintained 
that cultures were underpinned by similar values and these made it possible for him to 
work with Abrax. 
Drawing on my personal experiences as a Ghanaian, I aimed to explore how 
support workers being older than Abrax would impact on decision-making. In Ghana, 
there is a close relationship between age and moral entitlement to 'respect', a cultural 
practice captured in an ethnographic study of children rights in Ghana by Imoh 
(2011), a UK-resident Ghanaian academic: 
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They [children] are not expected to challenge adults and certainly, not 
expected to question what they are told to do. As a result of the value 
placed on respect, the need for children to respect and obey their parents 
and other adults in their community frequently emerged in various focus 
group discussions [ .. .]' (p384). 
Imoh suggested further that 'respect' was a form of inter-generational transfer of duty: 
the children in her study felt that they had to respect older people in order to receive 
protection from harm or have their needs met. Thus my cultural upbringing enabled 
me to identify age as one possible issue that would affect how culture impacted on 
decision-making in Abrax's life. Hence, I also sought to understand how the 
relationship between age, culture, and decision-making played out within a policy 
context such as the MeA in which cognitive capacity and not age and culture was 
recognised as the key determinant of mental competence. 
Age, culture and decision-making at Yarlow 
In my interviews with the support workers, I gathered evidence that like me, they too 
hailed from cultures in which an older person had the moral right to make decisions 
for a younger person. However, the categories 'adult' or 'elder' were necessarily not 
associated with chronological age but rather depended on the ages and social standing 
of the addressed or addressee. Thus, whereas in the UK, 18 years of age marks entry 
into adulthood, in the cultures of the support workers, there was no concomitant 
landmark age. In their cultures, one acquired the status of adulthood or an 'elder' if 
being addressed by someone younger. In this sense, age was a relational concept in 
the support workers' cultures. Robert, for instance, said in our interview that, in his 
home country of Uganda, relative age accrued 'respect' from people younger: 
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When you're still young, any person who is older than you, even if you're 
found in the street and you've done a mistake, you've done something 
wrong on your way from school he's allowed to give you a punishment. 
Yeah even that person can bring you to your dad or you mum, 'that I've 
found her doing this one, I've given him this punishment' and your 
parents will give punishment again as well [ ... ] you respect anybody older 
than you, respect, even the moment I see you I stop doing what I'm 
doing? (Taped interview, Robert, 2 January 2012). 
In the passage above, Robert's explanation drew on absolute and relative notions of 
age. In the first part, Robert talked about 'young' in relation to school age so that 
someone at school was by corollary a child. Anyone out of school was therefore older 
and could mete out physical punishment if the child transgressed a behaviour code. In 
absolute terms, older people therefore had moral right of parenthood and, as such, 
could discipline any child. Robert suggested, further, that parents would not contest or 
challenge physical chastisement of their child by another older person. Of further 
interest is Robert's assertion that even the child's parents were more likely to 'give 
punishment again as well'. It may be that parents mete out further punishment 
because ill-discipline by their child outside the home suggested that their parents were 
unable to set boundaries. Moving on from childhood, in the last sentence of the 
passage, Robert made a pronouncement on relative age - i.e. 'you respect anybody 
older than you.' By this last statement Robert confirmed the power that accrued to an 
older person to make decisions for those considered younger. 
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At the same time that they confirmed the power of 'elders' to receive respect, some of 
the support workers indicated that exposure to Western ideals had led them to 
question this moral code. Firstly, even before they moved to the UK, through their 
high(er) levels of education they had become exposed to Western lifestyles in large 
cities, and in these spaces, there was relative egalitarianism. According to Anthony 
(also from Uganda), his self-reflection on the (un)desirability of aspects of his 
Ugandan culture started before he came to the UK through his education and living in 
the capital city of Kampala. He explained in our interview that Kampala is a 
metropolis which is 'Westernised' with an educated population. When he lived there, 
Anthony saw at first hand women in powerful positions, leading him to question his 
cultural upbringing which stressed men's powerful roles in society: 
I mean there is a difference in the West and I think it is good the way they 
do it in the West it shows there is equality. In cities [in Uganda] there is a 
change but in villages, there are still people who [ ... ] still want women to 
be below them and I don't think it is a good thing personally. (Taped 
interview, Anthony, 28 February 2012). 
As a continuation of his reflection on the differences between Ugandan and British 
culture, Anthony said that through training and further self-reflection, he now 
believed in the inalienable right to choose as epitomised in liberal democracy: 
I've been trained as well to promote independence for example, to allow 
people to have choices and this is all about the quality of life that someone 
- everybody, you, Eric, me - we are not different, we are all people ... and 
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it would be a shame if for you, Godfred, you were not allowed to make 
your choices ... supposing you liked doing something and then someone 
said you can't do it and there is even no reason for them, for them to tell 
you not to do it or stop you from doing it; that would be taking away your 
right. (Taped interview, Anthony, 28 February 2012). 
The preceding quote from Anthony suggests that he believed there were several 
reasons why he needed to offer or enhance Abrax's choice. To Anthony, choice was 
tantamount to wellbeing - 'quality of life' - and, as such, a denial of choice resulted 
in 'shame', a word which also means 'degradation' in everyday usage. Furthermore, 
Anthony conceptualised choice-making as one of equality - 'we are all people' - and 
of not engendering choice as deprivation of human rights; 'that would be taking away 
your rights.' 'Rights'; 'quality oflife' and 'equality', by which Anthony justified his 
convictions about the moral imperative of choice are all embedded in current learning 
disability policy (DOH, 2009). Anthony's statement suggests that even if he hailed 
from a different culture, through 'training' he has grasped the values espoused by 
current policy on learning disability. This latter point also potentially explains how 
professionals completed the Learning Log in the first person '1'. The two quotes 
above from Anthony, also exemplify how culture, education, and place interacted to 
impact decision-making on Abrax's care. On the basis of the support workers' 
cultural heritage alone, age denoted power to make decisions for those younger. 
However, Abrax's age combined with the policy environment of their employment, 
which stressed autonomy, inverted the support workers' cultural understanding of the 
relationship between age and power. Nevertheless their education and their original 
middle class backgrounds prior to emigrating provided bridges to cross cultures. 
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Firstly, because of their education some of the support workers - for example Helder, 
Robert, Abbassi, Anthony - viewed the doctrine of choice (and by implication 
individualism) as a plausible alternative (or even more superior) to their cultural 
heritage, which sometimes emphasised collective decision-making. Secondly, even if 
they did not hold the view that choice mattered to people, through their training, they 
could consider the need to promote choice as a necessary part of their duties as 
support workers. However, while the support workers unanimously espoused the view 
that Abrax had mental capacity to choose, or that they believed in the right of every 
service user to choose, they did not always offer Abrax alternatives. In the next 
section I analyse data to show how the support workers' cultural understanding of 
food led them to overrule Abrax's choices. What was conspicuous in my observation 
was Abrax's response: in each case he responded to food being pushed into his mouth 
by being violently sick. While I interpreted his actions as resistance on his part, the 
support workers believed him to be ill. 
Food and the limits 0/ cultural intermingling 
The two incidents that I describe here both happened at breakfast. The first instance 
was on 18 October 2011, about a week into fieldwork. While Abrax was having his 
breakfast of porridge and croissant, he gestured that he was full but Anthony 
continued to feed him, whereupon Abrax violently regurgitated his food. Even at the 
time I interpreted Abrax's actions as resistance, as I recorded in my field notes: 
Anthony encouraged Abrax to finish the last portion of the porridge. I 
cannot recall how this conversation came about but it may be that he read 
an action from Abrax that he did not want to eat anymore. But 
immediately after this, after he put another spoonful into Abrax' s mouth 
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Abrax began regurgitating the food and Robert put the bowl under his 
chin. Robert then talking to [female support worker] said that he thought 
that Abrax's body suit sometimes caused him to regurgitate food. But at 
the time I wondered whether the regurgitation was a deliberate act of 
resistance by Abrax that he did not want to eat anymore. (Field notes, 18 
October 2011 ). 
The second occasion that Abrax became violently sick after being made to eat against 
his will involved Helder and closely resembled the first. The data extract below 
illustrates the complex interactions that occurred between Abrax and Helder, and how 
the latter's culture influenced his decision-making about Abrax's feeding. The 
backdrop to the incident about Abrax becoming sick after eating was that Helder had 
maintained beforehand that Abrax could make decisions for himself: 
He [Helder] said that Abrax was outgoing and that previously they 
planned his community activities a week in advance; however, these days 
Abrax chooses his plan daily because that is what he likes doing. Helder 
said 'well you will see, as you get to know him you will understand'. 
(Field notes, 14 October 2011). 
Implicit in Helder's statement above, is that Abrax told his carers daily what he would 
like to do. Despite espousing the view that Abrax could make choices, Helder 
overruled him on the issue of eating. During fieldwork on 16 November 20 II, I 
arrived to see Abrax eating breakfast, which I could tell immediately, was • African.' 
Abrax stopped eating but Helder encouraged him to eat more, and when he would not 
Helder pushed more food into his mouth which caused Abrax to vomit violently. As is 
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noticeable from the data extract below, even at the time of compiling the field notes, I 
wrote myself into the data, in that I clearly realised that it was my life experiences 
growing up in Africa which enabled me to, firstly, identify the breakfast as 'African' 
and secondly, provided means of interpreting Helder's actions. 
I noticed in sitting next to Abrax (who was again facing the window) that 
he was eating [a sandwich] breakfast of hot cross bun with processed ham 
in it. This breakfast caught my attention as particularly 'African'. I 
noticed also that Abrax did not eat anymore for several minutes and he 
became sick not long after Helder had pushed one of the portions [of 
food] in his mouth. I remember Abrax's sickness was sudden and it 
occurred to me that on the first time I noticed him sick this was after food 
had been similarly pushed into his mouth. (Field notes, 17 November 
2011 ). 
Notwithstanding his expressed views that Abrax was capable of making decisions, 
Helder did not feel the need to ask him about whether he was full before pushing 
another portion of food into his mouth. Abrax's subsequent regurgitation may be 
interpreted as his act of resistance or that he had a stomach bug (as his carers 
subsequently claimed). However, an interpretation based on an insider perspective -
as a Ghanaian (and African) - arguably yielded more fruitful analysis about the moral 
significance of food to Helder, and how this led to the interactional outcome shown in 
the data extract above. 
From my life experiences food (and especially meat) has centrality to some 
people who would consider themselves as of African origin, and it may be that this is 
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what led me to immediately realise the 'African' nature of the breakfast on entering 
Abrax's home. In most African countries where food is less plentiful, it is not to be 
'wasted' and one is not allowed to have an unfinished meal if only because most 
people have diminished access to food. Eating and completing a meal is, therefore, 
not only a matter of personal nourishment or personal expediency; it also has moral 
significance because leaving a plate uncompleted showed profligacy. Moreover high 
food intake epitomised in weight-gain suggested prosperity (Rehanzo et aI, 2012). 
Eating, and therefore weight-gain, had powerful moral significance beyond the need 
to survive. For instance in 2011, a Ghanaian woman was prosecuted at the Old Bailey 
(High Court) for force-feeding her baby22. Following an investigation into what was 
perceived to be inadequate professional response, one explanation for professional 
inaction to the risk accruing to the baby from force-feeding was limited understanding 
of the cultural value of food to his mother: 'Practitioners were insufficiently sensitive 
to obtaining an understanding of the significance of cultural and/or individual values 
with regard to weight, body image and feeding practices.' (London Borough of 
Waltham Forest Children Safeguarding Board, 2011; p3). 
My analysis here is that Helder, being African, would have seen it as his moral 
duty to ensure that Abrax finished his plate of food. Stemming from this Helder, 
despite espousing a discourse of choice which would necessitate his ascertaining or 
respecting Abrax's mental capacity to refuse further feeding, Helder chose to push the 
food into his mouth without asking. Helder would not offer a choice to Abrax as to 
whether he ate more or not as Abrax had to have the food to fit into Helder's cultural 
and moral frameworks around food. Helder's force-feeding of Abrax and the latter's 
22 < http://www.bbc.co.uklnews/uk-eng)and-)ondon-15689864> (accessed on 19 June 
2013). 
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response through vomiting is also reflected in some of the debates in mental capacity 
with England. Tan et al (2006) have argued that people suffering anorexia should be 
forced fed because the condition displaces a person's mental capacity to understand 
the symbolic value of food, eating and nourishment. 
Rounding of the discussion, in Part Two, I have taken analytic excursion 
around culture, showing how peoples' cultural lived experience was a key contextual 
factor in their decision-making for Abrax's life. Culture was present in Yarlow and in 
Abrax's life. Unlike in Kotoka, professionals in Yarlow were happy to discuss their 
culture, and how it affected the decisions they made about Abrax's care. At the same 
time, the discussion in this chapter has shown that while people in Abrax's life had a 
strong sense of their culture, they also acknowledge that it was shaped by other 
variables such as place, age, employment, and their own preferences. In the case of 
Mr and Mrs Chantos, culture was sometimes mediated by what they felt was in 
Abrax's best interest instead of their families'. While the modulating effect of other 
variables on culture and decision-making can be acknowledged, it nevertheless 
challenges current postulations of mental capacity as solely a cognitive activity of the 
brain. If anything, mental capacity is more akin to other social categories which 
emanate from social relations and power. 
Conclusion 
In this last data chapter I have narrated Abrax's life story using the concept of critical 
moments to identify key periods in his childhood and how these map onto the three 
substantive concerns of my research, namely: learning disability, ethnic identity, and 
mental capacity. Abrax' s life story provides insights into how social categories 
operate. Abrax acquired the category of learning disability through the education 
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system, yet he might also have been classified as physically disabled because he 
required other people's physicality in his everyday life. Taking Abrax's life story as a 
case in point, an argument can be advanced that social categories are not necessarily 
acquired because of people's inherent characteristics but through chance. For 
instance, although from birth Abrax did exhibit control over his physique, it was his 
mind that became the focus of disability categorisations. In another sense, therefore, 
Abrax being classified as learning disabled exemplifies the binary nature of statutory 
classifications. A parallel conclusion to draw from Abrax's life story is that social 
categories become reified. From the accounts of Mr. and Mrs. Chantos, medical 
professionals were puzzled by Abrax's higher than expected level of understanding 
alongside his inability to vocalise his thoughts. Furthermore, Abrax in his social life, 
gained more skills with age, and was perceived to understand complex concepts in 
comparison to his peers at school or in the day center. Thus the label of learning 
disability does not capture the sophisticated texture of Abrax' s abilities nor is the 
category adequately variable to express Abrax's intellectual development since 
childhood. 
In terms of current understandings of mental capacity, Abrax's adult life 
provides grounds on which to challenge them. At the time of my fieldwork, Abrax 
had not undergone a formal capacity assessment. Within his close social network, 
however, it was believed that he could make decisions for himself. Abrax's carers and 
family felt that they knew his mental capacity on the basis of their knowledge of his 
day-to-day life. With each daily interaction, the range of his carers' understanding of 
his mental abilities increased and their views about his capacity revised. Based on 
these ongoing revisions, it may be argued that knowledge about a person's capacity 
accruing from day-to-day interactions will display multiplicity, change, and 
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flexibility, rather than fixed statutory assessments. Moreover, in Abrax's social 
network when people decided on his best interest, it was within the context of his rich 
social relations rather than his preferences alone. People made best interest decisions 
for Abrax based on how his wishes would impact on the care arrangements between 
his five male carers, his flat mates at Yarlow, and lastly, his parents' wishes. 
Taking a broader perspective, while my thesis is not a comparative study, 
there are some marked differences between the first two data chapters on Kotoka and 
the case study of Abrax. In Kotoka professionals were concerned with risk whereas in 
Yarlow at no point did I hear professionals refer to Safeguarding Adults policy 
framework. Furthermore, unlike at Kotoka, in Yarlow ethnic identity (and/or culture) 
was visible in that I heard different languages spoken, people talked uninhibited about 
their culture, and professionals acknowledged their difference(s) from Abrax. From 
my perspective as a researcher, ethical concerns were also different. Whereas in 
Yar)ow I was pre-occupied with the impact of Abrax's mental capacity on fieldwork 
(inter)relations, in Kotoka I was concerned about how my presence was impacting on 
the work of the team. These issues outlined in this last paragraph led me to make 
decisions with methodological and epistemological consequences, on which I now 
reflect in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT. REFLECTING ON 
THE METHODOLOGICAL IMPACT 
OF IDENTITIES 
In this chapter I introduce new data as part of my reflections on the ethics of my 
research, and how my identities as a black man (British of Ghanaian origin), PhD 
student, and qualified social worker shaped fieldwork. By general acknowledgement, 
ethnographic researchers should attend to ethics because they interact with people 
over a period of time and are, therefore, more likely to impact on their lives. Thus, 
Murphy and Dingwall (2001) advice that ethnographic researchers should: seek to 
avoid harm to participants; seek to bring about some good and not use participants 
simply for research purposes; respect the autonomy of participants; and finally, treat 
all participants equally. However, in my research, ethical concerns are amplified 
because of the involvement of Abrax, who was classified as learning disabled. 
Research involving learning disability service users is considered to present novel 
ethical issues in two areas. Firstly, how researchers elicit consent and secondly, how 
they prevent coercion. In Part One, I explain how I addressed these two ethical issues 
in my research. Subsequently, given that I attentively relied on my identities to 
accomplish my research aims, in Part Two of this chapter, I reflect on the impact of 
my respective position(ing) as a black man, PhD researcher, and social worker. It is 
necessary to engage in this self-reflection because I drew on my biography to pose 
questions on culture and to interpret some fieldwork observations. 
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Part One. The (im)possihility of 
knowing: mental (in)capacity and 
fieldwork ethics in Yarlow 
In Part One, I explain how I assessed Abrax's mental capacity and reflect on the 
knowledge gained from that experience. Finally I explain how I ethically managed 
fieldwork relationships with Abrax and his carers. 
Assessing Abrax's mental capacity 
On first meeting Abrax it was apparent that he displayed some understanding of 
everyday communication. Below, I have reproduced the field notes I recorded 
following my first meeting with him to assess his mental capacity. In the field notes I 
have observed that Abrax could tell that I was the person whose photograph was on 
the Participant Information Sheet I showed him. To contextualise the forthcoming 
discussion, I now briefly recount what led to the events I have described below. In my 
first meeting with Abrax, among other aims, I wanted to gain some perspective on 
how much of my research he understood. While I explained my research to Abrax, 
one of his carers, Robert, took images of our encounter on a digital camera. Robert 
then gave me the camera so that I could browse through the digital images to learn 
more about Abrax's life. Scanning the photos with Abrax, I thought I would use the 
opportunity to gauge what he remembered about himself, his understanding of verbal 
communication, and the consistency of his choices: 
As I explained the Information Sheet to him [Abrax] Robert took photos 
of the process. He left the digital camera on the table and said that I could 
look through some of the activities that they arranged for the service user. 
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So I was flicking through the photos with the service user looking and I 
would ask him 'who is that?' and he would point to himself if he was in 
the image on the camera or he would point to me [if it was an image of 
me]. He was accurate every time. (Field notes, 11 October 2011). 
As well as evidencing that Abrax understood some verbal communication, the field 
notes above also show that my framework for assessing Abrax' s mental capacity was 
ethically robust. This is because I exceeded statutory advice about assessing capacity 
to involve people in research. Strictly speaking, the MeA solely requires the 
researcher to assess someone's capacity to participate 'on the balance of probabilities' 
of their understanding of the research and its accompanying risks (Dobson, 2008). 
However, in my case, had I focused primarily on my research during my first 
encounter with Abrax, I would have missed out on the other aspects of his life in 
which he displayed understanding of complex concepts. For instance, on my first 
visit, I observed him and his carers in their 'normal' routines and Abrax's 
understanding of these, the way his carers elicited responses from him, and his 
personality. I observed Abrax and his carers communicate about their everyday 
activities, I also paid attention to their interactions, and Abrax's responses to verbal 
communication. After spending a few hours with him on my first visit it became 
clear to me that Abrax understood more about his everyday life and general living 
than a formal capacity test, focused on the narrow issue of consenting to research, 
could ascertain. 
Even so, after the three visits to Abrax I concluded that, for the purposes of 
research, Abrax lacked mental capacity to consent to his participation. I could not 
evidence that he understood my research aims despite my conviction that, beyond the 
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aims of my research, Abrax understood a lot about 'everyday' living. On every 
subsequent visit he showed signs that he recognised me, and he was also friendly 
towards me by holding my hand. However, I could not conclude that he understood 
the totality of the research nor could I, as a researcher, find ways of drawing out that 
evidence from him. Stemming from these issues, I assessed that Abrax lacked the 
mental capacity to consent to his participation, a decision which triggered the MCA 
safeguards around the need to consult other people. According to the MCA, when it is 
clear that a prospective participant does not have capacity to consent, then the 
researcher is obliged to nominate a consultee. A professional, friend, or family 
member, the consultee's role is to 'assent' to the involvement of the person adjudged 
to lack capacity (DOH, 2008). In addition to the consultee assenting, the researcher is 
required to consult them regularly and brief them about how the research participant 
lacking mental capacity is faring in fieldwork. It is, therefore, due to my uncertainty 
about Abrax's capacity to consent that I appointed his parents Mr and Mrs Chantos as 
consultees. As I showed when I discussed my research methods in Chapter Four, 
Abrax's parents served as consultees and participants in my research, 
Additionally, I chose to nominate Mr and Mrs Chantos as consultees because, 
from my conversation with Annikka (social worker in Kotoka, discussed in Chapters 
Four, Five, and Six), I learnt that they played an active role in Abrax's life. Also, 
when I first visited Y arlow, my conversations with his care workers suggested that 
Abrax was very close to his parents. I reasoned that as well as acting as consul tees, 
Mr and Mrs Chantos could provide valuable data on Abrax's 'critical moments' 
(Thomson et aI, 2002). Choosing Mr and Mrs Chantos as consultees also enabled me 
to discuss Abrax with those who knew him best; thereby gaining a better 
understanding of his likes and dislikes. My decision on consultees was justified, given 
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the rich accounts Mr and Mrs Chantos gave of how Abrax became categorised as 
learning disabled, as I have shown through the case study in Chapter Seven. However, 
notwithstanding my assessment that Abrax could not consent to his participation in 
my research, in my everyday engagement with him, I operated within the ethical 
framework that I had to directly seek his views. 
My ethical decision to seek Abrax's views directly, despite my assessment that 
he was unable to consent had upsides and drawbacks. On a positive note, Abrax 
surprised me continuously with his level of understanding. For instance, he 
understood the concept of medicine, and could tell me that he did not take medicines 
daily. I found this out on one visit. Knowing that learning disabled service users were 
routinely medicated, I wanted to know this about Abrax. So I asked him during 
breakfast, out of context of any prior discussion about medicine 'do you take 
medicine every day?' and he responded by shaking his head. The fact that Abrax did 
not take medication daily - only when ill - and yet he was able to tell me that he did 
not take medicines shows how much information he retained and understood. As 
such, I assumed that Abrax understood communication, yet sometimes I was proved 
wrong. On one occasion I was with Abrax in his room looking at the photos of his 
siblings (one of the carers had previously shown me the pictures). When I placed my 
finger on the photo of his sister and asked Abrax 'is this your sister?' he said 'no.' 
The example I have just cited shows how Abrax sometimes seemed unfamiliar with 
some of his immediate surroundings at the same time as he displayed more cognitive 
awareness than I had imagined on other occasions. Thus one challenge of fieldwork 
with Abrax was grasping the uncertainty about his mental capacity and its implied 
ethical challenges. 
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uncertainty: challenging epistemologies 
and methodologies of mental capacity 
research 
Because Abrax regularly surprised me with his level of understanding, my recurring 
emotion throughout fieldwork was uncertainty, an issue which I now deliberate 
further upon in response to the call for reflexivity in social science research (D'Cruz 
et al, 2007; Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007). Paralleling the reflexive turn in 
sociology, increasing attention is being devoted to the methodological impact of 
emotions as researchers challenge the tendency to place emotion and reason as binary 
opposites (Blackman, 2007; Holland, 2007; McLaughlin, 2003). In my fieldwork with 
Abrax, my feeling of uncertainty about his mental capacity caused me to be more 
observant and to seek multiple sources on emerging significant data. One illustration 
of how I used the feeling of uncertainty about Abrax's mental capacity 
methodologically involves different stories that I was told about Abrax's capacity to 
direct people to his grandmother's house. 
In the course of fieldwork, accounts emerged from various people that Abrax 
could direct any new care workers to his grandmother's house, if asked the right 
questions. These accounts were significant data because they suggested that Abrax 
had a good memory, and that he had an awareness of the spatial configuration of the 
area where he grew up. Then when I first visited Abrax's parents, unprompted, they 
both repeated the aforementioned stories, as shown below in my field note extracts: 
Abrax could direct someone from Morrisons to maternal grandmother's 
house: Abrax's parents told me this within the context of the discussion 
about his memory and understanding. I recall Mr Chantos saying that the 
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distance between Abrax's maternal grandmother's home and Morrisons is 
not that far and he intimated that this should not detract from Abrax' s 
capacity for memory ... I recall telling Abrax' s parents that I thought that 
sometimes his answers are inconsistent and they said that it may be that 
sometimes he jokes - Abrax's mother recounted a story here about Abrax 
apparently wilfully providing the wrong directions to someone previously. 
(Field notes, 17 November 2011). 
There are a few noteworthy points from the above data extract. I recorded that Mr 
Chantos downplayed Abrax's capacity to provide directions by highlighting that the 
distance between the supermarket, Morrisons, and his maternal grandmother's home 
was not that far. In the course of the conversation about memory, I also attempted to 
provide a contrasting view. I mentioned that Abrax sometimes provided inconsistent 
answers so one could not be certain about his memory, or understanding, or his ability 
to direct people to his grandmother's home. As recorded in the field notes extract 
above, Mrs Chantos acknowledged the inconsistency in Abrax's answers and 
explained it as a 'joke'. Later on in my fieldwork, the issue of Abrax's ability to 
provide directions to his grandmother's home came up again when I accompanied him 
and his care worker, Abbassi, on the bus. Abbassi was dismissive of the story, and he 
suggested that such accounts of Abrax's apparent mental capacity only served to put 
pressure on him: 
On the bus I asked Abbassi if he thought that Abrax is aware of the route. 
This led Abbassi to tell me that when he first started he and Abrax had to 
go somewhere and when he asked another member of staff for directions 
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they said that Abrax would show him. However on the way Abrax could 
not show him the directions and appeared to answer 'yes' to Abbassi's 
questions about getting to their destination. This led Abbassi to say that he 
felt that too much was expected of Abrax sometimes (Field notes, 04 
November 2011). 
My account of the conversation with Abbassi about Abrax's memory (reproduced 
above) was contrasting data to what I had been told by another care worker and 
Abrax's parents. Substantively I felt that different stories about Abrax's abilities 
required further exploration so this caused me to observe Abrax even more closely. 
One day, I was sitting next to Abrax on the bus, when we drove past the local library. 
Abrax became animated, making sounds to the effect of 'ya ya' and pointing to the 
street. By now I knew that 'ya ya' meant grandmother in Greek, and from the 
previous conversations, I could tell that Abrax was saying that his grandmother lived 
in that direction. The account that I have given up to this point is one of my 
motivation to look for contrasting or affirming data about Abrax's mental capacity 
because of my feeling of uncertainty. Although I had assessed that Abrax could not 
consent to his participation in the research, in fieldwork I did not consider my initial 
assessment as 'closure'. 
The emotion of uncertainty I felt in fieldwork with Abrax potentially has 
broader theoretical, ethical, and methodological ramifications in research on mental 
capacity. The MCA, arguably, reflects positivist theorisation of mental capacity as 
'objective.' As, Charland (1998, 2001) has argued, positivist understandings of mental 
capacity side-line emotion by taking the view that it distorts rational thought. In this 
regard Charland proposes that emotion is required for decision-making: 
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To say that an individual appreciates the nature of a treatment decision in 
the sense that they can properly evaluate its personal meaning and 
significance, requires the capacity for emotion as well as the traditional 
"cognitive" capacities [ ... ] Emotions are the source of many of the most 
basic human preferences, which, in tum, help to shape and define many of 
individuals' most important goals and values. (Charland, 1998; 
unpaginated). 
Charland aims to challenge the dominant epistemology of mental capacity by arguing 
against theoretical separation of emotion and reason, and the implicit association of 
rationality with capacity. Thus according to Charland, in place of the current position 
that people in a heightened state of emotion are not capable of making 'rational' 
decisions, emotion and reason should be considered symbiotic. However Charland's 
takes his argument from the viewpoint of people undergoing assessments. I, on the 
other hand, am arguing for considering emotions as part of the epistemology of 
mental capacity from the standpoint of the assessor. 
My fieldwork experiences provide an alternative view that as well as 
cognition, emotions are necessary for judging mental capacity. If, as the MCA 
suggests, mental capacity should be assessed 'on the balance of probabilities', then, 
assessors cannot claim certainty in their judgements about capacity. Judging from my 
experiences in fieldwork it would seem that assessors themselves can rarely be certain 
that their assessments are correct. In this regard emotion may be positive, if only by 
causing assessors to re-check their judgments. Two further points on ethics and 
methodology flow from my argument. If assessors cannot be certain about their 
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assessments, this entails the ethical need for them to be transparent about their doubts. 
Methodologically, if capacity assessment is a matter of probability as advised by the 
MCA Code of Practice (TSO, 2(07), then arguably the qualitative paradigm is more 
suitable for mental capacity research. This is because qualitative methods pay more 
attention to contextual factors (Seale, 1999), and in the case of the MCA, these would 
include the values and emotions of the assessor and those assessed. Additionally, 
quantitative methodology would in likelihood reify mental capacity by measuring it as 
a stock in time when decision-making capacity is understood to fluctuate in the MCA. 
Up to now, I have discussed how I assessed Abrax's mental capacity, my 
realisation that his capacity was to some extent indeterminable, and how this caused 
uncertainty in my fieldwork. While the discussion to date has focused on theoretical 
and methodological issues, in the next section, I discuss how uncertainty impacted on 
human relations in fieldwork. 
Crossing boundaries? 
Another aspect of Abrax's mental (in)capacity that impacted on fieldwork relations 
was whether or how he understood my relationship with him. I had to consider if he 
saw me as a 'friend' or care worker. Furthermore, I was aware that I had to carefully 
manage any expectations about my role in his life at the time, an issue complicated by 
the fact that I could not ascertain his views. The matter of blurred 
professional/personal friendship has long been recognised in ethnographic research 
with learning disabled service users: 'When ethnographic methods are employed, 
especially within people's own homes, concerns about intrusiveness may give way 
over time to worries about setting up expectations of continuing friendship which 
might not then be realised.' (Stalker, 1998; p to). Stalker's caution about the 
possibility of role conflation was relevant from the outset of my engagement with 
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Abrax, as we discussed another day that I could visit. A date was suggested by 
Abrax's carer, which I said was unsuitable for me because I needed to be at the Open 
University for supervision. Immediately after my response, Abrax started making a 
noise and jabbing his finger on the table which all present interpreted as a sign of 
agitation. The data extract below from my field notes on the first encounter picks up 
the story: 
We appeared to have settled on Friday at one point but then I remembered 
that I needed to be in Milton Keynes for supervision so I said that it may 
not be possible. At this point the service user began pointing his fingers 
on the table whilst at the same time making noises which suggested his 
distress. Both Robert and I knew from the sounds and the actions that the 
service user was indicating that he was unhappy with me not coming on 
Friday. I think that I did say that I understood that he was unhappy and 
that I would be coming on Friday after all. So we agreed that I would 
come on Friday at 8AM to see him prepare to go out to the center. I can 
surmise that the service user agreed with this arrangement because unlike 
previously there was no protesting. (Field notes, 11 October 2011). 
At the same time as demonstrating that Abrax understood verbal communication, the 
exchanges that I captured in my field notes cited above caused me to wonder about 
the fusing of professional/friendship boundaries. Although Abrax' s family visited him 
frequently and he had a close relationship with his carers, throughout fieldwork I was 
uncertain whether he understood that my visits were not permanent, or that I was a 
researcher not one of his care workers, or a friend. Relatedly, once fieldwork was 
underway, I felt accepted by Abrax and his carers. It seemed that most of my requests 
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would be acceded to. Sometimes I was even invited to witness Abrax's personal care. 
Thus, apart from the possibility of conflation of my role as researcher with friendship, 
it seemed that Abrax's privacy would sometimes be compromised if I accepted every 
invitation to observe him. 
One of my self-imposed ethical rules was, therefore, to decline any offer to 
observe Abrax' s personal care in the mornings even when Abrax gave the permission 
that I could do so. Throughout fieldwork, Abrax's carers maintained that he 'chose' 
his outfits in the mornings; he decided when he woke up, and the time that he would 
have his personal care. As a matter of fieldwork, I was keen to know how these 
decisions were made by Abrax but at the same time, I was convinced that answering 
these questions would constitute my crossing an ethical boundary and transgressing 
Abrax's privacy. To maintain or perhaps more appropriately contain my identity as a 
researcher, I always arranged a day for my next visit with Abrax and his carers; thus 
Abrax and his carers controlled the schedule for my visits instead of the other way 
round. Also, responding to Angrosino and Perez's (2000) call for participant 
observation to be a context for interaction, I spoke to Abrax and the carers, but I 
declined any offer to partake in any activities that could be misconstrued as care 
workers' tasks. 
But as I now explain, the boundaries between care worker/researcher were 
sometimes deliberately tested by Abrax's carers. A case in point was that on one visit 
in the morning Anthony asked me to feed Abrax his breakfast. Although I declined, 
Anthony was persistent and at one point enlisted Abrax's support, 'Abrax should 
Godfred feed you breakfast?', to which Abrax said 'yes.' This exchange around 
breakfast put me in an ethical quandary because I felt that I would be crossing the 
boundary between researcher/care worker thus potentially confusing Abrax about my 
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role, but also being manipulated by Anthony. On this occasion, quick thinking on my 
part resolved the matter because I told Anthony that the Open University insurance 
for my research probably did not cover my feeding Abrax. In the field, I had to 
operate by self-imposed ethical rules in addition to the ethical codes and undertakings 
given to SCREe. 
In Part One of this chapter I have shown how, as a focus of my research, 
Abrax's identity as a service user, as an individual labelled as learning disabled, and 
assessed by me as not able to consent to his participation in research, affected 
methodology and fieldwork relations. Motivated by the principle of inclusivity, I 
aimed to involve persons likely to lack capacity to consent to their involvement in my 
research. As such, ethical sensitivities were amplified from the outset of my thesis. 
Yet the actual practice of fieldwork led to moral complications unanticipated in my 
application to SCREC for ethical approval. The statutory ethical approval process 
requires the research to judge mental capacity of prospective participants, and in this 
way, there is an underlying assumption that capacity can be captured. In my research I 
found that I could not determine Abrax's capacity, so I decided to appoint consultees. 
My uncertainty about Abrax' s capacity also caused me to be more observant and seek 
out data to refute (or confirm) my uncertainties. At the level of personal relations, I 
could not be certain that Abrax understood my temporary role in his life, making me 
anxious about whether I could live up to his expectations. Part One has, therefore, 
focused on Abrax. In Part Two, I explore how my identities as a black man of British 
nationality, a PhD researcher, and a trained social worker impacted on fieldwork in 
Kotoka and Yarlow. 
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Part Two. Using my identities as a 
research tool 
I start this section by discussing how my social work professional identity shaped 
fieldwork. In qualitative research it is accepted that researchers' views of the world 
and their life histories mould knowledge production. Calling the latter 
acknowledgement 'epistemic subjectivity' Breuer et al (2002) argue for transparency 
and accountability in how identities impact on research. It may also be said of Breuer 
et aI's exposition of subjectivity that both the researcher and their participant(s) bring 
to the research encounter their life histories, personalities, and emotions, which 
together shape the social situation of the research, and by corollary, data generation, 
analyses and representation. Correspondingly, subjectivity entails elements of ethics 
because parties bring to research relations their senses of right and wrong, and how 
people should be treated. 
Social worker 
Being familiar with Kotoka from my previous employment as a social worker in the 
Disabled Children's Team, I felt that my employment experiences would be 
methodologically advantageous. I thought that I would be familiar with some of the 
work processes, the documentation, and the professional discourse of statutory social 
work. Once fieldwork started however, I realised that my experiences as a social 
worker counted for very little in terms of data gathering as I recorded after my first 
day in Kotoka: 
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Contact with the field has also surprised me about how little my social 
work experience counts here. For one thing this is an area of social work 
that I knew little about in detail so in a sense I am learning a new aspect of 
social work which I find fascinating (Reflective Diary, 10 June 2011). 
In Kotoka I was unfamiliar with the work processes and discourse as my fieldwork 
was sited in adult services. When I practised as a social worker, 'risk' was mitigated 
through the process of child protection and the legislative framework was the 1989 
Children Act, whereas in adult services, safeguarding is the preferred term. The 
procedure for allocating cases in the integrated learning disability team was different, 
and as a child care social worker, I was part of a standalone social work team, 
whereas Kotoka was an integrated team. While during my period of practice multi-
disciplinarity was regularly talked about as a policy aim, it was in Kotoka that I first 
experienced the practice implications thereof. Moreover, the time spent doing a PhD 
had lessened my familiarity with office environments and everything in Kotoka 
initially seemed fast-paced. As I recorded in my Reflective Diary on 06 June 2011: 
'there is so much more that goes on in an office than I ever imagined would be the 
case.' 
My solution to the unfamiliarity of the research setting was to work harder and 
concentrate more so as not to miss anything during observations. I wrote copious 
amounts of notes, asked questions, and soaked up any information I came across. 
Later, once the professionals and I had developed a personal relationship, they said 
that my interest in their work was endearing. However fieldwork was emotionally and 
physically draining. I was also consumed by the possible (im)morality of my presence 
in Kotoka and I was also determined to stick to the agreement with SCREC that my 
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research would be non-interventionist. Initially because of the 'non-interference' 
commitment to SCREC, I sat around the office not talking to people, and 
predominantly observing, giving rise to an intense feeling of voyeurism. At other 
times I was pre-occupied with the ethical principle that I was not to impose my will 
on other people. Sometimes I heard professionals discussing needs of service users 
who were part of my caseload when I practised as a children's social worker but I did 
not feel that I could 'reveal' my knowledge, lest I be seen as 'interfering' in case 
work. Similarly, when I saw faces that I recognised from my period as a children's 
social worker, I did not want to renew old acquaintances for fear of blurring roles. 
Altogether, in the initial stages of fieldwork in Kotoka, I expended a great deal of 
energy working out what constituted 'non-interference.' With time, instances 
occurred to suggest that my presence was eliciting performances from professionals 
or that people were engaging in activities which they had designed for me to record. 
Here it may be said that my positioning as a PhD researcher was impacting on data 
generated. 
A researcher capturing staged performances 
My identity as a PhD researcher played out in different and interesting ways during 
fieldwork in Kotoka. Sometimes I was positioned as the resident expert on the issue 
of mental capacity, and attempts were made to draw me into professional discussions. 
An example was a Safeguarding Meeting I attended which was called because of 
reports of domestic violence against a service user. The social worker introduced me 
at the meeting and the chairperson asked about the topic of my PhD. As the meeting 
evolved and a solution to the case seemed intractable, the Chair turned to me and 
asked how domestic violence affected people's mental capacity. I have reproduced the 
relevant field notes below: 
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Chair turned to me and asked how [domestic violence] affects someone' s 
capacity to make decisions: Recalling the exchange with the chair I feel 
that she was asking two questions: one whether (and how) domestic 
violence affects someone's capacity to make decisions and/or how you 
resolve a domestic violence issue where the service user has capacity to 
decide to stay in the relationship with the alleged culprit. I recall giving an 
answer to the effect of whether the person understands the risk. At the 
time I felt that my answer sounded silly but I was also keen not get too 
involved; to become the resident expert. (Field notes, 14 June 2011). 
The above field note can be interpreted along the lines that I was deemed by the chair 
to have knowledge to resolve the dilemmas of the meeting; therefore, I was placed in 
a position of power. At the same time throughout the meeting, I questioned myself as 
to whether my presence had led to the prolonged discussion about mental capacity 
and culture. As I later captured in my Reflective Diary, I was unsure as to whether, 
were I not at the meeting, the discussion would not have taken a different trajectory: 
A question that I may not be able to answer is how much my presence 
contributed to the discussion of capacity issues. Sitting here now I 
remember the Chair asking whether there were any cultural issues to 
consider in the work with the clients. Here it is worth noting that there 
were seven people in the room and only I and the Community Nurse 
(Asian) were minorities although I did not ask any of the professionals for 
their ethnicity. (Reflective Diary, 14 June 2011). 
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The two data extracts presented in this section suggest that my presence on some 
occasions led professionals, unprompted by me, to discuss or ask questions that may 
otherwise not have been the case. In one other instance however, a social worker set 
up a situation in which I would be a witness to her professional grievance. In this 
sense, rather than my utilising the professionals for my research ends, I was being 
used. The subsequent discussion that I present thus highlights the multi-faceted nature 
of ethics in my fieldwork. 
The central character in the field notes below is Annika, one of the social 
workers who I developed a good working relationship with during fieldwork. On one 
shadowing session, she invited me to sit in on a meeting with her manager, Chris. As I 
entered the room Chris said something to the effect of 'this is to be anonymised' but I 
could not tell whether he was joking or not. It became clear to me that Annika invited 
me to the meeting to perform the role of witness to her complaints about 
unsustainable case loads. Chris, on the other hand, turned to management-speak and 
explained the various procedures that he had enacted to manage caseloads: 
I had a premonition that it would be inappropriate to take notes and when 
we entered the room I sat at the far side of the table whilst Annika and 
Chris sat opposite each other with Chris closer to the door. It was one of 
the most uncomfortable and awkward experiences [in my life] because I 
wanted to be invisible but clearly I was not; I could not take notes, nor 
partake in the conversations but undeniably my presence was having an 
impact...Annika talked at length about the fact that [one] case had taken 
all her time. She implied that she was close to the edge but at the same 
time apologised for making this known to Chris because she felt that 
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'everyone is in the same boat.' Chris said that it was his role and that of 
the other managers to ensure that the social workers did not feel under 
such pressure and that Annika should bring this up with her supervisor. 
(Reflective Diary, 23 June 2011). 
The data extract above draws attention to how ethical practice in research cannot be 
the sole responsibility of the researcher. My witnessing the discussion between Chris 
and Annikka was outside my control and moreover, an argument could be advanced 
that Annika set out to use me for her ends, which she had determined was the need for 
an 'independent' witness to her grievance about high caseloads. However Annika and 
Chris both appeared to interpret my presence as a signal to present their cases. On 
Annika's part, her case was that all social workers were overworked - 'everyone is in 
the same boat' - and on Chris' part, a denial of Annika's point on the basis that 
management had put in place procedures for addressing high caseloads. 
So my identities as a social worker and researcher played out in unexpected 
ways in Kotoka. Methodologically, being a social worker did not provide pointers for 
questions as I expected. However my skills as a social worker were useful as in the 
case of Annikka above when I had to empathise with her as she recounted stress 
accruing from her work load (Atkinson, 2004). Regarding my positioning as a 
researcher, professionals sometimes took me to be the 'resident expert', a depiction 
which occasionally led them to 'perform' for me. At other times, I was cast as an 
'independent' witness and used as a sounding board: either to listen to professionals' 
grievances within the team or about their high caseloads. In a similar way, my 
subjectivity as a black male of British nationality, played out in unexpected ways 
because my ethnicity was both visible and invisible in the research. 
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Operationalising ethnicity in fieldwork 
In both Kotoka and Y arlow, ethnic differences played out in unforeseen but revealing 
ways. At Y arlow, my ethnicity as a black man was visible. Positioning myself as 
Ghanaian I used my heritage as a reference point for questions and answers about 
culture. Besides, all of Abrax's carers were of Black African origin, a good starting 
place for building rapport. Furthermore, during fieldwork my questions about how 
people's ethnicity affected their work with Abrax were critically engaged with openly. 
There was also no palpable sense of unease among the professionals when the subject 
of ethnicity was discussed. Arguably, professionals in Yarlow relished the prospect of 
discussing their ethnicity. 
In contrast, professionals in Kotoka appeared uneasy about discussing 
ethnicity. As I have reported in Chapter Six, in Kotoka, professionals told me that 
they did not understand the concept of ethnicity or BME so, in the latter half of 
fieldwork, I asked about culture instead. But as a researcher, operationalising ethnicity 
as culture left me uneasy because, although the two concepts are inter-related, there 
are differences, in that the former captures a political and institutional phenomenon 
whereas the latter is more suitable for exploring everyday experiences. Furthermore, 
in my discussions with professionals I could perceive the disjuncture between 
academic and lay (everyday) understandings of ethnicity: as a researcher I thought of 
ethnicity as a fluid concept whereas my core participants in Kotoka spoke of it as if it 
were static. Another interesting reflection on my fieldwork was that, in Kotoka, I did 
not explicitly discuss participants' ethnic identities and instead, questions were 
framed around how the former contributed to their practice. In Yarlow, on the other 
300 
hand, I drew on insider perspectives to ask how Abrax's carers' culture impacted on 
their interpretation of his needs and hence the options that they presented to him. 
Yet my application of insider perspectives in discussions with Abrax's carers 
revealed our different subjectivities, shattering my illusions about our shared 
commonalities. As a result, I was able to engage with some of the dynamics of the 
insider/outsider debate I explored in my methodological discussions in Chapter Three: 
sometimes even where the researcher considers themselves to be an insider, research 
participants may identify markers of difference of 'them' and 'me.' In my case, the 
cultural capital accruing from my education was a point of differentiation. During one 
life story interview with a Ugandan care worker, Robert (previously an accountant), I 
asked him to talk about his initial experiences of life in the UK. Robert recounted that 
accounting firms in London would not accept his Ugandan qualification. Eventually 
Robert found employment as a residential worker in Cambridge but this involved 
many hours commuting between London and Cambridge. Using my apparent British 
accent as a marker of difference between us, he suggested that whereas I would be 
accepted in the UK because of my accent, he wouldn't because he still sounded like a 
Ugandan. The realisation that Robert perceived my accent as a point of difference 
between us fractured my sense of shared commonality between us, fellow Africans. 
Altogether my fieldwork experiences mirror the warnings about the possibilities of 
reifying ethnic categories and conflating ethnicity with culture in empirical research 
that I discussed in Part One of the literature review (Chapter Two). In the next section 
I propose a model based on aspects of relational sociology as a potential solution to 
the problems of reification and conflation in empirical research on social categories. 
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Part Three. Ethnicity, learning 
disability, and mental capacity: 
towards a relational model 
I argue in this section that one way to avoid conflation and reification of the three 
concepts central to my research is by operationalising them as relational concepts. My 
argument in this section is influenced primarily by 'Manifesto for Relational 
Sociology' (Emibayer, 1997). In relational sociology: 
The very terms or units involved in a transaction [or relation] derive their 
meaning, significance, and identify from the (changing) functional roles 
they play in that transaction. The latter, seen as a dynamic, unfolding 
process, becomes the primary unit of analysis rather than the constituent 
elements themselves. (Emibayer, 1997; p287). 
In the above conceptualisation, social categories - for example ethnicity, learning 
disability and mental capacity - are detectable from the outcomes of interactions 
within the networks that people inhabit. Social categories do not exist in and of 
themselves; instead, it is what people do and the choices that they make that produce 
outcomes identified as ethnic relations or learning disability or mental capacity. Thus 
culture is central to the discussion for two reasons. Culture symbolises agreed 
practices, shared meanings, social and moral frames of reference. Culture may also be 
seen as one of the mediums through which agency and structure interact: 'The relation 
between culture and structure [in relational sociology] is not one of a duality between 
two autonomous entities. Rather, culture and structure, language and relational ties are 
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fused within a socio-cultural setting.' (Miitzel, 2009; p875). Consequently a relational 
model for my research would not deny the existence of the MCA or learning 
disability, for instance, because being social categories emanating from government 
policies, the two concepts can be conceived of as structure. In this latter sense, the two 
are by John Searle's (1996) postulation 'ontologically real.' At the same time a 
relational model would escape any supposition that social categories are 
epistemologically 'real' or independent of human interpretations by drawing attention 
to situated meanings that arise within cultural contexts. Relational sociology implies 
that what is imposed at the macro level may not necessarily be actualised on the 
ground in peoples' lives. This is because people will exercise agency by reinterpreting 
statutorily defined classifications. In so doing people are influenced by their values 
and socially accepted norms. 
Because relational sociology stresses contextual networks rather than intrinsic 
qualities, it implies the need to clarify the relations that matter to individuals, as a way 
of making transparent the potentialities for the formation of social categories (Archer, 
2010). In the context of professionals in Kotoka, the institution of integrated learning 
disability matters in their construction of social categories primarily because their 
actions are circumscribed by law. In this regard, it is arguably the case that 
professionals are more likely to draw upon statutory classifications of ethnicity, 
learning disability, and mental capacity. With Abrax we may conceive of him 
inhabiting deep and wide social relations. The wide relationships are broadly speaking 
society. On the other hand are Abrax's deep social relations where he derives full 
meaning as a person. These deep relations involve his family and the private care 
company (including care workers), and it is here that he is likely to experience ethnic 
relations. How people in Abrax's deep social network live, and their conceptions of 
303 
their ethnic identities matter more to his everyday life than his occasional interactions 
with professionals from Kotoka, although they too make decisions with far-reaching 
implications for Abrax. 
By drawing on relational sociology one can argue that Abrax experiences 
ethnic relations notwithstanding that he does not communicate 'conventionally' and 
thus cannot self-identify. Abrax's network of carers who provide intimate help are all 
black men who, as I have demonstrated in Chapter Seven, do not call themselves 
British or Greek. Besides providing for his immediate needs Abrax's male carers, 
together with his family, also form his link to the external world. In interpreting his 
gestures and sounds people in his deep relations, such as family members and carers, 
arguably draw on their cultural frames of reference: 'Ethnic categories [or relations] 
shape institutional as well as informal cognition and recognition. They not only 
structure perception and interpretation in the ebb and flow of everyday interaction but 
channel conduct through official classifications and organisational routines.' 
(Brubaker, 2002; p184). For Abrax's carers who are not British, their work with him 
also influences their conceptions of their ethnic identity by opening up their 
consciousness to the British formalised way of providing care, and the everyday 
routines of a Greek extended family. Mirroring this, Abrax's ethnic identic is also 
impacted as he is introduced to non-European forms of socialisation and he is the 
target of actions drawn from his carers' interpretation of his needs through their (non-
European) cultural frames of reference. 
Through this transactional model, the discussion to date suggests that a 
relational approach provides potentially more useful conceptual tools to operationalise 
ethnicity (and social categories) in my research. Importantly, by drawing attention to 
context I avoid reification because a relational framework accommodates new 
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categories from each encounter between professionals and service users. In eschewing 
reification of ethnicity specifically, I also avoid a cause-and-effect analysis whereby 
culture is seen simplistically as the driver of decision-making between Abrax and his 
deep networks or between professionals in general. Rather, in the relational model, 
research participants draw on ethnic relations in particular circumstances when 
decisions have to be made or when specific encounters lead them to (re)negotiate their 
ethnic frameworks of reference as a way of arri ving at decisions. 
Furthermore, because the relational model suggests negotiation and 
contestation it draws attention to power in ethnic identity formation: 'Far from being 
an attribute or property of actors, then, power is unthinkable outside matrices of force 
relations; it emerges out of the very way in which figurations of relationships [ ... ] are 
patterned and operate' (Emirbayer, 1997; p292). In the relational model all 
participants have power to affect the encounter (albeit it in different dimensions); as 
such, service users are not passive bearers of social categories, and through their 
actions they challenge classifications. Consequently service users' agency and 
subjectivity is notionally preserved and respected. A case in point is Dwayne, who I 
discussed in Chapter Six. Dwayne challenged his categorisation of mental health by 
psychiatrists by requesting a hearing at the Mental Health Tribunal against his 
sectioning. Furthermore through his actions, Dwayne resisted any attempts by 
professionals to categorise him as learning disabled or mentally (in)capable because 
he demonstrated clearly that he could choose. 
Due to the constant re-figuration of relationships which arise from the 
contestation of power, a person's lived experience of social categories is in regular 
flux and is unstable (even if official classifications are static) because different spatio-
temporal contexts require different negotiations and different outcomes. The further 
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implication of the above discussion is that everyone present at a given social 
gathering, where ethnic relations specifically are manifested, becomes affected by the 
encounter. Being the researcher I am part of the social relations through which 
ethnicity is constituted. Therefore, on the occasions that I observed Abrax or 
discussed culture with professionals in Kotoka, I interrogated my own ethnic identity 
through seeing new ethnic relations lived and demonstrated. In fieldwork, the 
questions that I asked participants about their culture, their thinking processes about 
the questions, and their thinking aloud about what they perceive their culture to be, 
similarly shaped them and me. Sometimes in answering my questions, participants 
have asked me about my culture presenting me with an opportunity to talk about my 
culture, which I may not have had. Therefore in fieldwork I have caused people to 
construct their ethnicity, and in so doing I have constructed mine (Andrade, 2000). 
Even in analysing the data I am the one who identified the markers of ethnicity, and 
argued through textual representation that those signs constituted ethnicity (Chaitin et 
aI, 2009). The theoretical implication of this section is that the relational approach 
combines researcher identification and participant self-identification In 
operationalising ethnicity, which is arguably a more robust analytical framework. 
Conclusion 
In the preceding discussion I have reflected on the ethics and methodological impact 
of peoples' identities on my thesis. Abrax elicited ethical concerns before the research 
because being a learning disability service user, there were doubts around Abrax's 
mental capacity to consent, and whether he would be susceptible to coercion during 
fieldwork. Although I assessed Abrax as unable to understand my research, in 
fieldwork, he continuously surprised me with his level of understanding: often he 
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demonstrated a grasp of concepts which I considered complex but on other occasions 
he seemed unaware of some routine aspects of his life. Adopting an ethically robust 
position I always asked Abrax for his consent to observe him whenever I visited. An 
important ethical lesson I have gained from my experience with Abrax is that 
researchers should consider assessments of peoples' capacity to consent to participate 
in research as distinct from participants' understandings of their everyday lives. 
Moreover researchers should ensure a degree of social distance because they may not 
be able ascertain what research participants conceive of the social context of their 
engagement. This latter point especially applies in ethnographic research where the 
researcher becomes a part of participants' lives and their social networks. Given that 
the title 'researcher' is sometimes accepted as a mark of impartiality; one could easily 
gamer trust and expectations which both may be unmet or abused. In my case, Abrax 
seemed unhappy whenever I rescheduled my visits leading me to wonder where he 
saw me as a researcher, friend, or professional. 
Personally, in one sense, I was an 'insider' because as a social worker, PhD 
researcher, and a black man, I was engaged in fieldwork exploring ethnicity within 
statutory social services. I have shown in this chapter that my insider status played out 
in unexpected ways. If the benefits of being an insider include rapport building and 
acceptance by the group, then my experience in Kotoka suggests that achieving that 
status in fieldwork may not always be on the terms envisaged by the researcher. As 
such being an insider may not always hold methodological advantages. Furthermore 
the group involved in the research may position the researcher differently depending 
on the topic of discussion. For instance during my time in Yarlow, I consciously drew 
on my life experiences as a Ghanaian, firstly to build rapport, and secondly, to probe 
how the support workers' culture played out in their work with Abrax. Sometimes the 
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support workers granted me insider status such as when we talked about the 
experience of living in the UK as an African. However when we discussed their 
employment experiences of low-wages, their feelings of being over-qualified for their 
roles and powerless vis-a-vis their employer, they positioned me as an outsider. This 
is because in their view I enjoyed relatively more cultural capital from my status as a 
British citizen and high educational attainment. Thus insider status or a researcher's 
identity plays a multi-dimensional role in research. Researchers should reflect on 
whether they are actively seeking insider status or deploying their identities 
methodologically; what roles they are being ascribed or are seeking in the social 
relations of research. as well as the ethical implications of these positions. 
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CHAPTER NINE. CONCLUDING MY 
THESIS 
In this thesis I have empirically examined how the social categories ethnicity, learning 
disability, and mental capacity are operationalised within statutory services, and how 
they manifest in the everyday life of a service user. Influenced by social 
constructionism, I firstly examined how professionals in Kotoka understood and 
articulated these social categories as they discharged their duties under the MCA. 
Then adopting a case study approach to gain breadth of understanding, I explored the 
embodiment of social categories in Abrax' s life, and how his life story affirmed or 
refuted current understandings of these three social classifications. 
My research interests arose out of an intellectual curiosity, professional and 
personal experiences, to think differently from current understandings of mental 
capacity, ethnicity, and learning disability. Currently the dominant understanding of 
mental capacity is that of a cognitive process underpinned by the conception of a 
rational individual whose autonomy needs to be protected or enhanced. It is also 
assumed that mental capacity can be assessed 'objectively' based on assessors' ratings 
of a person's understanding of the decision that they are being asked to make, whether 
they 'can retain, use and weigh up the information' (MCA Code of Practice, 2007) 
aligned to the task at hand at the time required; and finally, whether they can 
communicate the information. As evidenced by my literature review in Chapter Two, 
at present, very little is known about how the MCA's indicators of mental capacity 
operate on the ground although there is an increasing body of literature and case law. 
Moreover, while the definition of mental capacity in the MCA is drawn from 
medicine, law, and philosophy, careful cross-cultural anthropological work suggests 
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that in some societies, there is less emphasis on individualism (Bekker at aI, 1999; 
Garro, 1998; White, 1998). Thus in some cultures families are an intrinsic part of 
decision-making, thereby drawing attention to the explanatory power of relational 
sociology as an alternative conception of mental capacity (as I outlined in the 
preceding chapter). With regards to research on ethnicity, in response to the 
postmodernist challenge, it is now accepted that ethnic classifications are neither 
static nor necessarily genetic. Given this consensus, the current methodological and 
substantive agenda is aimed at capturing the fluidity of ethnic categories in research 
design, as well as responding to the need to evidence how ethnic classifications 
contribute to inequality (Mir et aI, 2012). Keeping to statutory services, since the post-
war period, integration of services has been the longstanding aim of poJicymakers 
(Wistow, 2012), yet there is little empirical research on professional practice within 
integrated learning disability teams and how these affect the realisation of policy 
aims. I have responded to these latterly cited challenges in my thesis through my 
adoption of ethnography, and my fieldwork choice of statutory services - 'sites of 
power' - (Rose, 1996) - where categorisations and resource a11ocation occur. 
I chose ethnography because of methodological flexibility and its fit with my 
paradigmatic affiliations to induction and social constructionism. As I demonstrated 
in the literature review chapter, the MeA is a complex piece of legislation and 
substantive research agendas are still emerging; consequently, I wanted a 
methodology which would orientate my fieldwork towards what seemed salient to 
research participants. Epistemologically, I was interested in the localised meanings 
that research participants and their social networks adopted with respect to the three 
social categories, and the practices that sustained these understandings. Thus 
epistemologically and methodo}ogica11y, my research is an innovative addition to the 
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mental capacity literature, which often is drawn to quantitative methods, and is 
epistemologically inclined towards realism. My methodological approach has enabled 
me to uncover some new understandings in the operationalisation of the MeA. In my 
data analyses (Chapters Six - Eight), adopting thick description, I have presented 
detailed data on organisational context as well as the emotions and intentions of 
research participants (Ponterotto, 2006). Whereas the MCA assumes that mental 
capacity can be assessed 'objectively' my empirical research shows that contextual 
factors impact on whether professionals will assess capacity in the first place. 
Addressing research questions 
I set out to address five questions in my thesis: 
1. In terms of the internal composition of an integrated learning disability service 
and how its structure impacts on the discharge of duties under the MeA; who 
makes decisions about which duties to discharge? 
2. The literature review showed that risk is a prime concern of statutory services: 
how does this relate to the MeA? What understandings of risk are propagated 
by professionals and service users? 
3. How do professionals articulate the concept of ethnicity and how does this 
shape their practice decisions? 
4. From service users' viewpoints, what are the impacts of professional 
decisions-making arising from their conception of ethnicity? 
5. Lastly, how are all these substantive concerns manifested 10 the lives of 
service users? 
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Question 1 above is principally about the impact of context. Kotoka may be seen as a 
more complicated context than Yarlow. At the time of my fieldwork there appeared to 
be three distinct policies being implemented: safeguarding, personalisation, and the 
MCA. Implementing personalisation and safeguarding policies seemed to be the 
organisational imperatives but the MCA underpinned these policies both formally and 
informally (as I showed in Chapter Five with my description of the work of the PCP 
Coordinator). Thus, in contrast to the informal work processes that I described in 
Chapter Five, there were formalised procedures around personalisation and 
safeguarding referrals. Each had identifiable personnel. As I have described in 
Chapters Five and Six, the administrator for personalisation sat opposite the head of 
social work on the first floor and the Safeguarding Team were in charge of 
safeguarding policy. Besides discharging multiple duties under different strands of 
legislation, professionals in Kotoka were also engaged in delineating their roles vis-a-
vis the wider local authority. By contrast, as I have described in Chapter Seven, care 
workers at Abrax's home in Yarlow saw their primary aim as promoting Abrax's 
choice. 
Apart from organisational policy imperatives, another important contextual 
difference between Kotoka and Yarlow was in their respective hierarchical structures, 
and consequently, how power was manifested. In Abrax's home (Yarlow) all the 
professionals had the same rank as care workers and all of them were black. Although 
the care workers claimed that Abrax made his own decisions, I observed that they had 
subtle ways of enforcing their wishes. Sometimes they even forced him to eat against 
his will. In Kotoka, by contrast, there were different levels of seniority. Furthermore, 
although I did not observe any conflict between the different professions, those from 
'health' seemed on top of the hierarchy. Also, as I have shown in Chapters Five and 
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Six, within certain spaces and around specific issues some key individuals' VIews 
dominated. Thus in CCp23 for instance three white men drawn from 'health', in more 
senior positions tended to direct discussions about risks including how the 
organisation should handle service users' consent to any proposed care packages. In 
this way, gender and ethnicity linked into organisational hierarchy and power as key 
dimensions of context in the operationalisation of mental capacity. 
With regards to risk (question 2), safeguarding issues arose from 
professionals' notion of risks. Issues of risk included the following: mental health, 
'vulnerability', sexual practices, domestic violence, 'organisational' issues whereby a 
service user reported that a member of staff behaved in a way that has put them at 
risk, financial or physical abuse. Sometimes professionals constructed risk and this 
was different from a safeguarding episode because the latter was a more formal 
process with set statutory procedures and accompanying timescales. Professionals 
also reconceptualised safeguarding into whether the issue was of such a nature as to 
be dealt by the police or by another team within the local authority. In safeguarding, 
capacity assessments were conducted to determine whether the service user 
understood the safeguarding process, or whether they understood the nature of the 
risks to which they were exposing themselves. Where service users were found to 
have capacity, this presented particular difficulties for the service because it threw 
professionals sharply into the care/control dilemma which statutory services face. If 
service users demonstrated capacity, then practitioners evaluated the quality of their 
decisions. Thus, even if service users showed mental capacity, practitioners (and 
families) assessed whether they engaged in 'risky' behaviour such as sexual 
promiscuity. Thus in practice, faced with a statutory duty to 'protect' service users, 
23 Complex Cases Panel 
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professionals could not adhere to the MeA's 'unwise decision' principle. 
Consequently with Safeguarding Adults, where service users manifested capacity, 
professionals sometimes conceptualised their duties as 'policing risk exposure'. 
Through questions 3 and 4, broadly, I explored how street level bureaucrats' 
decisions were affected by their ethnic identities or the classifications that they 
assigned to service users. In the various empirical chapters, I showed that in the main, 
professionals struggled to articulate the concept of ethnicity, at least in a way that 
satisfactorily reflected the meanings of ethnicity propagated by sociologists. Instead 
most professionals took ethnicity to mean culture, and this was also the case with 
Abrax's carers. I have also presented data in the thesis which evidences that culture 
was operationalised as the property of the Other. For social work, which is committed 
to anti-oppressive practice, the finding of my thesis that there was a close relationship 
between ethnic identification and risk categorisation is a challenge to the value base 
of the profession. I witnessed on my research site in the integrated team that the most 
'complex' cases tended to involve people described as ethnic minorities. 
Abrax's life story, which I narrated in Chapter Six as a response to research 
question 5, highlights the confluence of structure and agency in the embodiment of 
social categories. At primary school Abrax acquired the classification 'learning 
disability' through the education system at his parents' request. Although the 
prevailing view is that learning disability is a diagnostic category, embodied usually 
at birth (DOH, 2001), and identified by doctors (NHS Choices, 2013), it is instructive 
that Abrax's condition had not been medically identified notwithstanding his regular 
examination at GOSH. Abrax's life may also be said to show that context matters in 
the manifestation and operationalisation of social categories. In Yarlow ethnicity was 
a lived classification: care workers cooked Greek food for Abrax, Abrax's family 
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visited regularly and spoke to him in Greek, and he was immersed in Greek traditions 
such as celebrating the birthday of the saint he was named after. Furthermore whilst 
Abrax's carers told me that he could make his own decisions, he had not been 
assessed under the MeA. Moreover when his care workers made decisions for him, 
they assumed that they were doing so in his 'best interest.' In this way, it may be 
argued that Abrax' s life in Yarlow shows that in routine social relations people make 
decisions for each other on the underlying assumption that best interests have been 
taken into account. The MeA formalised this supposition of everyday interaction; in 
statutory contexts professionals are now mandated to engage in the procedural action 
of eliciting best interest. In effect the MeA requires professionals to act differently 
from how they are socialised. 
The one question that I could not fully address in my fieldwork was whether 
the MeA was implemented wholly or discretely. This suggests the methodological 
limitation of my study. In my fieldwork, taking inspiration from some of the 
ethnography literature, I did not have any prior questions. Instead, I orientated my 
research as I became familiar with the fieldwork site and pertinent issues. This was 
advantageous in one sense because it allowed me to gain understanding of 
complexity. Yet this was also a drawback given that I was a PhD student without 
unlimited time to conduct fieldwork. As it happened, the MeA was complex, with 
several strands straddling different departments and teams within the local authority. 
In future research on the MeA, whether a deductive or inductive approach is taken 
(for example, grounded theory) researchers would need to pilot the study site to 
understand the context better, and concomitantly how best the research questions 
could be addressed. 
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My thesis has contributed significant knowledge in my substantive areas. On the 
sociology literature on ethnicity, I have provided further evidence on how social 
categorisations impact on the distribution of State resources. With respect to learning 
disability, theoretically and empirically, I have also generated new understandings of 
how agencies respond to people classified as learning disabled. Finally, with mental 
capacity, there have been very few sociological writings on the subject therefore my 
thesis charts a new research agenda. As I have demonstrated in the preceding 
chapters, the current research agenda in mental capacity aims to evidence decision-
making capacity in categories of people - for example, older people, people with 
mental health issues, and learning disabled people. But few of these studies pay 
attention to context. However, as I have shown in my thesis, institutional 
configuration matters, because it determines how statutory duties are met and who has 
power to do what. Besides, the life experiences and values of assessors are significant: 
for instance some professionals may consider sexual relations as akin to morality and 
would thus operationalise a high threshold of mental capacity. If context is a key 
dimension of how the MeA is operationalised, then my thesis charts a new research 
agenda. By employing qualitative methodology I have shown convincingly that 
whether formally or informally, mental capacity assessments involve complex 
interactions of life history, professional knowledge, institutional arrangements, 
culture, and emotion. 
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